

THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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The Gathering of the Nations

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The Growth of Education—The Transfer of Government to the Crown—The Beginnings of Congress—The Emergence of Anarchism—The Morley-Minto Reforms—The Effects of the Great War—The Goal of British Policy—Conflicting Standpoints—The Necessity of Union and Co-operation

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
The Republican Movement in South Africa

New Zealand:

Ministers and the War Conference—The Third War Budget—Progress of Compulsory Service

DECEMBER · MCMXVII Price 2/6 N° 29

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NOTE

THE ROUND TABLE is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in all parts of the British Empire, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of Imperial politics, entirely free from the bias of local party issues. The affairs of THE ROUND TABLE in each portion of the Empire are in the hands of local residents who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way THE ROUND TABLE will reflect the current opinions of all parts about Imperial problems, and at the same time present a survey of them as a whole. Opinions and articles of a party character will be rigidly excluded.

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THE GATHERING OF THE NATIONS

I. THE YEAR 1917

LOOKED at from the military point of view the year 1917 has been a serious disappointment to the Allies. At its outset they were confident that the great converging attack on the Central Powers for which they had prepared would deal a deadly blow at the enemy organisation, if it did not destroy it altogether. Yet at the end of the year the Germanic Alliance is able to point not only to a resistance to the Allies on every front, which is still quite unbroken, but to the capture of Riga and various Islands of great naval importance to Russia, and to the successful initiation of an offensive in the South which has already resulted in the complete destruction of the long and carefully elaborated defences of the Italian frontier, and which clearly has for its object the elimination of Italy as an effective military power. That this should be so is, of course, mainly attributable to the military collapse of Russia. If Russia had been able to take any effective part in the offensive this year there would have been a very different tale to tell. None the less, from a superficial view the military situation of the Allies is not very good. Russia for the moment is militarily impotent. Italy is in full retreat, having lost a considerable fraction of her army and an immense number of guns. America is not likely to be able to bring decisive offensive force to bear upon the battle front for a considerable time. France has borne the burden of the war so long that the brunt of the fighting is falling more and

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more on British troops, and the British army, largely in consequence, is now dispersed over every theatre of war. It is easy to contend in fact that if there is no weakening during this winter on the side of the Central Powers, and no regeneration on the side of the Allies, we shall be faced with something very like a stalemate in 1918. The argument that we have reached a stalemate is, indeed, the card which the enemy propagandists are most hopefully playing. By concentrating attention on the surface aspects of the military war map, by pushing into the background the political and economic as well as the profounder military aspects of the war situation as a whole, they hope to produce discouragement and weakness out of which to win a compromise peace.

This view of the situation, however, ignores the possibility that the forthcoming winter may see the military efficiency of Russia largely restored. It ignores also the significant victories in Palestine and Mesopotamia which may well mean the beginning of the break up of the allies of Germany on whose support her power and hopes now increasingly depend. It ignores too the tremendous effect which the various allied offensives and especially the steady hammer-strokes of the armies under the command of Sir Douglas Haig have had upon the German people. The heavy losses, the almost unendurable sufferings of their armies on the Western front, the unfailing regularity with which they have been driven out of one supposedly impregnable position after another by troops which a year or two ago they affected to despise, have told heavily on German confidence and German staying power. They have not succeeded in breaking down the enemy military organisation or the resisting power of his army. But they have contributed enormously to the almost overwhelming demand for peace before another fighting season begins which is now the gravest menace to the enemy morale.

Further, if we look at the map from a broader standpoint, the results of the year have been uniformly good.

The Year 1917

First of all there has been the Russian Revolution. For the moment the immense advantages which have followed from it in the political sphere are apt to be forgotten amid the more obvious disasters it has entailed for our military plans. But to all those who see that this war is a war for liberty, for the advance of civilisation upon the lines of democracy and the reign of law, instead of under the lowering domination of an absolutist autocracy, the Russian Revolution must always stand as the first of the great victories of the Allied Cause. Despite the fatuous speechifying of the Soviets, the organised anarchism of the Bolsheviki, and the military paralysis which seems to have settled on Russia as the fever of the Revolution has burned low, Russia to-day is fundamentally more healthy than she was a year ago, and in a position to do more for freedom than she could ever have done under the rule of Nicholas II. Nothing could have been worse than the direction of Russian policy by that noisome camarilla of traitors, maniacs and sensualists associated with the names of Stuermer, Protopoff and Rasputin who enjoyed supreme power at the beginning of the year, and whose chief object was to save their own positions by coming to terms with the German autocracy and betraying Russia and her Allies to their foe. The Russian people are now released from the blinding influence of despotism and free to move on lines of their own choosing. And even though constructive results seem slow in appearing, so far as the war is concerned, it can only be a question of time before the reign of law is once more restored and Russia begins to emerge from the ruins of the *ancien régime* as one of the great liberal Powers of the world. As Viscount Grey has recently written: "A free Russia is a splendid increase of freedom in the world, and whatever the immediate and passing effect upon the progress of the war the future effect upon democracy in Europe and upon international relations generally must be most favourable, and of incalculable value and benefit."

But the Russian revolution had a consequence of direct

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military benefit to the Allies. Had it not been for the Revolution it is doubtful if the United States would have entered the war with the promptitude and whole-hearted enthusiasm which she has now done. For the American the war is primarily a war for the principles of democratic civilisation. President Wilson crystallised the sentiments of his countrymen in the enduring phrase, "The world must be safe for Democracy." The overthrow of Tzarism removed the last shadow of doubt as to what the war was about. So long as Russia was governed by the degraded sycophants of an absolutist court it was inevitable that those at a distance from the conflict should be tempted to cling to the ease of neutrality on the ground that there was no clear issue of principle between the two sides. The revolution in Russia revealed the war as a world-wide struggle between a free civilisation and the Kultur of militarism. And it was promptly followed by the entry into the war of the greatest of the free nations, unequalled in its wealth, its population and its industrial equipment, not on a limited issue, but with an identification with the idealist aims of the Allies which would otherwise have been impossible. If the Russian Revolution had had no other result than to bring into the war a people inspired by the ideals and enduring fortitude of Washington and Lincoln, to take the place of a nation struggling in "a new birth of freedom," it would still have been a gain.

Two other changes must be recorded. The Greeks have been definitely won for the Allies. So long as Constantine was on the throne there was grave danger that Greece might be thrown into the conflict on the side of Germanism by its King, just as Bulgaria was by Ferdinand. Not only would this have meant that the whole Balkan peninsula was handed over to despotism and embodied in the German Empire of Mittel-Europa, but that the Allied forces at Salonika might have been driven into the sea and the coasts and harbours of Greece made the bases of a fleet of submarines which must have rendered the Mediterranean

The Year 1917

almost impassable for the Allies. The Salonika force, supplemented by the army which the enthusiastic energy of M. Venizelos is preparing, may yet play a vital part in the war for freedom.

Finally there is the significant rallying of the neutrals to the Allied cause. One by one all the nations not actually open to German attack have either broken off relations with Germany or declared war against her. The whole of Asia, save Persia, the whole of Africa, except Abyssinia, the vast majority of the States of North and South America are now definitely on the Allied side. Though their adhesion may not have important military results, it gives the Allies much valuable shipping, and creates an economic war map which, in the long run, will be far more important than the military war map. The control of practically all the great overseas markets of foodstuffs and raw materials is now in the hands of those who have declared against Prussian Kultur. The economic weapon is not a post-war weapon. Once a true peace has been signed, there must be peace in the economic sphere no less than the military sphere if we are not to prepare for a new war. It is rather a war weapon of tremendous power. If the Allies and their associates stand firm they can compel the Germans to come to terms, whatever the military map may be, for it will only be by their leave and with their assistance that the people of Germany and her Allies can escape from the privations and economic sufferings which week by week are increasing their demand for an immediate peace.

Looking, therefore, at the year as a whole there is good ground for quiet confidence. Month by month mankind has declared more and more emphatically for the Allied cause and against German Kultur. A moral map of the world shows that only the territory dominated by Berlin stands out for militarism and autocracy. Indeed, the only support the Germans have got left is the militarism of Prussia itself. Everything else is gone. They

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have thrown humanity to the winds. They have cast honour in the dust. They have made enemies of the human race. They do not trust to themselves. Neither do they believe in the debates of the Reichstag nor in the civilian Chancellors who come and go without affecting the war situation by a fraction of an inch. The allegiance of the German people to-day is to the Moloch of war, to the Great General Staff, and the intrigues it can generate in other lands, and to nothing else. And, despite all its victories, their confidence is coming increasingly to rest, not so much on the impossible dream that they can gain a military victory over the whole world as that the military machine will save them something out of the wreck because the Allies will fail to maintain the unity and endurance which are necessary if its fatal domination is to be destroyed.

That is the present situation of the war. The issue before us is, therefore, essentially a moral issue. Have we the clear-sightedness to see how immensely preponderant are the forces on the Allied side, the understanding that to compromise with iniquity is death, the unfaltering faith that right must triumph if we endure to the end, which will give us certain and complete victory? In order to fortify ourselves in our answer let us examine once more in the light of the experience of the last three years what is at stake in the war.

II. THE STAND AT ARMAGEDDON

EVERY month that has passed since August, 1914, has brought into higher relief the irreconcilable antagonism between the two systems which are represented by the German combination on the one side and the Entente peoples on the other. It is ever becoming clearer that it is not a war of race against race, or state against state, or the German people *versus* the French or the British, but between the claims of two incompatible ideals on the minds of men.

The Stand at Armageddon

The Prussian Kultur is irredeemably materialist. Its desire for domination is insatiable. Its standards of value are wealth, and commercial organisation, and power as evidenced by disciplined armies and countless weapons of war, wherewith to impose its will on others. So-called idealism it fosters, but only in the sphere of theory and speculation. According to its code morality must never be allowed to interfere with the real business of conquest in trade or politics. When it comes to practical life it denies that man is a free moral agent in the political sphere. The decisions must be taken for him. Obedience to authority concentrated in the hands of the Kaiser and his chosen advisers is therefore Prussia's iron rule, and *lèse-majesté* Prussia's unpardonable sin. The logical outcome, therefore, of Prussian Kultur is the enslavement of a whole people in a relentless military machine for the supreme purpose of subjugating other peoples to its rule through the agency of war.

Few Germans can have realised all that was implicit in their own Kultur before the war. Left to themselves, the German people have been a homely and humane race, incurably docile to authority, it is true, but peaceful and good-natured. The vast majority can never have suspected the abominations which they were about to be driven to commit by the orders of their rulers and the relentlessness of the creed they professed. That creed has driven them to deny one by one every virtue which humanity has held high. It has taught that other peoples were not neighbours with whom it should be the aim of statesmanship to live in peace, but rivals and enemies who must sooner or later conquer or be conquered. From this premise it has taught that acquiescence in that combination of autocracy and conscription which handed a whole people bound hand and foot to the caprices of a military caste, and which is the foundation stone of the Prussian State, was essential to national safety. Then it went on to justify treachery and violence as the first principles of international

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conduct, doctrines practised and acclaimed by Bismarck and Frederick the Great. The success which Europe allowed these methods to have in 1864, 1866, and 1870 confirmed their hold on the German people. Filled with pride in their own militaristic civilisation, their chief energy has since been bent towards preparation for the next war. In 1887 Bismarck screwed the system of conscription up to the utmost limit compatible with the development of the industrial aspect of German national life. This was followed by the ceaseless expansion of the German Navy. As under the strain of this perpetual expansion of armaments the war-cloud grew, every resource of civilisation was harnessed in the service of destruction. The point of view from which those who really controlled the policy of Germany looked at the advance of the sciences may be seen from this quotation from the well-known book by General Bernhardi, published before the war: "The state is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority." So, finally, Germany became an armed camp standing ready for instant war, in a world dreaming of peace.

But the worst consequence of this militarist Kultur has been the moral depravity which it has brought in its train. We have been so frequently shocked by the revelation of fresh horrors that we have almost lost sight of their abomination. Pacific professions and diplomatic courtesies were found to have covered elaborate preparations for war far within the territory of nominally friendly neighbours. The main business of official propaganda has been to sow dissension among all the races of the earth, to corrupt the ignorant, to organise outrage and revolt. Treaties have been regarded as useful cover behind which to prepare for sudden war. Every law and instinct of humanity has been progressively violated. The initiative

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in every fresh horror added to the conduct of war has come from Germany, until the modern battlefield is a hell of which the imagination of man could not have conceived five years ago. Frightfulness, especially against the innocent and weak, has become a primary weapon in the German armoury. Compassionate consideration has been regarded as weakness and treason, because it might lessen the terror on which Germany's hopes of domination were based.

It is not only against their enemies that the gospel of militarism has been invoked. The poison gas, the liquid fire, the sinking of passengers, the bombing of open towns, have had their counterpart in the terrible demands which the Prussian machine makes upon its own subjects. Not only are they sent to slaughter by the million or driven to work as slaves in the mines and factories at home under threat of machine gun fire from their own fellows, but the Kultur in which they believe has begun to trench upon the most sacred provinces of human life. The ruthless logic which would convert human corpses into the materials with which to lubricate the vast engine of war is justified with pride by the apostles of Prussian Kultur. Professors of this same Kultur are now endeavouring to substitute the commands of state authority for the covenant of matrimony as sanctioned by the civilised world. And as a final iniquity they have succeeded in challenging that foundation of human society, the loving relations of parents and children, by organising boys, trained in a fanatical loyalty to the Emperor, as Jugendwehr, and taught to shoot down their own parents and brothers and sisters when they begin to riot for bread or for peace.

It would be difficult to conceive of any diabolism of the human mind which has not been enlisted to subserve the ends of this machine which dominates Germany and her Allies. Never in history has there been a more sinister or more world-embracing conspiracy against human morality and freedom. The full realisation of the iniquity which goes by the name of Prussian militarism is only

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beginning even now to come home to the rest of the world. Before the war the Allied peoples were blind to much of it because they shared in some degree the vices which have made the Germans the prey to Prussianism. The fact that they were politically free, and had long been conscious of the evils of a military imperialism, enabled them to resist even at cost of war the repeated attempts of Germany in 1905, 1909, 1911, and 1914 to dragoon and cajole them into subservience to its will. But their pursuit of comfort, their love of money, their indifference to what happened to the rest of the world provided they themselves were left alone to follow their own selfish ends, blinded them to the full nature of the Prussian menace and prevented them from preparing adequately against it. It has been the sacrifices of the war itself in the trenches, in the munition shops, and in the countless sorrowing homes throughout the land, which have opened people's eyes to the true nature of the conflict. They now realise, to quote Viscount Grey again, "that this terrible war is a desperate and critical struggle against something evil and intensely dangerous to moral law, to international good faith, to everything that is essential if different nations are to live together in the world in equal freedom and friendship."

The Allies to-day are fighting that honour may rule in the relations of nations, that treaties may be sacred, that brotherhood and co-operation may take the place of jealousy and rivalry, that the reign of law may supplant the balance of power, that the strong may be guided by the sense of responsibility for the backward and not by the lust for domination and power, that the true liberty which comes from unselfish social service and faithful obedience to the principle of right and justice may prevail over militarism and autocracy in the affairs of men. This is the ideal which is coming to inspire the armies and peoples of the Allies. It finds expression in the common saying that this is a war against war, that the job must be done once and for all, that there must be no premature peace

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and no next time, that compromise with Prussianism is impossible, that it is a case of victory or downfall for all we hold most dear. Amid the roar of guns and the lathes, the mud of the trenches and the monotonous toil of the offices, it is not easy to see all this clearly. Nor is it possible to discern the new lines on which society, national and international, will be constituted. But the conviction is daily gaining ground that this is truly Armageddon, a world-wide struggle for the triumph of light over darkness, and that no new order is possible until the infamous and inhuman miasma of hatred and brutality and fear, which is Prussianism, is exorcised once and for all.

III. THE BIRTH OF A NEW WORLD

IT is not possible to say when victory will be won. Its outward and visible sign will be a treaty of peace, dictated not in accordance with the decisions of the sword, but by the unchanging verdict of right and liberty—a settlement which will contain no seeds of fresh wars, as did the peace of 1870, because it will restore all the invaded peoples of Europe to independence, will liberate and unite oppressed nationalities everywhere, and so create the foundations upon which a new international order can be reared. Such a peace is not in sight yet. The same men and the same caste that plotted the war and have planned its execution are still in power in the capitals of the Central Powers, and they know that the system whereby they live can only survive if they are able to show that it is not justice but the sword which has drawn the new map of the world. For all their eloquent protestations about universal peace and disarmament they are no more ready to give practical effect to-day to the abstractions they profess than they were ready to abide by the treaties and international laws which they signed before the war. Nor will they change until

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the people of Germany or their Allies awake to the evil by which they have been enslaved. When that awakening will take place none can tell. It may come from the military triumph of the Allies. It may come, as the Russian Revolution came, from a blind revolt against the intolerable infamies and sufferings imposed on them by the Prussian machine. But, however the end may come, victory cannot follow from a compromise with Prussianism itself. Liberty and absolutism can no longer live side by side. One or the other must triumph, root and branch.

In the forthcoming winter, however, the most important conflict may well be not in the trenches but in the hearts and consciences of the individual. The enemy is fighting us quite as much behind as in front of his lines. We are entering the final testing time when only a clear grasp of principle and an unbending resolution that the world shall be saved for freedom will carry us through. It is well, therefore, to examine briefly the insidious arguments whereby our clear vision of the issues at stake may be impaired and our courage sapped.

There is, first of all, the pacifist argument. Fortunately there are few true pacifists left, at any rate in the British Commonwealth. The majority are people who, through a literal interpretation of the Bible or an inability to rise above a purely material valuation of life, believe that war, with its suffering and bloodshed and death roll, is the greatest of evils, and who persuade themselves either that Germanism is not the evil which it seems or that in some way which they cannot explain liberty will triumph if only hostilities are stopped. The out and out pacifist has usually no real understanding of what liberty means. For all his professions he would take the risk of leaving the small nations of Europe under the tyrants' heel and the stronghold of militarism untouched. He would "condone" all the iniquities of the machine, from the ravishing of Belgium to the massacre of the

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Armenians. He would welcome peace even if it meant a reversion to a state of society which is in fundamentals the same as that out of which the war itself came. He cannot see that now is the appointed time for winning liberty and peace. Nor can he appreciate the immeasurable superiority of the warrior in the trenches, who has sacrificed everything for a spiritual ideal, to the "man of peace" at home, who spends his life in pursuit of excitement, pleasure, or ease, or the wordy propagation of some fanciful creed of his own. He cannot see that the war itself is the birth-throes of that new world of which he himself dreams, in which the devilries which make peace impossible will be overcome, and freedom and justice and honesty, the conditions of peace, are secured.

The second quarter from which the attack may come from behind the lines is from among those who are so preoccupied with ideals of their own, ideals social, economic and political, that they have lost sight of the fact that their own dreams can be made real only through victory, and that victory will, in fact, bring them in its train. The social system in the British Isles, the capitalist system throughout the world, is badly in need of reconstruction. There must be a greater equalisation of status, of wealth, and of opportunity. There must be an end made of the system whereby wages are determined mainly by competition, whereby those who inherit wealth and have only lent it for industrial purposes have the right to unlimited profit from the harder work or better methods of others. Capital is entitled to legitimate reward for the risks it takes and the enterprise it shows. But it ought not to carry with it unlimited power and the right to idleness. Every citizen ought to do a full day's work for a fair day's wage, and public spirit ought to supplant private profit as the motive power from one end of the national activity to the other. But these beneficent changes cannot be introduced by a stroke of the pen. Not only will they be impossible if the Prussian military caste still rules over Mittel-Europa, and condemns

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all nations to a new rivalry in armaments as a prelude to a new war, they will come about only as the outcome of a real change of heart in all classes, and it is in the struggle for liberty in Europe that the spirit which will change the heart of society is being born. In the international sphere lasting peace will not result from the mere mechanism of arbitration or of a League of Nations, but from a substitution of the friendly desire to work for humanity for the national rivalries of the past. So in industry, it will not be from the panaceas of the advocates of the class war or the introduction of the bureaucratic paraphernalia of the socialist state that industrial peace will come, but from a change whereby rich and poor, capitalist and labour, cease to regard inordinate wealth and having no work to do as the conditions of happiness, but agree that the first duty of industry is to provide adequately for the needs of all, and that throughout industry happiness and affluence will only come from perfect work and perfect service by all. Does anyone believe that any heaven could be made out of the jealous hatreds and bitter controversies which dominated the industrial world before the war? Is it not obvious that the spirit which will transform our national life is the spirit which took men out of these conditions into the battle, and which has enabled them to find peace and contentment in greater measure than they had ever done before, though sacrificing everything that the world had to offer, at duty's call? It is out of the war, and out of victory for our cause alone, that the real reconstruction of our society will spring. The dreamers of social reform who regard the war as an interference with their hopes are not unlike the pacifists. Their real panacea for social ills is a return to the catchwords and panaceas of pre-war days, because they cannot see that not only the spirit but the very machinery of a new social order is being created hour by hour in the struggle for the freedom of mankind.

Then there are those who are appalled at the price which

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has to be paid, and who feel that nothing can justify the prolongation of the present carnage. No one with a spark of feeling can fail to shudder at the awful suffering of the modern battlefield, and the perhaps more terrible suffering in the homes far from the firing line. Nothing could justify the carrying on of the war for another hour save that to stop it now would mean an infinitely greater loss and suffering in the long run. The Prussian military machine, inspired as we have seen by doctrines which respect the laws neither of God nor man, has established an absolutist mastery over the nations they describe as their subjects and their Allies. The last vestige of independence disappeared when the Germans took over the Isonzo front. Berlin is the despot of all the inhabitants of Mittel-Europa organised from top to bottom for war. Under its direction they have challenged the world in arms. Is it conceivable that if the Allies weakened and gave them terms which did not imply the complete triumph of right and the utter defeat of their tyrannous purpose, these people would throw off the yoke after the war? The Prussian machine would claim, and claim with justice, that its promises had been fulfilled, and that under the inspiration of its militarism the German people and their Allies had proved themselves masters of the world, for the world in arms had been unable to defeat them. It would appeal once more for discipline, for armaments, for trust in their matchless wisdom and strength, and they would begin to prepare, as General von Freytag Loringhoven has just explained, to organise the vast Empire of 150,000,000 souls, in order to make a certainty of victory in the next war. If the German people are docile now, is there any reason to suppose that they will be less docile when faced by arguments such as these backed by the ruthless use of the terrible engines of destruction which have been devised in the war? There is nothing in the history of 1866 or 1870 to justify this view. And it is significant that the German minority Socialists were anxious

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for the Stockholm Conference precisely in order to tell their fellow Socialists abroad that, if the Allies did not win victory now, they would have to win it at some fiercer Armageddon in future years. If we are to avoid still worse horrors in the future, if we are to attain to a state of society in which all nations are not hourly contriving new devilries by land and air and water and under the seas with which to destroy one another, but living in amity and peace, the liberation of the world from militarist tyranny must be finished in this war, once and for all. Victory now, whatever it may cost, is the cheapest and most merciful road.

Finally, there is a still more subtle enemy, the mental and moral inertia which settles down at the end of every long struggle and which is reinforced by inability to see clearly how victory is to be won. Having made great efforts in the past, it is only too fatally easy to shrink from the fresh efforts and constant resourcefulness and adaptability which are necessary to the mastery alike of the enemy and of the circumstances of the time. The broad situation is clear. The Government of Germany and its agents are endeavouring by every means to persuade us that we have reached a stalemate, that victory is impossible for either side, and that compromise is the only alternative to the total destruction of civilisation. Nothing could be more untrue. Never have the Allies had such assets on their side. They have the whole world behind them. Is it not obvious that if the Russians and the Italians were to pull themselves together, if the British and the French continue their steadfast work, if the Americans mobilise their utmost, and the other nations of the earth were to unite in putting economic pressure on their enemies, it would not be long before the Germanic combination were in ruins at our feet? In truth, the need of the time is not to look at the advantages of the enemy, but to consider the immeasurable resources on the Allied side, and combine to bring to bear upon the autocracies of Central Europe—exhausted by four years' war, weakened by want of food,

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honeycombed by the revolutionary unrest they have propagated so industriously abroad, passionately longing for peace—a pressure which would be irresistible.

The war indeed can only now be lost by faint-heartedness. The apostles of Prussian Kultur are making frantic efforts to get a compromise peace before their own victims turn against them. They know that if the Allies are united and resolved they must be defeated utterly and for ever. If it once became clear to the Germanic peoples that, despite all its victories and all its promises, the military machine was impotent to save them, that to trust it further would simply be to inflict further suffering on themselves, and that the peace terms of the Allies involve no injustice, but ensure liberty and equality with all other nations for themselves, the dawn of the day of liberation would not be long delayed.

Our part, therefore, to-day is with a brave heart to continue steadfastly in the course on which we have started, constantly awake to new opportunities and new methods of work and service, but inflexible in our resolution to continue our battle with Prussianism by every means in our power, until it stands ruined and discredited among men. We need at this time something of the spirit with which men enlisted for service in the early days of the war. With the great majority it was no subtle calculation of chances, certainly no thought of profit, that took them into battle. The men who won the first battle of Ypres went forward and stood firm because it was their duty and because they could see no other way of fulfilling the mission which they felt laid upon themselves. If we go forward in the same spirit now, we shall obtain no less a victory. Like Moses and the Israelites, it is the simple obedience to the call of duty, the calm trust that right must triumph and wrong be worsted, that at the moment when things look most hopeless, and the cohorts of the enemy are spurring most fiercely on, the victory is most near, that will give us the courage and insight to endure until the promised land of freedom is within our sight.

THE GENESIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN INDIA

IN order to make the present situation in India clear to those who have no first-hand knowledge of the country it is necessary to go back some way into the past; for the special problems presented by the India of to-day are not easily intelligible apart from some consideration of the conditions out of which they arose.

It is probably realised by most people outside India, although it is often forgotten by the modern generation of educated Indians, that Great Britain came to rule the country, not because she desired to do so, but because she was unable to do anything else. From the earliest times the instincts of the East Indian Company were in the direction of peaceful trade, not of territorial acquisition. In the welter of anarchy in which India lay throughout the eighteenth century a certain amount of territorial acquisition was a necessary concomitant to commercial existence; but the struggles with the Native powers in which the Company became involved were not only unsought, they were forced upon it in face of the almost tearful protests of the Directors. Despite all efforts to maintain a policy of non-intervention, circumstances forced the Company along a road it would fain have avoided. The policy of non-intervention eventually broke down because it was not only morally unjustifiable, as abandoning the bulk of India to disorder, but was also inconsistent both with a continuance of trade between India and Europe and with the safety of "the British Pale."

The manner in which order was by degrees established in India by the great administrators of the early

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nineteenth century is generally known. The names of Elphinstone, Munro, Outram, and many more are emblazoned in letters of gold upon the annals of the Empire. But it should be remembered that owing to the particular conditions under which their work was carried on the administrative system of British India received an image and a superscription of which the main outlines have persisted down to the present day. Quite apart from the dominant personalities of these men who first brought order where anarchy had reigned, the mere fact that this order was superimposed upon India from the outside inevitably produced a system which was not merely of the nature of paternal despotism but possessed in addition the peculiarity of requiring the paternal despots to be foreigners. The British official, whether in a district or at the headquarters of Government, found himself, metaphorically speaking, "upon a peak in Darien," arbiter of vast conflicting interests, invested with semi-autocratic powers executive, financial, and judicial: protected from the temptations of his position as much by its splendid isolation as by his own innate traditions of straightforward dealing. It is in these conditions that an explanation must be sought of the continued failure of the British administration of India to find room, despite oft-repeated promises, for a large proportion of Indian officials among that close body of more trusted servants in whose hands all control tends to be concentrated. The administrative structure was from the very first what it has still remained virtually up to the moment of writing, a system devised by foreigners and worked by foreigners. It cannot, therefore, be a matter of surprise that such attempts as were made to give effect to Clause 87 of the Charter Act of 1833,* and to subsequent enactments

* No native of the said territories, nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the Company.

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similar thereto, have been to the liberal-minded a stumbling-block and to the conservative foolishness. The British administrators, relying upon their own benevolence and integrity, were thereby strengthened in their belief that the destinies of India were not merely safe in their hands but had been committed to their control by Providence. They pushed on their admirable work of spreading efficiency and enlightenment, without waiting to carry along with them a sufficient body of Indian intellectual opinion. Some mentors, indeed, they had, like F. J. Shore, but these were in the main discontented men with personal grievances, whose warnings carried no weight. What these mentors had foreseen, at length came to pass. The landed classes and the aristocracy of religion, believing their privileges and their creeds to be threatened by a policy which left them out in the cold, made no attempt to check a great wave of reaction against the rapid imposition of Western ideas and Western methods upon a conservative people ill-prepared to receive them. Of this reaction the Mutiny of 1857, though confined to a relatively small portion of India and largely military on the surface, was the most prominent manifestation. The brains of that movement were a handful of men, mostly Hindus, who employed as their tools thousands of ignorant persons convinced, partly as a result of the blunders and over-confidence of the administration, that their customs and beliefs were endangered by the wholesale introduction of the new wine of the West into the age-stiffened bottles of the East.

I. THE GROWTH OF EDUCATION

THE main lesson of the Mutiny—namely, the necessity of associating the leaders of sentiment and of opinion in India with any far-reaching scheme of reform which touches the people—has never been forgotten. A further

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lesson, which could not be so clearly appreciated at the time, was the necessity of educating the people of India, not merely to render subordinate assistance in the work of administration but to understand the principles and aims of British policy. Half the troubles of the British in India have been caused by their failure to find a position of any real importance in their system for Indians equipped with a sufficiently thorough Western education to qualify them for the task of interpreting the mind of the West to the mind of the East. This has been due, in part, to the character of the education itself, which has never been consciously shaped by Government towards any clearly defined end. As soon as the Company had become "paramount in effect," the necessity had arisen of calling into existence a class of Indians possessed of a sufficient education to act as a more or less mechanical link between the administration and the people, principally in the form of supplying the clerical staff in the rapidly multiplying Government offices. With this strictly utilitarian aim had been, it is true, conjoined, in theory, the nobler one of educating, so far as possible, the vast mass of subjects committed to the charge of the Company, with the object of fitting them to appreciate the blessings of Western civilisation. As early as 1833 Macaulay had voiced this aspiration :

It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system until it has outgrown that system : that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government : that having become instructed in European knowledge they may, in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come, I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or to retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history.

Despairing of the magnitude of the task before them, those responsible for the project of introducing Western education into India deliberately confined their efforts to the upper strata of society, hoping that by educating the

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select few some tincture of Western learning might percolate down to the masses. In which plan they were but following the drift of existing circumstances. For ages untold, learning in India had been the much-prized privilege of a class, not the common heritage of the mass. The experiment of the early educators was thus foredoomed to failure; for the Brahmin, assisted by his innate aptitude for learning, quickly secured a virtual monopoly of the prizes open to the Western-educated, to the exclusion alike of the Moslems and of his less fortunate co-religionists. It is true that so early as 1854 the Wood despatch outlined a system of education which might in time have been developed into something worthy of the term national, but before it could be put into operation came the Mutiny and the subsequent remodelling of the Army and the general work of reconstruction, the joint effect of which was not merely to swallow up any funds which might have been devoted to the general diffusion of education but also to make Government extremely reluctant to impose additional taxation for any purpose, however necessary, lest fresh trouble should be stirred up. Higher education, for which there was an effective demand upon the part of the upper strata of society, flourished at the expense of middle and primary education, the extension of which rested largely upon the efforts of a Government which did not realise the vital necessity of preventing Western learning from becoming the monopoly of a class. Further, in its mistaken desire to encourage the manufacture of graduates, Government made a University career, as vouched for by the passing of examinations, an essential preliminary to every official post worthy of consideration. But the authorities forgot that quality is at least as important in education as quantity and that these graduates would miss the primary benefit of a University education if it were not so planned as to enable them to develop their character and shape their ideals in accordance with the needs of their country. This naturally reacted disastrously upon the Universities

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themselves, since they came to be regarded first and foremost, not as instruments of social and civic enlightenment, but as artificial avenues to Government service of some kind or another. In consequence the liberalising effect of Western education even as understood in India has been narrow in scope, and has, generally speaking, done little to break down the exclusive and monopolist tendencies of the castes which have profited by it.

It is upon a realisation of these two important factors, namely, the peculiar characteristics of the Western-educated—limited numbers, caste-exclusiveness, unshaped ideals—as well as the impossibility experienced in the past of finding a real place for them in a system of administration devised by foreigners to be worked by foreigners, that a true explanation of the present situation largely depends. For this situation is nothing startling or unexpected: it is the natural culmination of a movement which has been going on for the last half-century and has acquired a tremendous momentum during the last two decades.

II. THE TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT TO THE CROWN

FOUR years before the outbreak of the Mutiny Lord Dalhousie, then Governor-General, realised how much his hand would be strengthened in dealing with the Home authorities if he could associate himself with the opinion of a greater number of persons than those included within the close circle of his Executive Council, and largely as a result of his personal activities—so we gather from his recently published *Private Letters*—the Charter Act of 1853 empowered him to add six special members to his Executive Council for legislative purposes. The Legislative Council thus constituted was not a legislature in any ordinary sense of the term: it was the Supreme Government of India sitting in its law-making capacity: and in this connection it is significant that powers of legislation were at the same

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time withdrawn from the Provincial Governments of Madras and Bombay. Lord Dalhousie can scarcely have dreamed of the coming of a time when the "additional members" might conceivably outnumber the officials. He therefore never faced the question as to the powers of this Council in the case of difference of opinion between the Executive Council and the new body. This was to be productive of important results.

With the transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown in 1858, the structure of that Government was but little altered. The Secretary of State, who now replaced the old President of the Board of Control, was in theory subjected to an effective supervision by Parliament on the one hand and to a steadying influence by the Council of India on the other. And here it may be well to mention a fact which is now in some danger of being forgotten, namely, that the Council of India was originally intended to afford a substitute for that popular opinion which, in the case of the Colonies, exercised a powerful influence upon the Secretary concerned, but which at that time was in India non-existent. Curiously enough, however, the general effect of the Act of 1858 has been to remove India far beyond the vision of the Parliament of Westminster. In the days of the Company the necessity of conducting enquiries into the manner in which it discharged its duties kept Indian affairs well within the purview of Parliament, but when India came under the government of the Crown the occasion, though not the necessity, for Parliamentary supervision was no longer forthcoming. Parliamentary interest in Indian affairs, on the one hand, was spasmodic and often ill-informed: on the other, the Council of India soon became the stronghold of caution and conservatism. The joint result was to throw all real power and all real control into the hands of the Secretary of State.

In India, as has already been stated, one of the consequences of the Mutiny was a desire on the part of the

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British administrators to carry along with them in their activities the social and intellectual leaders of the Indian people. The plan devised in Lord Dalhousie's time, of associating with the Executive Council certain special members for the purpose of law-making, was plainly capable of contributing to that end. Accordingly, by the Indian Councils Act of 1861, the Governor-General was empowered to nominate from six to twelve persons to be additional members of his Council for legislative purposes. Further, legislative powers were restored to the provinces of Madras and Bombay, and conferred upon other provinces, these powers to be exercised through Provincial Councils, containing members nominated by the Head of the Province. In practice some of these nominated members, both in the Imperial and Provincial Councils, were always Indians. It is, however, most necessary to remember that these Councils, Imperial and Provincial, were not Parliaments. They were never intended in any way to exercise control over the Executive. They were merely designed to enable the Executive to ascertain the opinion of Indian leaders upon any given measure or proposal. There was not the slightest idea of compelling the Executive to be bound by that opinion, whether in the case of the Government of India or of the Provincial Governments. As had been the case with Lord Dalhousie, the framers of the Councils Act never conceived of a time when the officials upon these Councils might be in a minority, and they never faced the question as to what the precise limits of the powers of these Councils were.

As the memory of the Age of Anarchy died out, and as India began to advance in material prosperity, the Western-educated classes, whose numbers were steadily increasing, began to have a strong sense of grievance. This was principally due to the fact that they had no adequate place found for them in the administrative structure, and the educational qualifications on which they prided themselves failed to secure for them at the hands of their British

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rulers the social recognition enjoyed by the representatives of the old Indian aristocracy who still held aloof from Western education. Further, as Macaulay had foreseen, the study of Western writers, such as Burke and Mill, naturally produced a desire for a more liberal form of government, under which—so the educated classes hoped—they would become a power in the land. Moreover, in the British Parliament, men like John Bright and Henry Fawcett were continually urging that “the natives of India should be given a fair share in the administration of their own country,” without perceiving that in order to do this a drastic remodelling of the administrative structure, such as no one, either in India or in England, would have cared to face, was absolutely essential. The activities of these English members of Parliament, from John Bright to Sir William Wedderburn, have been of the greatest possible influence in the affairs of India, for they have encouraged the Western-educated classes to voice their aspirations and clothe their grievances in the language of constitutional reform in England, so that a movement which began originally as a desire to assert class privileges, has gradually come to be regarded by themselves as a struggle from the very first between the forces of popular control on the one hand and of bureaucratic government upon the other.

III. THE BEGINNINGS OF CONGRESS

BY the beginning of the “’seventies” the growing ease of communication between one part of India and another, the increasing use of English as a *lingua franca*, and the realisation of common interests as against the European administrator had enabled the party of the Western-educated to crystallise into shape. By means of an active and violent vernacular and Indo-English press it shortly began to exercise a power out of all proportion to its numerical strength. Certain undoubted grievances were

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seized upon, and employed as the cause, rather than the occasion, of an outbreak of racial feeling. The Lancashire cotton trade's abolition of the Indian import duties in their own interest and the raising of the age limit of the Civil Service examination in such a way as to handicap Indian candidates ; the rash and provocative tone adopted by the Anglo-Indian Press over the Ilbert Bill of 1883 ; the official opposition to Lord Ripon's measures for the extension of local self-government : all these combined to produce a considerable degree of ferment in the minds of the educated. Largely as a result of the activities of Mr. Surendranath Banerjee, associations were formed in the various provinces with the object of organising the expression of grievances. This movement received some encouragement from Lord Dufferin, who, hoping to create a safety valve, persuaded the late A. O. Hume, a staunch friend to Indian constitutional aspiration, to mould it into a more regular and quasi-representative shape. Accordingly in 1885 a meeting of delegates of the Western-educated classes from all parts of India was held in Bombay. This was the beginning of the " Indian National Congress," which was intended by its projectors to form " the germ of a native Parliament," and which has since figured so prominently in the politics of India. In this movement the Mohammedans had little part. They had been invited to join, but under the leadership of the great Sir Syed Ahmed they determined, with some few exceptions, to hold aloof from all political agitation and to pin their faith to the British Government. In this determination they were influenced apparently by two considerations. The first was the relatively backward state of their community, so far as education was concerned, which they felt would put them at a disadvantage as compared with the Hindus. The second was the belief that, being in a minority, they must rely for equity of treatment more upon the authority of Government than upon the brotherly feeling of the Hindus.

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Lord Dufferin apparently had hoped that the Congress would supply in India the place of "Her Majesty's Opposition" in England, by bringing to the notice of Government the defects of official measures from the non-official point of view, and by affording an index to educated Indian opinion. He had also looked to the Congress to become the rallying point of all the more enlightened Indians who recognised that social reforms, indispensable to any real progress, had to be initiated by Indians themselves and not by alien rulers. He was not prepared for the vigorous attempt it instantly made to press the programme of the classes composing it, namely the removal of special disabilities under which they laboured, their association in ever-increasing numbers with the administration, and the remodelling of the machinery of government so that it should present an external resemblance to Western Parliamentary institutions. On such matters as these the members found themselves at one. Unfortunately on the question of social reforms profound differences very soon revealed themselves, and, after a half-hearted attempt to include it among their activities, they decided to confine themselves to political ends. Upon such vital questions as the position of women, child-marriage, the remarriage of widows, the elevation of the depressed classes, and the modification of obstructive social customs, they were hopelessly at variance among themselves. The reality of the Western education on which they based their political claims was thus put to the test and in too many cases found wanting.

The existence of the Legislative Councils, Imperial and Provincial, gave the Congress politicians, on the other hand, the opportunity of putting their political claims in the foreground. Ignoring in the first place the limited function of the Councils, and in the next place the width of the gulf which marked their own class off from the overwhelming mass of their uneducated countrymen, they regarded the existing Councils as though they were Parlia-

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ments which could by a mere mechanical modification be made responsible to an Indian electorate consisting of themselves. They urgently and continually demanded an increase of the power of these Councils and the inclusion within them of representatives of their own. They aimed at securing by degrees a preponderating weight to be used ultimately for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear upon the executive. At the same time, they had no idea of themselves becoming responsible for the administration of the country.

Their position was in some respects a strong one. They laboured under social grievances which ought to have been redressed, and they employed these grievances to further their political ambitions. They were steadily befriended by several members of the House of Commons, and could usually command a sympathetic hearing from the Liberal Party, more especially when it was in opposition. Further, the whole tendency of the age was hostile to bureaucracy and favourable to any movement which had even the appearance of leading towards self-government. Last, but not least, the powerful Indian Press was held like a sword of Damocles over the heads of those persons and parties who showed any reluctance against falling into line with the Congress propaganda. Looking back over the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century, however, we can now perceive that the Congress politicians made three grave tactical errors. In the first place, they did not avail themselves of such opportunity as was presented to them, under Lord Ripon's scheme, of acquiring practical experience in the details of local administration. They thus exposed themselves to the charge of being mere dealers in rhetoric, without administrative experience, lacking all knowledge of the practical difficulties of Indian administration. Secondly, they did not draw up a definite scheme of political progress, but allowed themselves to be hypnotised by phrases like "self-government" and "popular control." Lastly, but perhaps not least serious, they dis-

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played little capacity for putting forward a broad statesman-like programme, dealing especially with those crying evils of the Indian social system which can be cured only by Indians themselves, but frittered instead their energies and those of their supporters in Parliament over such questions as "an act of oppression in a tea garden, a gross insult offered to an Indian gentleman in a railway carriage, the malpractices of the police and the bunglings of the executive." *

On the other hand, those with whom the responsibility for the administration of India lay made serious mistakes. The great Civil Service, proudly conscious of the value of the work which it had done for the country in times past, and was still doing, failed generally to appreciate the changing spirit of the age. Relying on the one hand upon the limited numbers of the educated class, and on the other upon their lack of practical experience, its ideal was to keep the ship of state upon the traditional course, while conceding as little as possible to the new and tumultuous currents whose significance it did not appreciate. The British administrators of India, while in no way relaxing their efforts for the moral and material progress of the country, did not recognise the necessity for a corresponding development in the sphere of politics. Whilst the literature of British democracy was expounded in Indian Colleges, no organised endeavour was made to give to Indian youths the civic training or to create openings for educated Indians to acquire the experience and sense of responsibility essential to the development of democratic institutions. By testing the value of our Indian educational system by the quality rather than by the numbers of the graduates produced by it, and by training up a generation capable of grasping the true inwardness and not merely the catchwords of Western political life, by dredging deeper into the social structure and giving special encouragement to the lower castes to raise themselves by education out

* A. C. Mazumdar, *Indian National Evolution*, p. 143.

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of the slough of social despond, they might have prevented the dangerous association of constitutional propagandism and caste-interest which became a sinister feature of Indian political activity. If at the same time they had welcomed instead of viewing with distrust and dislike the association of Indians with the government of the country, whether Central or Provincial, and had in fact driven them to acquire the administrative experience they conspicuously lacked, British rulers of India might have headed the Congress party off their dangerous demand for power divorced from responsibility—the smooth way which leadeth to destruction—and have made less turbulent and dangerous the process of transition between paternal despotism and responsible government. As it was, they treated the Congress movement rather with indifference and suspicion. They emphasised the narrowness and caste-interests of the educated class, without perceiving that these very defects were at once an indictment of the foresight of their predecessors and a call to themselves to redress the mistake. They remarked the littleness and petulance which characterised many of the proceedings of the Congress, without perceiving that these defects resulted in part from the want of a guidance which it was their duty to supply. Honestly convinced that the great bureaucratic system which had grown up under their hand was the only possible form of government for India in 1890 as for India in 1820, they regarded criticism as impiety and constitutional aspirations as fundamentally incompatible with Indian conditions, instead of realising that it must always be the mission of British rulers to educate the peoples entrusted to their charge up to our own level of political development. They had lost sight of the earlier ideals of Anglo-Indian statesmen, such as Elphinstone and Munro, who looked forward with equanimity and even with pride to a future, however remote, in which we should be able to resign into the hands of the Indians themselves a trustee-

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ship faithfully discharged and always to be regarded as temporary.

But, if the British rulers of India on the spot may rightly be charged in this respect with narrowness and stubbornness, it must be borne in mind not only that they were fortified in their opposition to the Congress movement by a strong sense of their responsibility for the well-being of the vast masses and the many communities who stood outside that movement, but also that they themselves never received any guidance from British statesmanship at home. Parliament, as we have already seen, had lost its grip of Indian affairs since the periodical enquiries into the state of India had lapsed with the old East India Company's rule. The principle of *laissez-faire, laissez-aller*, which dominated both political parties in England, was held to be equally applicable to India, unless there was some definite clash between British and Indian interests; and in such cases the British Government very rarely gave anything but an example of an unimaginative and often selfish stolidity to our own people in India. Nor has any stimulus to a more broadminded sympathy with the aspirations of educated Indians or to a more tolerant attitude towards the imperfections of their countrymen been supplied by the unofficial British community in India, very few of whom have any knowledge of, or take any interest in, the people or affairs of India outside the few large cities in which they mostly congregate.

Before long came the Indian Councils Act of 1892, which plainly showed the influence of the Congress propaganda. It was an attempt at compromise between the official view of the Councils as pocket legislatures and the educated Indian view of them as embryo parliaments. As such it marks a definite parting of the ways; the first milestone on a road leading eventually to political deadlock and the strangling of executive government. While no efforts were made to enlarge the boundaries of the educated class, to provide them with any training in responsible

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government, or to lay the foundation of a future electorate to control them, the act deliberately attempted to dally with the elective idea. Mr. Gladstone, speaking in support of the measure, remarked: "While the language of the Bill cannot be said to embody the elective principle, it is very peculiar language, unless it is intended to pave the way for the adoption of that principle." The actual provisions included an increase in the size of the Councils, Imperial and Provincial; the nomination of a proportion of non-official members on the recommendation of various associations and public bodies; the privilege of interpellation, and of discussing the Budget both of the Central and Provincial Governments. In other words, it was a real concession granted to the Congress party in the hope that their ambitions would be satisfied thereby. Needless to say, it confirmed them in their ideas as to the reward attendant upon sustained political agitation, and convinced them that they had only to advance along the path they had marked out to have the Executive government at last at their mercy. Lack of any definite conception of the goal towards which we should travel, and the fatal tendency towards compromise as an object in itself and not as the means to a larger end, had allowed the progressives of India to set their feet upon this dangerous road, just as lack of foresight on the part of those who should have controlled every step now encouraged an advance along it.

IV. THE EMERGENCE OF ANARCHISM

BETWEEN the Act of 1892 and the next great measure affecting the Legislative Councils, the Minto-Morley reforms of 1909, there lies a most critical period, the history of which can only be very briefly reviewed here.

The increasing antagonism between even the moderate champions of constitutional reforms in the Congress and the British administrators gave the party of Indian reaction

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against all forms of Western influence an opportunity of grafting on to the Congress movement an agitation which was ultimately directed more or less openly against British rule itself. It had its origin in the Deccan, where the influence of the Mahratta Brahmin, who still cherished the memories of domination and conquest to which British supremacy had set a term, was still a very powerful factor. Under the cloak of Hindu orthodoxy, the Deccan reactionaries had engineered in 1891 a violent opposition to the Age of Consent Bill, *i.e.*, to a Bill raising the age for consummation of Hindu infant marriages. Out of this agitation there resulted shortly afterwards an open breach between the whole policy of Social Reform of which the more enlightened leaders of the Congress movement had been fervent advocates and the policy of political reform which was eventually to divert a large part of Western-educated India to an organised attack not only on the structure of British government in India but on the fundamental ideals for which British governance stands. The Deccan extremists more or less paralysed the Social Reform movement, but the prosecution and conviction of their leader, Mr. Tilak, for sedition in 1898 stemmed for a time the violence of the political propaganda which at that period was mainly confined to the Mahratta country.

During these years, however, there was growing up among the younger members of the class of educated or semi-educated Indians a dangerous feeling of impatience both at the inability of Congress to force the hands of Government by any constitutional form of agitation and at the scornful indifference of Government to the pleas of the moderate men who disliked revolutionary methods and were grateful for the work of past generations of Englishmen. Brought up in ever-increasing numbers under a system which provided very little intellectual discipline for their minds and hardly any training of character, still less any definite ideas of national service, the best of them found no adequate place in the administrative structure of their

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country and carried their sense of grievance to the Bar, the teaching profession, or the newspaper office, whilst many still less fortunate merely lapsed into an intellectual proletariat. Such youths fell easy victims to the insidious doctrines of political agitators. It was not difficult for the latter to turn them from the mortifications of the present to the largely fictitious glories of the past and evolve for the purpose an unhistorical Golden Age, when India was unified and strong, the civiliser of the world. Fired by these visions, a section of the educated classes rallied to the reactionary leaders and became imbued not only with a belief in the superiority of everything Indian but with a fierce antagonism to the civilisation of the West. They differed from the original Congress party not merely in their dislike of a propaganda based upon the constitutional movements of the Western world but also in their secret desire to terminate the connection with the British Empire. Events outside as well as inside India helped to promote these tendencies. The prolonged difficulties which seemed to tax to their utmost the resources of the British Empire during the South African War, the sensational victories of an Asiatic over a European Power in the Russo-Japanese War, the revolutionary movement in Russia which compelled the autocracy to surrender some of its authority to a popular assembly, the collapse of the Conservative Party in England and the advent to power of a new and much more advanced school of British liberalism, created throughout Western educated India a powerful ferment. Agitation was still further fomented when the Government of India, concentrating as usual on efficiency, challenged Indian sentiment by partitioning the unwieldy Presidency of Bengal and taking in hand for the first time the thorny problem of education. The spark was laid to the extremist train. The turbulent methods of agitation, originally taught in the Deccan, fervid appeals to racial and religious fanaticism, the demonstrative boycott of British imported goods, the mobilisation of schoolboys and students in the

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service of a lawless propaganda, the denunciation of Government and all State aided schools, spread like wildfire from the Bombay Presidency to Bengal. Anarchism, borrowed from the revolutionists in Europe, made its appearance in India. There followed a succession of murderous outrages, perpetrated upon European Government officials and even upon Indian servants of Government, which were sometimes greeted in the Indian Press as proofs of Indian virility or at least extenuated as the inevitable outcome of bureaucratic and worse than Muscovite oppression. The Extremist section attempted to capture the whole of Congress, but at that time the Moderates, under the sane and able leadership of men such as Gokhale and Ferozeshah Mehta, were sufficiently strong to make a stand. After many had become frightened at the conflagration they had helped to kindle, the conflict culminated in 1907 at the Surat session of Congress, which broke up in the utmost confusion after stormy scenes. The effect of this violent schism was to paralyse the influence of Congress, whether for good or for evil, for some years.

V. THE MORLEY-MINTO REFORMS

EVEN so stout a Radical as John Morley, who was then Secretary of State for India, found it impossible to refuse to the Indian Executive authority to enact measures of a somewhat drastic character for the repression of criminal agitation. But he realised at the same time that, if the fangs of Indian Extremism had to be forcibly drawn, it was equally necessary to remove the legitimate grievances of Moderate Western-educated opinion and to make a further attempt to give Indians a reasonable share in the conduct of public affairs. In 1909 statutory sanction was given by Parliament to a new scheme of reforms generally known as the Morley-Minto reforms, which were mainly an extension of the Indian Councils Act of 1892.

The Morley-Minto Reforms

The changes now introduced operated in three main directions. First, a form of election replaced Government nomination for a large number of seats in both the Imperial and Provincial Councils. Secondly, the aggregate number of the non-official members on all Councils was practically doubled, and in the Provincial Councils the principle of a non-official majority was conceded. Thirdly, the rights of discussion and of interpellation were freed from many of the restrictions which had been laid down in the Act of 1892. In the Resolution of November 15, 1909, the Government of India gave a summary of these changes, but they did not mention one 'extremely important step, the concession of community representation to the Mohammedans. Alarmed at what they considered the growing ascendancy of the Hindus over Government, the Mohammedans demanded as the price of their acquiescence in the Morley-Minto schemes that they should receive community representation in proportion not to their numbers but to their "political importance." There were some strong considerations of policy which seemed to render it expedient at the time. Recent years had shown a marked change of attitude on the part of the Mohammedan Indians. Whilst, as we have seen, they had been content at first to hold aloof from politics and to rely on their British rulers for the protection of their rights and interests, they became uneasy at the results of Hindu political agitation, which, they feared, might succeed in securing to the Hindu community an excessive measure of influence. The more educated Indians came to the conclusion that the time had arrived to try their hand also at political organisation, and the All India Moslem League was created to co-ordinate the forces of the community for political purposes. There was as yet no feeling of distrust towards British administration, and Mohammedan loyalty had held entirely aloof from all violent propaganda. The Imperial Government deemed it their primary duty to maintain a just balance between the two chief communities in India. This con-

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cession to the Mohammedans has been condemned as an anti-democratic step, and it certainly constitutes a considerable difficulty in the present endeavour to formulate schemes for conferring responsible government upon India. But Lord Morley, it must be remembered, himself stoutly repudiated the suggestion that these enlarged Councils were intended to pave the way for anything resembling Parliamentary institutions.

Altogether the authors of the 1909 reforms showed little foresight. No one apparently realised that by conferring upon the class of educated Indians, who were to be given wider admission to the Councils, increased powers of criticism without any real responsibility, the noose which had been placed round the throat of the Executive by the Councils Act of 1892 had been drawn appreciably tighter. No one raised his voice to plead the urgent necessity of broadening the electoral basis. No one dreamed of testing the capacity of the educated Indian community by laying upon them any definite responsibilities. In point of fact, the system established under the Act is an illusion. As the *Bombay Times of India* pertinently remarked in a recent leading article: "Nobody knows even to-day what is the numerical foundation behind the elected members of the Legislative Councils, so indirect is the chain of election. Before the [British] Reform Act of 1832 much play was made of pocket boroughs of twenty or thirty members. In India, one constituency electing a member to the Imperial Legislative Council numbers exactly seven, and we know of cases where the representation has been divided by agreement between two individuals." The qualifications of candidates, as well as of electors, vary widely from Province to Province, but share the common characteristic, that the election is very often a matter of mere form. Members of the Provincial Councils are returned partly by Municipal and Local Boards arranged in various groups, without any connection with or mandate from the constituencies by which these Boards are chosen,

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partly by the landholding community, which does not consider itself bound by the acts of its constituted representatives. The so-called electorates have never been known to give mandates to those who profess to represent them or to pronounce upon any course of action which these representatives may pursue. And, while at the same time the Central and Provincial Governments were more exposed to criticism than ever before, no attempt was made to enable them to meet this criticism effectually by turning over definite instalments of responsibility to their critics. As might have been foreseen, the criticism directed against Government has been purely destructive; an artificial cleavage between official and non-official, between elected and nominated members, has been introduced in every Council; and a strong anti-Government opposition has grown up in these bodies which can and does impede the transaction of business, but which has no power to put its resolutions into practice, no power to control the policy of Government, and no opportunity to acquire experience in practical administration. Further, no attempt was made to break down that spirit of over-centralisation which had of late years marked the policy of the Government of India. The Provincial Governments still remained bound hand and foot by the necessity of constant reference to the Central Government, while the latter in its turn was forced to make an ever-increasing number of references to Whitehall. Thus Lord Morley with one hand attempted to make the Provincial and Central Governments responsive to the criticism of Indians, while with the other he enforced the principle, to a degree which no previous Secretary of State had ventured to do, that the Provincial Governments were responsible to the Central Government, and the Central Government to Whitehall, in every detail of administration. The concentration of all real authority in the hands of a few high officials involved the negation of the principle of responsible government; yet in the introduction of that principle lay the one hope of escape from the

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fatal results to which the Councils Act of 1892 ought from the very first to have pointed—the slow throttling of the Executive Government at the hands of an irresponsible Legislature. The Morley-Minto reforms have brought India a long step nearer to this intolerable situation without preparing the way for the gradual introduction of self-government, on however limited a scale, which alone can provide a reasonable issue from it.

What has been the result? The history of the last eight years reveals it only too plainly. At first the Congress, discredited by the exhibition it had made of itself at Surat, seemed likely to be permanently overshadowed by the new Councils. Moreover, other movements were developing outside it. Some of the more earnest-minded amongst educated Indians, disgusted at its failure to deal effectively with the work of Social Reform, turned away from it. The Arya Somaj, a Hindu Reform Movement started half a century ago, began to appeal with added force to the awakening nationalism of the educated classes by its cry of "Back to the Vedas" as the source of all knowledge. It had never professed to draw its spiritual inspiration from the West as the Brahmo Somaj had done, and the political activities of some of its members had laid it open to suspicions of sedition. As the Punjab, where its influence is centred, always contains a good deal of inflammable material, Government had been prone to treat its whole propaganda as suspect instead of making a genuine attempt to steer into safe channels a movement fraught with great potentialities of good, especially in the domain of education, female as well as male, and the emancipation of Hindu society from the trammels of caste degradation. The Servants of India Society, founded in 1905 by the late Mr. Gokhale, himself a Mahratta Brahmin, was the most signal though by no means the only instance of a new orientation of Indian activities amongst the educated classes towards Social Service rather than politics.

Unfortunately the artificial basis upon which the Morley-

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Minto reforms had been built soon revealed itself under the test of practical experience. The expansion of Indian representation in the Councils was not followed by any visible increase of Indian control over the conduct of public affairs. For a time the spirit which underlay the granting of the reforms had its effect. Both sides seemed to display a more conciliatory temper and the relations between the official and unofficial benches in the enlarged Councils assumed a more friendly character. In many cases the influence of the non-official members was successfully exerted to secure modifications in the legislative measures of Government, though from a mistaken desire to "save their face" the Government often preferred to make concessions at private conferences with the Indian leaders rather than as the outcome of public discussion, and lost thereby a good deal of the credit which they might have secured by a more open display of their desire to meet Indian objections. On some occasions before the war the pressure of Indian opinion even deterred Local Governments from introducing legislative measures which they considered essential to public safety because they apprehended defeat at the hands of the unofficial majority in the legislative Councils. But the Indian public remained generally in ignorance of the extent to which the influence of the Indian representatives made itself felt, either for good or for evil, on Government. The bureaucracy, more secretive in India than elsewhere, had never realised the importance of guiding public opinion, or, *a fortiori*, the necessity of keeping it informed if you wish to guide it. The politicians, on the other hand, preferred to make capital out of those questions on which they failed to make any impression upon Government, though the real difficulty very often lay in the rigidity of the statutory control exercised by the Central Government over Local Governments, and by Whitehall over the Central Government. The inevitable result eventually became clear. The enlarged Indian representation appeared to have less power

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than it really enjoyed, and, having no responsibility whatever, it was free to make bids for popularity with the classes which were its only constituents. Resolutions were introduced which, if they could have carried them, the unofficial members would often have been much puzzled to put into effect, and grievances were voiced which, even when well-founded, it was frequently beyond the power of a local Government to remedy. On the other hand, the Executive was threatened with the possibility of a complete deadlock, and the concessions by which it could be averted often alarmed not merely the innate conservatism of the official world but the more conservative elements of Indian society.

Whilst the Western-educated classes were coming rapidly to the conclusion that the Morley-Minto reforms had given them the shadow rather than the substance of political power, the attitude of the official classes towards the larger question of training up the people of India towards self-government remained practically unchanged. They had Lord Morley's word for it that those reforms were not intended to pave the way for anything resembling an Indian Parliament, and they were only too ready to take their cue in this matter from the Secretary of State. In such circumstances it was not unnatural that the more ardent Indian spirits should have turned again to Congress as the real "Parliament of India" or at least of Western-educated India. Since the rupture between the Extremists and the Moderates at Surat, the former had temporarily lost their chief protagonist on that occasion, Mr. Tilak, who had been again prosecuted and convicted of sedition and was still working out his sentence in Mandalay. The Moderates, who had to some extent regained control, could claim that the Morley-Minto reforms, however inadequate, had shown the more constitutional forms of agitation for which they stood to have been not wholly ineffectual. But the Extremists still constituted a very formidable party, and at a most critical period, just after Mr. Tilak was released

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and made his reappearance in public life, the death of Mr. Gokhale and of Sir Pherozeshah Mehta removed two of the most influential and stalwart opponents of violent methods. Under the able chairmanship of Sir S. Sinha, who had sat on the Viceroy's Executive Council as its first Indian member under the Morley-Minto reforms scheme, the Extremist section were kept in bounds at the Congress Session in Bombay at the end of 1915. But twelve months later the enthusiastic reception given at the Lucknow Session to Mrs. Besant and to Mr. Tilak, who resumed his seat for the first time since Surat, showed far more clearly than the actual resolutions passed by Congress that Extreme counsels had at last succeeded in capturing the "Indian Parliament."

VI. THE EFFECTS OF THE GREAT WAR

STRANGE as it may seem, this consummation was largely a result of the great war which had then been going on for nearly two years and a half. The war had at once brought into the very forefront of public discussion the problem of the readjustment of the constitutional relations between the great component parts of the British Empire which is essential to the work of Imperial reconstruction after the war, and with it the question of India's position within the Empire. Germany had reckoned upon India proving a thorn in our flesh during the war. It was one of her many miscalculations. The despatch of a large Indian force to Europe to fight shoulder to shoulder with British and Colonial troops had not only shown that India could be a valuable source of military strength to the Empire but it had made a strong appeal to Indian imagination and raised a wave of loyalty which swept through the whole of India, and, for a short time at any rate, submerged all political dissensions. The Indian Princes vied with each other in offers of personal service and in contributions of all kinds

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to the necessities of the hour. The great land-owning classes and the fighting races of British India displayed more than their traditional devotion to the *Raj*. The Western-educated classes, and even such extremists as Mr. Tilak, rallied publicly to the cause of the Empire as the cause of freedom. Their representatives in the Imperial Council at Delhi gave an earnest of their sincerity by their treatment of the Defence of India Act. The drastic provisions of the Act were in many ways repugnant to them, but they passed it on the mere assurance of Lord Hardinge, who had won their confidence by his courageous championship of Indian interests, that it was a necessary war measure. The British public at home responded generously to these convincing demonstrations of Indian loyalty, and British Ministers solemnly pledged the Empire's gratitude without stopping to consider how their pledges would be construed in India or could be ultimately fulfilled. Then the war dragged on much longer than had been generally anticipated. The Government of India, instead of striking whilst the iron was hot, had in many ways failed to sustain and to utilise to the full the original outburst of enthusiasm, and had been afraid to impose upon the country any financial or other burden that would have brought home to all the magnitude of the struggle in which the Empire was engaged. India, to whom the war has actually brought an immense accession of material prosperity, was so sheltered from its real horrors, and such a small minority of Indians, especially amongst the Western-educated classes, had any personal ties with those who were actually fighting, that the keen edge of interest in its progress was gradually blunted.

In the Legislative Councils the Government had secured a sort of political truce by undertaking not to introduce controversial measures during the war. But discussions throughout the Empire of schemes of Imperial reconstruction after the war had opened up a large field of political speculation which Indians could hardly be expected to

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refrain from exploring. For if India, as was generally conceded, had proved herself worthy of admission into the inner councils of the Empire on a footing even approximately similar to that of the self-governing Dominions, it was obvious that the constitutional relations of the Government of India to the Imperial Government would have to be substantially modified. And how were they to be modified so as to give the Government of India, responsible only to the British Secretary of State, anything like the same standing as the Governments of the Dominions, each of them responsible to their own people? Looked at from this point of view, the question of self-government for India assumed, even in the eyes of the most conservative officials, a reality which they had hitherto been reluctant to recognise. The Indian politician had been quick to seize the value of this line of argument, and the Indian Extremist was determined to press it forthwith to its utmost consequences. For he had grown weary of self-restraint and was not sorry for the opportunity of reviving a campaign of agitation against the whole system of Indian administration. The India for which he spoke was willing to remain steadfast to the British connection in the same way as the Dominions, but like the Dominions she must be given Home Rule. And Home Rule was not merely to be an ultimate goal to be reached by carefully graduated stages. It was not to be withheld till the now illiterate millions had been trained to produce electorates capable of giving an intelligent mandate to their representatives and till administrators could be found among such representatives qualified to discharge the functions of responsible government. It was to be conceded at once and in full.

It must be admitted that circumstances for which the British lack of imagination as well as the ponderous machinery of Indian administration is in some measure responsible have favoured the growth of this agitation. Some three years have elapsed since India was promised a

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"new angle of vision." Yet until three months ago there was no evidence to the Indian eye that anything was being done to redeem that promise. Lord Hardinge was believed to have taken home with him some scheme of reforms which he had drawn up before leaving India. Lord Chelmsford was believed to have set to work with his Council on a new scheme as soon as he reached Simla. But time passed and all this travail bore no visible fruits. Outside events also gave rise to suspicion. The rejection of the proposed Executive Council for the United Provinces at the hands of the House of Lords caused widespread irritation amongst even moderate Indians; and the rumours of schemes to hasten on Imperial federation and to give the self-governing Dominions some share in the control of Indian affairs aroused a very bitter feeling. For Indian opinion still smarted under the treatment of Indians in the Colonies, and the difficult question of Indian immigration had only recently been adjusted by a temporary compromise. The new Viceroy was very reserved and reticent, and his reserve and reticence were made the pretext for assuming that he was the reactionary nominee of a reactionary Secretary of State. No charge could be more unjust; and scarcely less unjust was the comparison, sometimes made to his disadvantage by European critics, between his position and that of Lord Durham in Canada in 1838. He had not Lord Durham's plenary powers, and he had more than Lord Durham's difficulties. His advisers were mostly high officials who had spent the better part of their lives in India and had therefore claim to speak with authority, but who failed to realise the determination of the Home Government, influenced by the avowedly democratic ideals for which the Allies were fighting, to introduce into the immense and complex structure of Indian administration a real element of popular control. It is plain from the Viceroy's subsequent announcement that a scheme was framed and sent home towards the end of 1916; and from the delay which subsequently occurred the inference is

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obvious that the home authorities decided that they would like further deliberation upon it. The Imperial Government could very reasonably plead that, since its energies were concentrated on the life and death struggle in which the whole Empire was involved, it had little time to devote to a serious study of such problems as the introduction of grave constitutional changes in India. But this plea was countered by the argument that the same Imperial Government seemed to find no difficulty in sparing time for such measures as Irish Home Rule, votes for women, and a large extension of the franchise in the United Kingdom.

The long delay, whatever its causes, perplexed and alarmed even moderate Indian opinion, which no longer had any leaders capable of guiding it, and waited in vain for any comforting assurances from responsible official quarters. Moreover, it allowed the Extreme wing to set up a standard of political demands which it became more and more difficult for any Indian to decline altogether to endorse without exposing himself to the reproach that he was unpatriotic and a creature of Government. As soon as it became known that the Viceroy was engaged on elaborating a scheme of post-war reforms, nineteen Indian Members of the Imperial Legislative Council hurriedly put together and published a counter scheme of their own. Apart from such eminently reasonable clauses as the repeal of the Arms Act and the granting of commissions to Indians, the proposals of the Nineteen would give the Provincial Councils power over the Executive subject to a limited veto of the Governor of the Province, would make election to these Councils direct—although nothing definite is said about the franchise: and would give the Imperial Legislative Council an unofficial majority and control over the Central Government except in certain reserved matters. The scheme is hazy, and bears evident marks of haste, but is open to all the objections of the Minto-Morley reforms, and in an aggravated degree

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to their dangers. It is an attempt to make the Central and Provincial Governments in India dependent upon the caprice of legislatures which have no mandate from any representative electorate, which have no training in responsible government, which are completely immune from the consequences of their own mistakes. If the lessons of the past have any meaning, such a scheme would lead to a hopeless deadlock.

Even this scheme did not altogether satisfy the more ardent members of Congress. It was amplified and made more precise and peremptory in a series of Resolutions adopted by Congress at the Lucknow session in December, 1916, and simultaneously by the Moslem League, also then in session at Lucknow. In recent times an extreme section had also grown up among the Mohammedans which had captured the political organisation of the Mohammedan community. A good many Indian Mohammedans had been steadily losing faith in Government. Matters abroad, particularly the Turkish-Italian War, conjoined with the Pan-Islamic propaganda put forward by the late Sultan Abdul Hamid, had led them to suspect that Great Britain was content to let Islam "go under," and would take no active measures to protect it. Worse still, the revocation in 1911 of the Partition of Bengal, which had, on the whole, served the interests of their co-religionists, convinced them that the will of the Hindu community, as expressed by its political leaders, was about to become supreme in India. The more fiery and ambitious spirits believed that they had less to hope—or to fear—from Government than from the Congress party. In 1911 an attempt had been made to bring about a political understanding between the two communities. It had failed; but after a little time the Moslem League was reconstructed upon other lines, the new ideal of self-government suited to India taking the place of the old ideals of loyalty to the British Raj and the jealous protection of the interests of the community against Hindu

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ascendancy. Broadly speaking, since its reconstruction, the League has represented only a very small fraction of the most advanced Mohammedans of India, and its doings are disliked both by conservative country gentlemen and by the general consensus of the all-powerful leaders of religious opinion, who profoundly distrust the younger "political" Mohammedans, whose orthodoxy is in many cases open to considerable suspicion. Some of the new leaders had come into close touch with Turkey during the Balkan Wars, and when Turkey actually joined the Germanic Powers shortly after the outbreak of the great European War their organs scarcely disguised their strong pro-Turkish leanings. No sooner had the Defence of India Act been passed than Lord Hardinge caused two of the most prominent "young" Mohammedans, Mohamed Ali and Shaikat Ali, to be interned in the Punjab, and the *Comrade*, the most notorious of their newspapers, had to suspend publication. But the political machine remained under the control of the advanced section, and in the course of 1915 a definite *rapprochement* took place with the Congress party in order to present the appearance of a united body of Indian opinion whenever the promised measures of reform should be disclosed. This pact was finally sealed and acted upon at Lucknow, some concessions having been made by the Hindus to Mohammedan sentiment in regard to communal representation in order to avert any immediate and open manifestations of dissent from the less articulate but more conservative sections of the Mohammedan community.

The Resolutions of Congress and of the Moslem League invested with a certain measure of authority the Home Rule movement, which had been started even before Lord Hardinge's Viceroyalty had closed, and against which he had earnestly but vainly warned the people of India in his farewell speech to the Imperial Council at Delhi. Mrs. Besant was its fiery champion. She had acquired a wonderful influence over young India by preaching

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with rare eloquence the moral and spiritual superiority of Indian over Western ideals and condemning the British administration of India, root and branch, as one of the worst manifestations of Western materialism. With her remarkable power of seizing the psychological moment, she had fastened on the catchword of "Home Rule for India," into which Indians could read whatever measure of reform they happened to favour, whilst it asserted the general demand of India to be mistress in her own household and to be freed from the reproach of "dependency" in any future scheme of reconstruction." She herself gave it the widest interpretation in *New India*, a newspaper whose extreme views had already drawn down upon her not only the action of Government but the censure of the High Court of Madras. The bulk of the Indian Press followed her lead. There were indeed many isolated and influential protests against an agitation which seemed inevitably bound to excite unrest and passion; but the Moderates gradually drifted for the most part with the rising tide, and the newspapers published every day long lists of fresh enrolments into the Indian Home Rule League. Even the appointment of Indian delegates to the Imperial War Conference and the extreme cordiality of their reception in London only made a temporary impression. What had they brought back with them, it was asked, beyond empty speeches? Much more potent was the effect of the Russian Revolution, which was hailed as an earnest of the doom that awaited all bureaucracies, and the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy in particular. Lord Chelmsford had, indeed, warned Indian politicians against advocating "cataclysmic changes": and his words had been echoed in slightly more emphatic form by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Governors of Bombay and Madras. Unfortunately, owing to the protraction of the correspondence between Simla and Whitehall, the Government of India was still precluded from making any positive announcement, and only later did the public learn that Lord

The Goal of British Policy

Chelmsford had invited Mr. Austen Chamberlain, then Secretary of State, to come out and judge for himself of the difficulties of the situation. Meanwhile the political tension became almost unbearable. When would Simla break its silence? The publication of the Mesopotamian Report only added to the flames, for it was not difficult to read into it a wholesale condemnation of the Indian administration. High hopes were raised by the speech of Mr. Montagu during the Mesopotamia debate a few days before his appointment to the India Office. These hopes, however, were somewhat damped by a speech of the Under-Secretary of State, Lord Islington, which indicated that the silence which had veiled the counsels of the Supreme Government was about to be broken. His pronouncement was in favour of a reform in accordance with the Australian model, foreshadowing a devolution of powers and genuine responsible government. It lacked definiteness, as might have been expected from the circumstances of its delivery; but it unhesitatingly condemned, on the soundest grounds, the reforms proposed by the Congress and Moslem League. The Home Rulers received it in the same way as they did the publication of Mr. Gokhale's political testament, which they declared to be well-meaning but entirely obsolete.

VII. THE GOAL OF BRITISH POLICY

AT last, in August, the Secretary of State was able to make the momentous pronouncement which if it had been made a year earlier and from the lips of the King-Emperor might have greatly eased the situation:

The policy of his Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that

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substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided, with his Majesty's approval, that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of local governments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others. I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility. Ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of the proposals, which will be submitted in due course to Parliament.

This announcement was at once recognised on all sides to be the most important ever made in the history of British India. In order to create a calmer atmosphere for the deliberations which were to follow Mr. Montagu's arrival in India, the Government of India deemed it prudent to order the release of Mrs. Besant and her two associates in the Madras Presidency, but they declined to release the two Mohammedans, Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali, until the former had signed a reasonable pledge of good behaviour during the war. This he has refused to do. These concessions, and still more the public rebuke inflicted upon Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who had been conspicuously successful in preserving tranquillity in the Punjab in times of very serious stress, for a perhaps inopportune comparison between the proofs of loyalty given by his own province and by other provinces, created some alarm and bitterness amongst Europeans. This uneasiness, coupled with the fact that the Congress have elected Mrs. Besant to the chair at the next session in Calcutta, and that the recalcitrant Mohammedan leader Mahomed Ali has been elected

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to the Presidency of the next Moslem League Session, shows the general state of unrest which pervades India at the present time.

Mr. Montagu has now reached India, and we shall not attempt to anticipate the results of his mission. We have merely endeavoured to indicate the immensely difficult nature of the task which lies before him. The policy to which the Imperial Government have pledged themselves is that it shall gradually lead India towards the appointed goal of self-government. The immense difficulties of this policy can only be appreciated by those who remember that India is a vast country, containing more than 315,000,000 inhabitants, divided into Provinces and States, each containing many millions, and divided also by differences of race, religion, caste, and by almost infinite varieties of social status. But this policy is the only policy compatible with British traditions and with the principles for which the whole British Empire is fighting at the present day. Our own history teaches us to regard responsible institutions as essential to self-government. The practical problem, then, which confronts Mr. Montagu and the British Government and Parliament is this : What steps can be taken to develop these institutions in India, without delay, but without making an advance so rapid as to lead to chaos, and at the same time to rally in support the two great classes in India whose co-operation is indispensable and who are now unfortunately divided by an undeniably wide gulf of antagonism—the British administrators and the Western-educated Indians.

VIII. CONFLICTING STANDPOINTS

ONE of the greatest difficulties of the situation is that each of these two parties claims to have the better knowledge of the real needs and interests and wishes of the vast Indian population, which is still too ignorant and inarticulate

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to give expression to them for itself. The Western-educated Indian claims recognition at our hands first and foremost because he is the product of the educational system we have ourselves introduced in India. His limitations, intellectual and moral, are largely due to the defects of that system, just as his political immaturity is largely due to our failure to provide him with opportunities of acquiring experience in administrative work and public life. Where careers have been opened up to him in the liberal professions he has often achieved great distinction—at the Bar, on the Bench, in literature, and, more recently, in certain branches of science. The Report at last published of the Public Services Commission admits, though in his opinion very inadequately, that he has already qualified for a considerably larger measure of employment in the higher branches of the administration, whilst without his assistance in the more subordinate branches the everyday work of administration could not be carried on for a day. He contends that he must instinctively be a better judge than aliens, who are, after all, birds of passage, of the needs and interests and wishes of his own fellow-countrymen and a better interpreter to them of so much of Western thought and Western civilisation as they can safely absorb without becoming denationalised. His complaint is that his own best efforts and best intentions are constantly thwarted by the rigid conservatism and aloofness of the European, official and unofficial, wrapped up in the superiority of race and traditions. He admits that he may not be able to discharge with the European's efficiency the legislative or administrative responsibilities for which he has hitherto been denied the necessary training, but he protests against being kept altogether out of the water until he has learnt to swim, especially when there is so little disposition ever to teach him how to do it. What he lacks in the way of efficiency he alone, he argues, can supply in the way of sympathy with and understanding of his own people. When it is objected

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that he represents only a very small minority of Indians and forms, indeed, a class widely divided from the vast majority of his fellow-countrymen, and that the democratic institutions for which he clamours are unsuited to the traditions and customs of his country, he replies that in every country the impulse towards democratic institutions has come in the first instance from small minorities and has equally been regarded at first as subversive and revolutionary. If again it is objected that the moderate and reasonable views he expresses are not the views of the more ambitious politicians who profess to be the accredited interpreters of Western-educated India, that there are many amongst them whose aims are more or less openly antagonistic to all the ideals for which British rule stands, and are directed in reality not to the establishment of democratic institutions but to the maintenance of caste monopoly and other evils inherent in the Hindu social system, and that in the political arena he seems incapable of asserting himself against these dangerous and reactionary elements, his reply is once more that he has never received the support and encouragement which he had a right to expect from his European mentors, and that it is often their indifference or worse that has largely helped to raise a spirit of revolt against all forms of Western influence.

The case for the British administrator can be still more easily stated. Britain has never sent out a finer body of public servants, take them all in all, than those who have in the course of a few generations rescued India from anarchy, secured peace for her at home and abroad, maintained equal justice amidst jealous and often hostile communities and creeds, established a new standard of tolerance and integrity, and raised the whole of India to a higher plane of material prosperity and of moral and intellectual development. They spend the best part of their lives in an exile which cuts them off from most of the amenities of social existence at home and often involves the more or less prolonged sacrifice of the happiest family ties. Those

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especially whose work lies chiefly in the remote rural districts, far away from the few cities in which European conditions of life to some extent prevail, are brought daily into the very closest contact with the people; and because of their absolute detachment from the prejudices and passions and material interests by which Indian society, like all other societies, is largely swayed, they enjoy the confidence of the people often in a higher degree than Indian officials whose detachment can never be so complete. Their task has been to administer well and to do the best in their power for the welfare of the population committed to their charge. The Englishman, as a rule, sticks to his own job. The British administrator's job has been to administer, and he has only recently been told, and never till a few weeks ago definitely and authoritatively, that it is also his job to train up a nation on democratic lines and to instil into them the principles of civic duty as such duty is understood in Western countries. No doubt there are British administrators in India whose innate conservatism, coupled with the narrowness which long years of routine and of official superiority are apt to breed, revolts against any transfer of power to, or any recognition of equality with, the people of the country they have spent their lives in ruling with unquestioned but, as they at least conceive it, paternal authority. The conditions of bureaucratic rule have inevitably tended to produce an autocratic temper. But it is not merely in obedience to that temper that they shrink from any changes that would weaken the administration. The best of them at least have a strong sense of their responsibilities as guardians and protectors of the simple and ignorant masses committed to their care. They may be inclined to judge the Western-educated class of Indians too harshly and to identify them too closely with the type that dominates Congress, but the form in which the question of yielding to the Congress clamour for political power and the Congress abuse of the British system of administration presents itself to their minds is

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by no means an entirely selfish one. "Are we justified," they ask, "in transferring our responsibilities for the welfare and good government of such a large section of the human race to an infinitesimal minority which has hitherto shown so little disposition to grapple any of the difficult problems with the solution of which the happiness and progress of the overwhelming majority of their own race are bound up, though, because themselves belonging to the same stock and the same social system, it would have been much easier for them to deal with those problems than it is for alien rulers like ourselves? Those problems arise out of the social system which is known as Hinduism—for Hinduism is much more a social than a religious system. Western-educated Indians will not openly deny its evils—the iron-bound principle of caste, which in spite of many concessions in non-essentials to modern exigencies of convenience remains almost untouched in all essentials and, above all, in the fundamental laws of inter-marriage, the social outlawry of scores of millions of the lower castes, labelled and treated as 'untouchable,' infant-marriage, the prohibition of the re-marriage of widows, which, especially in the case of child-widows, condemns them to a lifetime of misery and semi-servitude, the appalling infantile mortality, largely due to the prevalence of barbarous superstitions, the economic waste resulting from lavish expenditure, often at the cost of life-long indebtedness, upon marriages and funerals, and so forth and so forth. How many of the Western-educated Indians who have thrown themselves into political agitation against the tyranny of the British bureaucracy have ever raised a finger to free their own fellow-countrymen from the tyranny of those social evils? At one time—some thirty years ago—social reform did find many enthusiastic supporters amongst the best class of Western-educated Indians, but the gradual disappearance of men of that type may be said almost to coincide with the growth of political agitation. There have been and there still are

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some notable and admirable exceptions, but they are not to be found amongst the men who have most influence in the present Home Rule movement. It is on these grounds—moral rather than political—that we challenge for the present the claim put forward by the small Western-educated minority to be allowed to determine at their own discretion the present and the future of the Indian masses, for whose real welfare they have so far shown so little zeal."

This is perhaps the most forcible of the British administrator's arguments, and it is a thoroughly honest one. Another is that the Western-educated Indians are mainly drawn from the towns and from a narrow circle of professional classes in the towns. They cannot therefore speak on behalf of and still less control the destinies of a vast population, overwhelmingly agricultural, of whose interests they have hitherto shown themselves both ignorant and careless and from whom the very education which constitutes their main title to consideration has tended to separate and estrange them. The landowning gentry and the peasantry have so far scarcely been touched by this political agitation. The peasantry know little or nothing of its existence. The landowners fear it, for, having themselves for the most part kept aloof from modern education, and shrinking instinctively from the limelight of political controversies and electioneering competitions, they feel themselves hopelessly handicapped in a struggle that threatens with extinction their traditional prestige and authority as well as their material interests.

IX. THE NECESSITY OF UNION AND CO-OPERATION

WE have tried to set forth dispassionately both points of view, that of the moderate but progressive Western-educated Indian and that of the earnest but conservative British administrator. They both deserve consideration,

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for they may be taken to represent the best elements on both sides—elements which might have been brought together at an earlier stage had British statesmanship not lacked vision and which it cannot be beyond the wit of British statesmanship to bring together even now. The need is urgent. For it is only the union of the best Indian and the best European elements in India that can break down the forces of reactionary obstruction on the one side and of revolutionary destruction on the other which equally spell disaster in the end.

Indian Extremism, whether inspired by distorted ideals of Nationalism, or caste ascendancy, or racial hatred, is only the Indian incarnation of the spirit of anarchism which has brought Russia to the verge of ruin and jeopardised her new-born freedom, which is brooding over Ireland and threatens to blast all reasonable schemes of Irish Home Rule, which is undermining the vital forces of Italian resistance to the foreign foe, and which is creeping, less successfully and more silently, into many other countries. It seeks to render government of any kind impossible, and it is democracy's worst enemy because it is democracy gone mad and its mania is a suicidal mania.

Scarcely less dangerous is the spirit of bureaucratic negation, impervious to all changing influences, seeing only the difficulties and dangers which every change involves, and preferring to take the risk of stopping the clock lest it should happen to go too fast. Doubly dangerous is such a spirit in a country where the bureaucracy is an alien one, and therefore less quick to note or more prone to distrust any signs of impending change. Though it proceeds in India much more from a conservative habit of mind and an invincible belief in the abiding excellence of traditional methods than from less worthy considerations of self-interest, it has tended to stultify our educational policy, to petrify our administrative system, and to concentrate energy on the maintenance of present efficiency, instead of devoting it to the development of the

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larger self-governing capacities of the people. The unofficial Englishman, and especially the leaders of the great European merchant communities, have also much to learn if they are to give in return for the wealth they draw from India the intelligent sympathy and the example of civic duty and social goodwill, together with practical assistance in the promotion of Indian commerce and industry, which Indians may well expect from them. In the same way the great Indian landlords and the influential landowning classes must learn that they cannot hope to preserve their position or their prestige if they continue to hold themselves aloof from the responsibilities of public life and from the discipline of higher education.

A clear-cut ideal has now been set up—the development of responsible government in India—which should kindle the enthusiasm and revive the courage of all genuinely patriotic and public-spirited Indians and should stimulate all Europeans to new and higher endeavour. The attainment of that ideal can only be secured by the hearty co-operation of all Europeans and of all Indians who realise the value of India to the Empire and of the Empire to India. It will involve on both sides the sacrifice of many prejudices and predilections. Indian social reform will have to go hand in hand with political reform, gradual emancipation from the social bondage of inherited customs and superstitions with gradual emancipation from foreign political and administrative tutelage. With the European the old notion of efficiency as an end in itself must give place to the conception of educational training as the preparation for self-government. The great bureaucratic machine which has been elaborated by generations of foreigners in India must be so modified as to fall in with this conception. There must be the devolution of certain powers from Whitehall to Simla, of many powers from Simla to the Provinces, of some powers from the Provinces to Indian bodies representing an Indian electorate. This electorate cannot now be evolved by any system of education

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in the narrow sense of the word. There is no time. The criterion of literacy must be abandoned if the electors are to represent more than a fraction of Indian society. At the same time the British must forthwith attempt what they might long ago have accomplished—the extension of Western education far beyond the limits of the hereditary literary castes. But above all things, the responsibility which is placed upon this electorate must be real and within its limits effectual.

The British people is now face to face with the biggest experiment in the creation of responsible government which the world has ever seen—the introduction of practical self-government into a continent containing a sixth part of the human race. Whatever plan the Imperial Government may adopt in taking the first steps towards that goal, the British people may count on the loyalty of the public services in giving effect to it. But, whilst it rests chiefly with the Indians themselves to make or mar its success, it lays upon the British people a great responsibility. Let them remember the duty they owe to India as their predecessors remembered it from the days of Burke to the days of Bright, and let them insist upon a revival of the old healthy system of periodical grand inquests by Parliament, which shall systematically subject the progress of the Great Experiment to the most searching, the most impartial, the most conscientious investigation.

AMERICA'S PART IN THE WAR

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WITH every increase in the interdependence of the modern world it has become more and more difficult to localise armed conflicts. To-day every war has potentially the widest ramifications. At the outbreak of the Great War very few foresaw its vast extension, and even fewer perceived the fact that it would bring within the range of possible settlement the greater part of those political questions that were producing unrest. In Europe every question arising from thwarted, suppressed, and exploited nationalities has been cast into the seething crucible. Furthermore, the searching rays of life at white heat have been focussed upon the political and social mal-adjustments within the State and reforms are being insistently demanded and, in many notable instances, have even already been effected. Outside of Europe, in Asia and in Africa, the future of hundreds of millions of politically backward people is being determined on the plains and hills of France and in the fields and marshes of Russia.

When the United States entered the war it was the earnest hope of the most influential leaders of American opinion, and especially of those who instinctively recoiled from the inherent brutality of war and who, though advocating the resort to force, yet deplored its grievous necessity, that these widespread problems would in great measure be settled in accordance with the most progressive principles. In addition, they looked forward with confidence to the establishment of some supernational authority that would effectively prevent the recurrence of such a

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disaster by keeping all future aggressors in check. The compensation for the harrowing sacrifices of the present generation was to be a future world redistributed according to the general wishes of its component peoples and providing full security for those that sought progress along the paths of peace.

It is now some six months since the United States has become one of the belligerents. The radiant hopes of the sanguine days when the Russian Revolution was being inaugurated—before its unavoidable, and presumably passing, military drawbacks were plainly discernable—have by no means been abandoned. They are still widely, if not universally, cherished. But it is being increasingly recognised that their realisation is not immediately at hand and that much hard work remains to be done if the confident expectations of the spring of 1917 are to be made real.

America's declaration of war was not predominantly due to universal, or even to very general, indignation at Germany's contemptuous invasion of American rights, but was largely the result of an ever-firmer conviction on the part of an intellectual minority that the world would become an unbearable place for all its free peoples unless the political ideals and moral code of Prussianism were utterly discredited by the failure that can come from defeat alone. Thus the attitude towards the war was distinctly rational rather than emotional, and it still remains such, in spite of much subsequent evidence of heinous and malevolent misconduct on the part of Germany. While there is plenty of earnest determination there is but little excited enthusiasm. Towards Germany the temper is rather one of cool abhorrence than of hot hatred. The war was, and still is, not popular in an active sense. It was an unwelcome burden that was reluctantly assumed because there was no alternative course if America was to remain at all true to her traditions. But accompanying this reluctance is a firm resolution to carry the burden through to the end. Just as war itself has become so largely scientific and

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mechanical, so America is preparing for her part in it with the same systematic method, with the same absence of dramatic flourish, with which the engineer plans his railroad or canal in some distant land. It is a big task—one of incalculable size—that must at all costs be accomplished. There is no joy in doing it, but there is resolute dedication to the purpose of freeing the self-governing peoples of the world from the danger of involuntary subjection to autocratic force.

It is in this methodical manner that the United States is preparing to add its potentially great weight to the Entente cause. The available resources in men and material are enormous, but they were at the outset almost completely unorganised for war purposes. Yet, in the first six months of belligerency, a veritable revolution has been systematically effected. Including contracts and authorisations, Congress appropriated for war purposes the stupendous and unprecedented sum of over twenty billion dollars. Seven of these billions, it is true, are for loans to America's Allies, but the remainder is all for America's part in the war. With these funds a large Army is being created, the Navy is being increased, merchantmen on a vast scale are being built, and in countless other ways the potential strength of the United States is being mobilised. Congress deserves a full measure of praise both for its grants without stint and for the unwonted absence of party spirit during its sessions.

When war was declared the strength of the regular Army was 126,000 men and that of the National Guard about 180,000. In six months this small force had been expanded to one million and a half men, of whom it is expected that about one million will be available for service in Europe during 1918. In addition, 640 million dollars have been appropriated for the future air fleet and contracts have already been let for 20,000 aeroplanes. At the same time the Navy has effectively armed and manned American merchantmen for protection against the German sub-

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marines. In so far as new construction is concerned, especial attention is being given to a rapid increase in the number of destroyers and to improvement in their type and speed; 350 million dollars is being devoted to this special purpose alone.

In connection with purely military measures the time factor was not crucial. There was no actual peril of invasion to be forestalled, nor was the Western front in Europe at all endangered. Hence, it would have been folly to have thrown hastily prepared men into the field against veterans. But the element of speed was vital when it came to the problem of completing merchant vessels to offset the ravages of submarine and mine and the normal wastage by the elements. The delay in this construction was most deplorable. The trouble has now been rectified, but the time lost can never be regained, and this may prove costly. Towards the end of September, the British Controller of Shipping stated :

It is of the utmost importance that the United States should realise that the shortage of shipping is the most vital fact in the present situation, and that the building of merchant ships is of the utmost importance. The question the United States must face is whether, on the basis of the shipbuilding preparations she is now making, it will be possible for her to send any substantial force to France next spring without such a drain on the world's shipping as will subtract just as much from the fighting strength of the other Allies as her own forces will add.

In this connection Sir Joseph Maclay further correctly pointed out that the programme of the United States should be to outbuild the tonnage destroyed by the submarines, even if this means, he added, "the building of six million tons a year." Although the United States Shipping Board has been very energetic, it is doubtful if this maximum of production can be quickly reached. According to an official statement of September 26, the United States had available on that date $3\frac{1}{2}$ million tons

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of shipping, including that commandeered and requisitioned from German and Austrian owners. As the vessels then under construction amounted to nearly 6 million tons, it is expected that by the end of 1918 the merchant fleet will aggregate somewhat over 9 million tons. This is exclusive of the supplementary programme of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which in time will provide several more million tons. These ambitious plans are certainly not too great for the country's industrial capacity. But opposed to their speedy realisation are serious obstacles, some of which are also retarding the general economic mobilisation. Labour is both scarce and restless and, furthermore, consumption and production are far from being on a war basis.

Skilled labour is in urgent demand and it is becoming a serious problem to procure an adequate supply of workmen for the shipyards. Moreover, strikes are of quite frequent occurrence. In general, however, labour is cordially supporting the war. The American Federation of Labour, under the skilful leadership of Mr. Samuel Gompers, is actively co-operating with the Government. Disaffection is, however, being fomented by the Industrial Workers of the World, whose paramount aim is to aggravate every industrial disturbance so as to disintegrate the modern State. Opposition in labour circles is also being produced by the Socialist Party's doctrinaire attribution of the war's outbreak to the universal dominion of capitalistic imperialism throughout the world. Both of these organisations are largely in the control of men of alien tongue and origin and their direct and indirect opposition to the war is widening the breach between them and their colleagues of English-speaking traditions. Even under normal conditions the socialistic strength is small and its former influence has been considerably lessened by a secession of an important English-speaking minority, among whom are John Spargo, Charles Edward Russell and William English Walling. This is but one of the many instances of the

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war's polarisation of deeply ingrained racial and national instincts.

Washington is proceeding vigorously, and perhaps somewhat intolerantly, against the socialists and has refused the privilege of the mails to all papers directly or indirectly opposing the effective conduct of the war. For instance, allegations that the Government is controlled by Wall Street, by the munition manufacturers or by any special interest, bring them under the ban. Even more drastic action has been taken against the Industrial Workers of the World because, in their case especially, there was some ground for suspecting that German money was aiding the agitation. But, entirely apart from such extraneous disturbing influences, there is substantial reason for a considerable measure of unrest. In some instances wages have risen extravagantly since 1914; in others they have lagged behind. The cost of living, however, has increased immoderately for all. Those whose wages have not risen proportionately are naturally discontented and their dissatisfaction is intensified by the knowledge that the producer of raw materials and the manufacturer have been and still are making inordinate profits. In addition, Labour feels its power and some of the leaders are adroitly and selfishly taking advantage of the emergency arising from the shortage of workmen to secure conditions and wages that greatly increase the burden of the war both to the United States and to the Allies.

This scarcity is primarily due to the fact that consumption in the United States is not as yet on a war basis. The war cannot be so real to Americans as it is to those immediately within its range, and the economy campaign has so far not produced widespread results. The American people are notorious for their extravagance. The Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Houston, has given his official sanction to an estimate that edibles to the value of more than 700 million dollars were annually wasted in American kitchens. This normal extravagance was further fomented by the two

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years of fabulous prosperity preceding the entrance into the war. Retrenchment is no easy matter unless the compelling necessity is very actually present. To some extent, the financial disturbance is forcing a readjustment; but, in general, with the exception of food conservation, there has been comparatively little voluntary thrift. Despite the general scarcity of coal, the streets of New York are resplendent with myriads of electric lights and the consumption of gasoline by motor-cars for purposes of recreation is on a stupendous scale. An immoderately large proportion of labour is engaged in the production of luxuries.

In many respects this is unfortunate. Every decrease in the demand for non-essentials releases man-power for the production of war material. It lessens the cost of the war both to the United States and to the Allies. Widespread economy such as prevails in England would make possible the speedy completion of a ship-building programme far larger than the one under way. In another connection also the comparative failure to save on a large scale is proving somewhat harmful. It is a commonplace of war finance that the savings of the people are the most advantageous fund for the absorption of Government loans. Least satisfactory are those subscribers who borrow the money to pay for their bonds, for this process leads to an expansion of loans and to credit inflation. The huge Government issues cannot, however, be entirely covered by savings since the thrift campaign has so far had only moderate success. Hence, a considerable portion of the bonds will have to be taken by subscribers who must borrow money in order to do so.

Unfortunately, in very many instances, their ability, and also their inclination, to borrow money have been greatly lessened by serious financial disturbances. Prices of securities have declined most rapidly and there is marked lack of confidence in the financial future. To some extent this distrust is due to the so-called conscription of

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wealth. For war purposes additional taxes—in the main on excess profits and incomes—amounting to $2\frac{1}{2}$ billion dollars annually have been imposed and their effect and incidence is still a matter of conjecture. But, in greater measure, the disturbance is due to the fact that the credit of the railroads has been seriously undermined. Wages and materials have risen far out of proportion to rates, and the Interstate Commerce Commission is apparently loath to grant the desired relief. As a consequence, the investor believes that his property is faced either with bankruptcy or with Governmental expropriation at an unfair price. This is pre-eminently a domestic problem, but it has its effect on the war, not only in that it hampers the flotation of Government loans, but also in that it makes impossible a highly necessary expansion of transportation facilities. There is no question that all the money needed will in the end be raised, but unnecessary difficulties have been created by this gratuitous disturbance of credit during a time of exceptional prosperity.

The delay in ship-building, the scarcity of labour and its dislocation, the meagre success of the economy campaign, and the disturbed financial situation are unfortunate, but not ominous, facts in a situation that is on the whole full of promise. The catalogue of real accomplishment both in military preparations and in economic mobilisation is actually most impressive. In six months a markedly individualistic economic system has been nationalised and brought under Governmental control. The prices of foodstuffs and of fuel have been regulated and those of basic commodities, like copper and steel, have been determined by voluntary agreement between the Government and the manufacturer. In addition, a strict control over exports has been established so as to prevent supplies from reaching Germany through Holland and Scandinavia. The building of ships, the purchasing of supplies, the limitation of prices, the control of exports, of railroad transportation and of foodstuffs—to mention only the most conspicuous

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measures adopted to adjust the nation's economic life to war purposes—have meant a vast expansion of the Executive's activities. Board upon board had to be created to carry into effect the enlarged functions of the Government, with the result that the national administrative system has assumed a distinctly new character. In place of the ordinary functionary in his rut of routine, business men and financiers accustomed to large enterprises, students of public affairs and experts are conspicuous in directing the Government's new activities.

The question that is naturally uppermost in all thoughts is how America's resources in men and material can best be used to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Public opinion is far from clear on this point. The two really outstanding uncertainties are disconcerting and render impossible a confident judgment. On the one hand, there is the doubt as to whether Russia will be able to reorganise her partly demoralised army so that an unequivocal military decision may be possible in 1918. On the other, there is the unknown extent to which Germany's man-power is failing and her supplies of foodstuffs and warlike materials are being exhausted. These uncertainties give rise to interminable discussions. But, in general, the United States is not counting upon either contingency, be it a German collapse, a Russian revival—one, both, or neither. The preparations are for a war of indefinite duration, for whose successful conduct America has assumed unlimited obligations including, if necessary, the full development of her potential war strength. In official circles at Washington the possible termination of the war is put five years hence.

From this it is evident that the talk of peace in America is far less real than was that in Europe last summer and autumn. This is but natural. The long-suffering peoples of Great Britain and France had been buoyed up with the confident expectation of a military decision during 1917. The Russian disorganisation deferred this hope, but the inevitable result was considerable disappointment, which was

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aggravated by the fact that no perfectly clear light was visible ahead. In addition, these people had gone through three years of sacrifice. In the United States, the fresh belligerent just girding up his loins for the fray, these factors did not enter. While there is the keen desire of a pacific people for peace, there is full support for Mr. Wilson's position that the future peace must be equitable and enduring. The insistent demand is for a good peace, nor for mere peace in itself.

It cannot be sufficiently emphasised that the determining factor in American foreign policy, and pre-eminently so during time of war, is the official attitude of the President. America's conception of patriotism demands that in this respect at least public opinion be quite malleable and take the White House impress. Hence President Wilson's attitude towards the future peace is of supreme importance. In comparison with it the real views of Congress—whatever they may be—are of an insignificance that those accustomed to the executive responsibility of the parliamentary system can with difficulty realise. Even less important is the voice of the Press when once the Administration has taken an official stand. In fact, nearly all the important dailies are heartily supporting the President. However insidious be some journals of demagogic tendencies, however clamant be others of the socialistic creed or of the pacifist temper, however fine-spun be the criticisms of those of the secluded intellectual type, they count for comparatively little. Mr. Wilson cannot voluntarily swerve from his clearly-defined course without self-stultification. As in all things human, the personal factor cannot be ignored. Hence it is highly important to understand the President's policy.

On May 27, 1916, in his original general endorsement of "The League to Enforce Peace" programme, Mr. Wilson enunciated the following fundamental propositions: first, every people have a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live; second, the small States have the same right to their sovereignty and territorial integrity as

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have the great States ; and third, " the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations." These are the cardinal principles of the President's code of public right, and they have determined his subsequent conduct, as well as his conception of the nature of a stable peace.

Six months later, in December of 1916, at the time of the abortive peace manœuvre of Germany, Mr. Wilson officially stated that the United States was prepared to enter a League of Nations to safeguard these rights and the general peace of the world. Furthermore, a few weeks thereafter, in his notable address to the Senate of January 22, 1917, he declared that America's willingness to enter such a " concert of power " for the purpose of guaranteeing peace and justice throughout the world was contingent upon the terms of peace, for the settlement that is made must be worth guaranteeing and preserving. Such a peace, he maintained with buoyant optimism, must not leave a legacy of resentment. It must be based upon a recognition of the equality of the rights of all States, great and small. And, finally, such a peace must be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed. " No right anywhere exists to hand people about from potentate to potentate as if they were property." Furthermore, after referring to the general recognition of the necessity of re-establishing a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, he enunciated the comprehensive doctrine that " henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own." In addition, President Wilson pointed out the necessity of unimpeded access by all to the highways of the sea, which must be free " in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind " ; and he further stated that there must be a limitation of armaments, both military and naval.

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Hard upon this eirenicon followed Germany's defiant removal of all restrictions on her submarine campaign and America's entrance into the war. On April 2, 1917, the President explicitly defined the reasons for this momentous step. The object of the United States, he declared, "is to vindicate the principle of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth ensure the observance of these principles." He likewise drew a clear distinction, wisely perhaps in view of the German-American element in the United States, but unquestionably too sharply, between the German people and their autocratic Government, whom alone he held responsible for the war and the long-continued policy of aggression, intrigue and espionage that preceded it.

Two months later, after the Russian Revolutionary Government had explicitly announced as a basis for the future peace the rigid formula of "no annexations and no indemnities," Mr. Wilson categorically proclaimed America's disapproval of the negative programme of a mere restoration of the *status quo ante* from which, he contended, "this iniquitous war issued forth." He insisted upon the necessity of effective readjustments in order to do away with the wrongs of the old *régime*. These changes, however, must be based upon the following liberal principles :

No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

This summary recapitulation shows clearly that President Wilson has in mind well-defined principles of public

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right to which the future map of the world must conform if a stable peace is to be established and, if then, on this basis, an effective superstate authority is to be established. These principles were reaffirmed with considerable clarity and with some important amplifications in Secretary Lansing's reply to the Curia's plea for peace published on August 15, 1917. This answer cannot be comprehended unless the Vatican proposals are kept clearly in mind. Pope Benedict's expressed object was to hasten the advent of a peace "just and lasting—stable and honourable to all." To this end he made various concrete proposals. The general remedial ones were the substitution of moral right for the force of arms, a radical diminution of armaments, compulsory international arbitration, and "the true freedom and community of the seas." As to the material damages sustained by the belligerents, he urged the general principle of complete and reciprocal condonation, with the possible exception of certain unspecified cases that "would be deliberated upon with justice and equity." More concretely, the Pope proposed the complete evacuation of Belgium and France and also the restitution of the German colonies. All other questions at issue—specifically, Alsace-Lorraine, *Italia Irredenta*, Armenia, the Balkans, the ancient Kingdom of Poland—should, in his opinion, be left to negotiation in the hope that, "in consideration of the immense advantages of a durable peace with disarmament," they would be settled equitably and justly in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples immediately concerned.

Apart from its expedients to prevent a recurrence of the cataclysm, what was proposed was apparently a return to the *status quo ante*, but it was really far less than this. The basis of the peace was to be merely a qualified *uti possidetis*, for the pious wish as to the disputed occupied territories, such as Poland and the Balkans, was far from giving the slightest assurance that the proposed peace would not mean an enormous increase in power to the Central

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Empires and consequently their unquestioned hegemony over Europe. *Beati possidentes* have a very marked advantage in negotiation and one which the votaries of organised power are not likely to abandon voluntarily. No one conversant with political realities could have failed to perceive this.

As this proposal was diametrically at variance with President Wilson's Note to Russia, it was a foregone conclusion that he would point out its inadequacy and that he would lay especial stress upon the fact that it was futile to expect the existing Government of Germany to treat in a conciliatory spirit the various questions left to adjustment. In a carefully worded reply to the Pope, under date of August 27, Secretary Lansing pointed out that it would be folly to take the proposed path if in fact it did not lead to the desired goal of a stable and enduring peace. The object of this war, it was maintained, is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace of a militaristic and irresponsible Government imbued with the ambition to dominate the world and heedless of treaty obligations and international honour. "This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people." To make peace with this power on the Pontifical basis would, it was further contended, involve :

a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments, and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honour it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation ?

In the spirit of Mr. Wilson's address to the Senate of January 22, the Note then discussed the essential bases of a durable peace. The settlement, it was argued, can have

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no permanence if founded either upon political and economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and to cripple others, or upon vindictive actions of any kind. Though the American people had suffered intolerable wrongs at German hands, it was pointed out that they desired no reprisals upon the German people, believing that peace should rest upon

the rights of peoples, great or small, weak or powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government, and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world—the German people, of course, included, *if they will accept equality, and not seek domination.*

The words italicized by the writer are among the most significant ones of the entire Note, for they emphasise the crux of the international situation. After this solemn warning to the German people, Secretary Lansing reaffirmed the disinterestedness of the United States in the war and again declared that "punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues" were not the proper foundations for an enduring peace. We cannot, he concluded, take the word of the present rulers of Germany unless explicitly supported by the will and purpose of the German people, for "without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitution of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation, could now depend on."

The Note contains some delphic phrases and its meaning is far from perspicuous. Evidently, one of its main purposes was to drive a wedge between the German people and their Government and to strengthen the liberal and disaffected elements inside the enemy's lines. It was the natural sequel to the distinction between the German people and their Government made in Mr. Wilson's War Message, and the amplification was probably suggested by

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the two parallel statements made by Mr. Lloyd George on June 29 at Glasgow and on July 21 at Queen's Hall, London. On the latter occasion, in answer to Chancellor Michaelis's maiden speech, he said :

What manner of Government they choose to rule over them is entirely the business of the German people themselves ; but what manner of Government we can trust to make peace with is our business. Democracy is in itself a guarantee of peace, and if you cannot get it in Germany, then we must secure other guarantees as a substitute.

This appeal over the head of the Government to the people themselves is diplomacy of a new and democratic type. It is strategy of considerable danger in that its effect might possibly be to unify the German nation in the face of such interference in its domestic affairs. Time alone can tell. This danger, however, was considerably lessened by the fact that the American Note to the Pope contained a positive assurance to the German people that no merely punitive damages would be imposed and that there was no intention to dismember Germany. The phrase, "dismemberment of empires," presumably does not debar the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine ; nor is it probable that it was meant to apply either to Austria-Hungary or to Turkey, since the United States is not actually at war with them and hence was not likely to bring these questions into its diplomatic correspondence. This, however, is problematical. Similarly, the reference to "selfish and exclusive economic leagues" is somewhat enigmatic. The natural inference is that it referred primarily to the *Mitteleuropa* project and only secondarily to the resulting defensive measures planned at the Paris Economic Conference. Patently, a world divided into two hostile economic leagues would not be in a state of stable equilibrium. The tendency to a renewal of the armed conflict would be strong and possibly irresistible. Finally, in the background of the entire Note is the scarcely veiled comminatory reference to the fundamental economic fact,

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whose importance is being increasingly realised in Germany, that the economic reconstruction of the Central Empires is absolutely dependent upon the Allies, since they not only control the great bulk of the essential raw materials, but also command the seas that give access to them. In general, it was made clear to the German people that if they secured control of their irresponsible Government, gave conclusive evidence of good faith, and abandoned all ideas of domination, better terms of peace would be granted ; but that, if the existing system with its doctrines of aggression and ascendancy persisted, peace was still in the distant future and Germany's economic rehabilitation would not only be embarrassed but thwarted. It was Mr. Balfour's alternative of a free and loyal Germany, or one powerless to do evil.

That the malign spirit of Prussianism cannot be exorcised by pious wishes and that defeat and failure alone will discredit the cult of force is becoming more and more the firm conviction of Americans. Thus Mr. Wilson himself, on October 8, insisted that the war should end only when Germany is beaten and the rule of autocracy and might is superseded by the ideals of democracy. All talk of an early peace before Germany is defeated, he added, is one of the evidences of misdirected thought and should not cloud the vision of those who understand that the United States is fighting now for the same ideals of democracy and freedom that have always actuated the nation. On this point the two living ex-Presidents, though not of Mr. Wilson's political party, are in complete accord with him. On September 26, at Montreal, Mr. W. H. Taft said :

The Allies cannot concede peace until they conquer it. When they do so, it will be permanent. Otherwise they fail. . . . He who proposes peace now either does not see the stake for which the Allies are fighting, or wishes the German military autocracy still to control the destinies of all of us as to peace or war.

With characteristic aversion from half-measures, Colonel

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Roosevelt has gone even further. Adopting to the full the doctrines of Chéradame and other champions of "*la victoire intégrale*," he asserted on October 5 :

The only peace that will make the world safe for democracy is a peace based upon the complete overthrow of Germany and the dissolution of Austria and Turkey.

In this very connection it should be especially noted that the entire programme of a future League of Nations depends upon a conclusive Allied victory. With six of the eight Great Powers and a large number of secondary States allied against the Central European combination, the war has most distinctly assumed the aspect of the enforcement of a decree of the projected World Concert. Were Germany and her satellites able to defy this world-wide combination, the proposed League would patently be the most unseaworthy of ships of State. It would be wrecked before it left the ways. As Mr. Taft, the head of the unofficial organisation spreading the League gospel, has stated :

This war is now being fought by the Allies as a League to enforce Peace. Unless they compel it by victory, they do not enforce it.

That unfortunate phrase, "peace without victory," no longer arouses any enthusiasm and is being discreetly ignored. In so far as it means a negotiated peace between unbeaten equals, it rings the premature doom of President Wilson's inclusive League to ensure justice and peace. To the extent, however, that it does not preclude a victorious war, but merely "a militaristic peace" with punitive and vindictive damages imposed upon the vanquished, it still represents American policy.

Events during the war, and more particularly the State Department's disclosures of Germany's criminal intrigues in America, have engendered so deep a distrust of the German Government's good faith that but scant attention

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was paid to the answers of the Central Empires to the Vatican's peace proposals. Germany's most belated adhesion to a programme of compulsory arbitration and diminution of armaments based upon a conception of international right seemed to be not even a death-bed conversion, but merely an insincere attempt to secure such favourable territorial terms as would render feasible a renewed trial for world domination under more advantageous conditions. The reservation of "the vital interest of the German Empire and people" and the significant allusion to the war-map in the concluding phrase, "the situation in Europe," especially aroused suspicion. If these protestations were merely an attempt to beguile the Entente into an inadequate settlement, they failed signally in America.

Public opinion strongly supports the Administration's stand. With their characteristic common sense, the American people realise that Germany is still unbeaten, that the paramount duty is to defeat her, and that nothing is to be gained by a premature definition of the details of a peace settlement whose attainment entirely depends upon the combined effects of future military and economic pressure. There is inevitably opposition in various quarters. As in England, there is a group of intellectuals who uphold the war, but are so over-anxious for its speedy termination that they refuse to face fundamental facts. Remote from the realities of life, they urge the necessity of a negotiated peace that will leave no rancour anywhere. Largely because they want to, they believe in the possibility of Germany's sudden conversion from the time-honoured tenets of Prussianism, and hence they over-estimate every bit of evidence tending towards such an ultimate consummation. In contradistinction to the parallel British group, which magnifies the venial sins of its country into heinous crimes, some of these intellectuals are prone to be complacently nationalistic and to emphasise the faults of other Governments, even though they be America's associates

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in the great enterprise of making the world safe for its peace-loving peoples. Similarly, some of the extreme pacifists continue to advocate the speedy termination of the war, disregarding entirely the effect of its inconclusive issue upon human liberty. Some of the Socialists, in their anti-national internationalism, are likewise using the familiar catch-words of a "capitalistic war." Under the surface also German intrigue is still subtly active. All these various elements are, however, largely impotent. The American people are far from tolerant of internal opposition in the face of the enemy. One is loath to think of the fate of any American citizen who presumed, for instance, at this juncture to go behind his own Government's back and appeal to the peoples of neutral States to do what they could to stop the war at once. In 1863, during the Civil War, a prominent politician, C. L. Vallandigham—the rough prototype of E. E. Hale's famous "man without a country"—urged the futility of further slaughter, the immediate stoppage of the war and the reconciliation of the combatants, and, in general, opposed the war policy of the North. He was illegally tried and convicted by a military tribunal, and his sentence was commuted by President Lincoln to banishment, which was executed by escorting him within the enemy lines. Although the present crisis is far less concretely acute, such intolerance is becoming increasingly apparent, and there is a marked tendency to characterise all opposition to the Government's policy as not only unpatriotic, but traitorous and seditious. In overcoming such obstruction, the national and local authorities, and even academic bodies, have proceeded to far greater lengths than in England. Newspapers have been suppressed, pacifist meetings have been forbidden, and dissentient college professors have been dismissed. Apart from the broad question, whether freedom of speech has not been excessively infringed, even after making full allowance for the exigencies of war times, this has had the unfortunate result that it has

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somewhat retarded the educational process that results from an effective answer to error.

The small minority that openly or surreptitiously opposes the war is driven by this very fact into an attitude verging on condonation of Germany and of unsympathetic and carping criticism towards their own country's Allies. Hence in combating what are generally deemed to be their disloyal utterances, the average American tends to become the sturdy champion of America's associates. Any attack upon the Allies is necessarily an indirect attack upon the United States. Thus a very influential organisation of recent formation, the League for National Unity, has adopted the following fundamental principle :

It is not a time for old prejudices or academic discussion as to past differences. . . . We, therefore, deprecate the exaggeration of old national prejudices—often stimulated by German propaganda—and nothing is more important than the clear understanding that those who in this crisis attack our present Allies attack America.

The Government has taken the same stand. Postmaster-General Bureson, upon whom broad authority over the Press has been conferred, has officially declared that he "will not permit the publication or circulation of anything hampering the war's prosecution or attacking improperly our Allies."

As most of the insinuations and criticisms have been directed against England, there has in reaction resulted a far more sympathetic feeling towards that country and a more generous appreciation of the splendid part she has played in the war. As a consequence of this and of the co-operation demanded by the war, the traditional feeling towards England is rapidly changing. There still remain sporadic vestiges of the inherited suspicion. The distrust crops out in odd quarters, but it is probably most frequent among the minor politicians who cannot readily over-night abandon the jejune oratorical device of twisting the lion's

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tail. But a new tradition is steadily developing. Many an American, who only a year ago regarded England as the inherited foe, now looks upon her as the natural Ally.

This is not the place to analyse those intangible forces that produce national sympathies and dislikes. It is easy to praise or to blame, but it is always difficult to understand; and men generally prefer the facile to the arduous road. The root of most national antipathies lies in ignorance. In considerable part, the inherited prejudice against England that pervaded wide circles of the so-called "plain people" of America was due to the grossly prejudiced character of the history taught in the elementary and secondary schools*

An interesting illustration of this and of the clarifying effect of association in a common cause is afforded by the following remark, made by the author of one of the most popular books of war experiences. Sergeant A. G. Empey, an American who had served in the British Army, told his fellow-citizens after returning from the front :

We don't understand England over here. I was raised in Virginia and brought up on McGuffey's *Reader*, and I had the same opinion of England that a Minute-man † or a Sinn Feiner would have; but I found Tommy Atkins the squarest man that ever drew breath.

The defective unscientific character of very many of the history text books used in the lower grades of American schools is freely admitted by all competent authorities. The pernicious effects of this early training are widespread. For the youthful impressions harden into stub-

* Charles Altschul, *The American Revolution in our School Text Books* (Doran, New York, 1917). In this timely volume the passages dealing with the American Revolution in the text books used in a large number of schools in the United States are quoted *verbatim*.

† In 1775, in preparation for the impending revolt in Massachusetts against British authority, a special section of the militia, known as "Minutemen," was formed. They were under orders to be ready for service at a moment's notice.

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born convictions that condition conduct throughout life. Some initial steps have been taken to remedy this admitted evil. Similarly, a number of Americans who believe firmly that not only the peaceful development of their own country, but also the welfare of the world in general, is dependent upon close relations between all the English-speaking peoples, are endeavouring—singly and in groups—to spread an accurate knowledge of Anglo-American relations in the past. The scientific historians of recent decades have been unduly secluded, and too little of their labour research has reached the broad public. To rectify this is usually a slow process, especially in days of peace when the past arouses no keen general interest. It is an almost hopeless task when the will is opposed to conviction. But, at the present propitious moment, the reverse is more and more frequently the case. This promises well for that mutual understanding upon which effective co-operation must be based. Day by day it is becoming clearer that the English-speaking peoples are the mainstay of the coalition against Teutonic aggression, that upon their future close association depends the effectiveness of any future League of Nations, and that their vast economic and financial resources must be used jointly to rehabilitate a world that has gone through untold misery in ridding itself of the menace of Prussianism.

New York. October, 1917.

FREEDOM AND UNITY

NONE of the outstanding personalities of the war has made a stronger impression on the sentiment and imagination of the British peoples than General Smuts. And the reason is to be found not so much in his remarkable combination of talents, not so much in his record of achievement in the field and in council, as in the simple fact that only sixteen years ago he was fighting against the British Commonwealth and now he is fighting for it. Like his colleague and brother-in-arms, General Botha, he is at once a champion of the ideals on which the British Commonwealth now rests and a living proof of their rightness and power. "Freedom," he said himself at the Guildhall, "like wisdom, is justified of her children"; and history can show no swifter nor more striking instance of the operation of that rule than the results of applying to the two Boer Republics, almost on the morrow of their defeat and annexation, the doctrine of colonial self-government initiated by Lord Durham and his little school of Radical Imperialists nearly eighty years ago.

There is a special interest, therefore, in the series of public speeches in which General Smuts during his stay in this country has set forth with an eloquent simplicity the principles of his political creed. The first of these principles is freedom and the second is unity. No one has a better claim to speak of freedom than the man who, not long since, fought long and desperately for the independence of his people and is now engaged in a still longer and more

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desperate struggle for the independence of all peoples. And no one has a better claim to speak of unity than the man who took so great a part in building on the ashes of the old disastrous race-feud in South Africa the framework of a united nation ; and who, in the early days of this war, was forced to take the field against a misguided section of his own people in order that the work accomplished at the Union might not be undone and South Africa plunged again in internecine strife. General Smuts's life, in fact, has been a record of active service for both those ideals : he knows from the hard realities of his own personal experience that both must be sought together, that either indeed is unattainable without the other : and it is both ideals that he has preached to his fellow-citizens in this country. Thus, on the one hand, he has from the first insisted that freedom is the object and inspiration of this war—freedom from the perpetual menace of Prussian militarism. Freedom, again, he has reminded us, is the very life-blood of the British Commonwealth, without which it has never prospered in the past and can never prosper in the future. At the meetings of the Imperial War Conference none of his colleagues from overseas laid more emphasis than he did on the necessity for fully recognising the principle of autonomy in the self-governing nations of the British Commonwealth. None of them, on the other hand, supported more warmly the proposal for the regular institution of an Imperial Cabinet for the unified control of foreign policy. While he pleaded for the full freedom of the Dominions to develop and control their national life he pleaded also that they must stand united in their relations with the outer world, and that some constitutional machinery must be devised for keeping them together. It is unity, similarly, that he calls for from the people of this country as the one thing needed above all other things for the successful prosecution of the war. And it is with the same idea of unity that he advocates the establishment of a League of Nations. For the rationale of the League of Nations is to replace inter-

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State conflict by inter-State co-operation ; it rests on the idea of the unity of mankind and the hope of its ultimate embodiment in the political organisation of the world as against the doctrine of perpetual schism and inevitable war.

In the sphere of political thought at the present time nothing could be more opportune than General Smuts's reminder of the interrelation between the two ideals. The prolongation of the war is putting an increasing strain on the political structure of all the belligerent States : in one of them the old structure has been overthrown and no stable fabric has as yet been erected to take its place ; and from Russia the whisper of Revolution has run through Europe. In the field of ideas, as well as in the field of action, democracy is on its trial ; it is not only by their energy and endurance in the conduct of the war that the democratic peoples have now to prove their faith, but also by the steadiness and breadth of their political opinions. And this applies particularly, perhaps, to the democracies of the British Commonwealth and the American Republic. For theirs is the oldest and strongest tradition of self-government : it is their common heritage from England, the mother of freedom : and Europe now looks to them, as it once looked to England, for the proof that freedom and unity are not irreconcilable.

The British and American democracies have so far stood the test. The American people have followed President Wilson's lead with a unity and cohesion which have justified the most confident expectations of their friends and allies ; and the war has brought to the peoples of the British Commonwealth a stronger sense of unity than they ever possessed before. Nor is there any danger that American or British citizens will allow the ideal of unity to eclipse the ideal of freedom ; to suffer, for example, the perpetuation in peace time of the curtailments of individual liberty imposed on them by the necessities of war. The danger, such as it is, lies rather the other way. Of

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the two ideals unity is the more difficult to attain and to preserve in a democratic State ; and, in this country at any rate, it is the desire for unity more than the desire for freedom that has been weakened by the strain of war. The definition and discussion of the issues at stake have naturally thrown the emphasis on freedom. Men's minds are everywhere in reaction against the negation of freedom implied in the precepts and practices of Prussian militarism ; and, inevitably perhaps, the balance of thought has tended to swing over to the opposite extreme. In its most illogical form this tendency reveals itself in the occasional assumption that, because some German ideals are false and vicious, the world has nothing at all to learn from Germany. It is sometimes argued, similarly, that, because the German Government has perverted some vital function of civilised society, that function is itself unnecessary, if not positively harmful. The brutality of Prussian discipline, for instance, seems to encourage the belief that discipline is intrinsically a bad thing. And the same reasoning is applied to the State itself. Because the Prussian rulers of Germany have formed an irresponsible and immoral conception of the State and drilled their subjects to accept it, it is asserted that the existence of the State is in itself a danger to freedom and that it is at the best a piece of political machinery, not indeed to be dispensed with, but not to be regarded as the supreme form of association among men, whose legitimate claims override those of every other social organism when they conflict with them. The fallacy in all such reasoning is obvious enough. In theory and in practice the democratic State is wholly different from the Prussian-German State. It is not something detached from and potentially hostile to its citizens : it *is* its citizens organised as a single political community ; and its actions are the expression of their communal will. Thus it is the embodiment, and the only possible embodiment at the present stage of civilisation, of both the ideals. It is the only body which contains *all* the members of the community what-

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ever their class or race or faith. It is the only power which has authority to settle in the last resort the disputes that may arise between the individuals or the groups within it. Only through the State can unity be attained. And only through the State can freedom be attained. Except as a member of a State no man is really free. Freedom of movement, free expression of thought, the enjoyment of life itself, are only guaranteed by the protection of law; and law is but the instrument through which the democratic State gives effect to the prevailing sense of right and justice among its members. To maintain and extend the reign of law is indeed the whole purpose of the democratic State.

These facts are commonplace; and yet they are all too frequently neglected in current political thought. Both in this country and in the United States there is an increasing volume of what may be described as anti-State philosophising. It is pointed out quite truly that the old theory of the sovereign independence of the State in the sphere of its external relations has been steadily and inevitably giving way to the necessity of interdependence between States: but it is also prophesied that in the new era after the war State sovereignty will have to be "scrapped" in internal affairs as well. It is even proposed that "class, trade and professional associations" should "compete with the State for the loyalty of its citizens" and that the future development of democracy should be along the line of "co-operative" or "concurrent" allegiance.* Such proposals seem the more strange in that they are not novel. It was the doctrine of "concurrent allegiance," the theory that the citizen of one of the component States owed no higher loyalty to the United States as a whole than to his own particular State, that led to the American Civil War. And, once they are translated from theory into action, those ideas are just as dangerous to-day. *Si monumentum quaeris, circumspice.* On those ideas rests

* E.g., *New Republic* (New York), April 14 and September 15, 1917.

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the theory that a single class is justified in setting its own claims on a level with the claims of the whole community ; and from that it is but a short step to discarding the machinery the State provides for the redress of its grievances, and even to enforcing its will, if it can, upon the rest of the community by other means. It was in obedience to such arguments that organised Labour in Australia attempted this autumn to paralyse the government of the country by a series of strikes in the very midst of the war.* From those ideas, again, springs the doctrine that the Socialists of every State should be loyal to the *Internationale*, even when its decisions conflict with those of their own State. This doctrine is indeed repudiated by moderate Socialist opinion ; but it lies at the root of the pacifist agitation in Italy which is believed to account for the attitude of those regiments whose defection in the face of the enemy precipitated the recent military disaster. But the most obvious and terrible example is that of Russia. Under the old *régime* the peoples of the Russian Empire were united but not free. They were held together by the chains of despotism. And now they have broken that iron bond without as yet attaining freedom. For there can be no freedom in a world of anarchy and civil strife : there can be no freedom without unity. And the unity of the Russian peoples has been destroyed, for the time being at any rate, by the influence of those same disintegrating ideas in their most extreme form. Denied education, denied all means of acquiring political experience, a large part of the Russian peoples have fallen victims to the Maximalist doctrinaires who, having discredited and dissolved the reign of law by preaching the creed that every man should be a law unto himself, are now trying to save the situation by forcibly overriding the will of every other party in the State, and establishing their own supreme power by a *coup d'état*. They have set the Russian Revolution on the road which leads through anarchy to a new tyranny—that of

* See the Australian article in this issue.

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the Terror ; and unless all the forces in the country which stand for unity can combine and defeat them the last state of Russia will be worse than the first.

But it is not enough to recognise in such events as these the danger of political theories which lay all the stress on freedom and none at all on unity. The prevalence of such theories in old-established democracies is not a passing incident, nor wholly caused by the reactions of the war. It is largely due to a widespread discontent with the achievements of democracy, a discontent that was strong enough before the war and will be stronger after it. And, when all has been said in favour of the democratic State, it must be frankly admitted that, as at present organised, it is by no means a creature of perfection. Wise men do not discard an instrument which performs, however imperfectly, a vital function of civilised life without a sure belief in their ability to replace it with a better : but neither do they rest contented with its imperfections and make no effort to remedy them. And it is well to remember how wide is the scope for improvement. The democratic State, after all, is a very recent creation in modern history. In a sense, it has not yet been created ; it is still an only half-developed organism, an ideal half-realised. In this country, so far from having attained its final shape, it is at the present moment passing through one of its periodical phases of sudden and rapid growth. The forms of government on which it rests are undergoing drastic changes. The basis of the whole structure—the voting-power of the people—is to be vastly widened by the Franchise Bill now running its course through Parliament : and the Reform Bill of 1917 will not be the end of a process of expansion which only began with the Reform Bill of 1832. And if the scope of the people's voting-power has not yet attained its full development, still less has its quality. The capacity to vote wisely rests on education ; and on the heels of the Franchise Bill is to follow an Education Bill to widen and improve a system of public education which has only

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existed for less than fifty years. It is the same with the machine which gives effect to voting-power—Parliament itself. Proposals are now being discussed for the reform of the House of Lords: and the House of Commons is confronted not only with the necessity of devolving some of its over-numerous duties on to other bodies but also with far-reaching changes in the character of its *personnel*. The recent decision of organised Labour to constitute a national party * and to contest a much larger number of seats at the next election than heretofore is likely to mean a great increase in its representation. It is to be hoped, moreover, that, in all parties after the war, membership of the House of Commons will be regarded far more earnestly than heretofore as public service of the highest order, demanding the deepest sense of vocation and the best gifts of intellect and character the community can provide.

These are but a few examples of the countless possibilities of change and growth in the existing body and spirit of the democratic State. They suffice, however, to demonstrate the absurdity of regarding it as effete and out of date, as a political instrument which has been given a fair trial and has proved a failure. But they also serve to remind its supporters of the long task that awaits them. Not till the democratic State is fully developed and scientifically organised, not till the sense of responsibility on which its moral power rests is fully awakened in its citizens, can the final answer be given to those who depreciate its value and seek to undermine its authority.

The foregoing considerations may be applied *mutatis mutandis* to all democratic States; but there is one particular aspect of the problem of the interrelation between freedom and unity which concerns only those States which are not "national," but "multi-national" or "super-national," and of which the British Commonwealth is the most remarkable example. Nowhere is that prevailing

* See the United Kingdom article, p. 154.

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tendency to disregard the proper balance between the two ideals more marked than in the treatment, both in thought and in action, of the problem of nationality. And here again the primary reason is clear enough. The course of the war and the issues it has raised have thrown a special weight on the ideal of national freedom. Never does the spirit of nationality burn so brightly as when it is challenged and overridden; and, just as it was brought to life by the tyranny of Napoleon, so it has won a new power throughout the world from the attempts of Prussian militarism to destroy it. It pervades and stimulates the purpose of the Allied peoples. If the war is regarded in general terms as a war for freedom, it is regarded in particular as a war for the freedom of small nations.

Up to a point the emphasis thus laid on freedom has been as salutary in regard to the question of nationality as in regard to the more general problems discussed above, and it was perhaps more needed. It has reminded a generation who had forgotten Mazzini that a nation has a right to preserve and develop its character and traditions, its language and religion and ancestral ways of life; that, if this measure of freedom is denied to it by a despotic Government, it has a right to attain it, if it can, by achieving its political independence; and that, if in the past its people have been torn apart by force of arms and divided up among despotic Governments to satisfy their craving for aggrandisement, it has a right to recover, if it can, its political unity. Thus the civilised world recognises and affirms more clearly than it did four years ago the claim of the Poles to reconstitute their ancient State, of Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France, of the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires to attain the liberty so far refused to them by establishing their independence or uniting themselves with their fellow-nationals in neighbouring States.

But to recognise a right of national "self-determination" in those cases is one thing: to assert that that right

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is *absolute*—or, in other words, that a nation is entitled to political independence as a sovereign State if it desires it whatever the circumstances—is quite another. No political rights are absolute; and with a nation, as with an individual, the right to freedom is only the converse of the duty of service, and is only valid because and in so far as it is through freedom alone that the nation can do its own appointed work for the welfare of humanity. “Nationality is sacred to me,” said Mazzini, “because I see in it the instrument of labour for the good and progress of all men.” And again: “A nation is a living task, *her life is not her own*, but a force and function in the universal Providential scheme.” But Mazzini’s stern code of duty is forgotten by those nationalists who think of freedom only and regard complete political independence as the right of every nation which does not possess it, whatever the character of the State of which it forms a part. They make no distinction in the matter between autocratic and democratic supernational States. They prefer the same claim for the constituent nations of the British Commonwealth, for instance, as for those of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

This is but another example of the tendency to exalt the ideal of freedom at the cost of the ideal of unity; and again its unhappy fruits are to be seen in the actual course of events. Once more the clearest warning comes from Russia. The complete suppression of national liberty was an inevitable feature of the absolutist *régime*; and inevitably the Revolution brought with it a strong wave of nationalist feeling. But instead of waiting and working for a Federal Commonwealth which could combine the domestic freedom of each national division of the Russian State with the unity of the whole, the impatient extremists of Finland and the Ukraine have demanded separation, and by thus promoting disunion and chaos have not only jeopardised their own freedom as well as that of all the peoples of Russia,

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but injured also the cause of freedom throughout the world.*

Nor is the British Commonwealth by any means immune from this reckless and self-regarding nationalism. In Ireland and South Africa it has already produced rebellions, easily suppressed indeed, but leaving behind their disastrous legacy of hatred and distrust. And its disciples are still preaching the same doctrine. The attitude of Sinn Fein is still frankly separatist. Its leaders are demanding at this moment the establishment of an Irish Republic as an independent sovereign State. And General Hertzog is still laying down the constitutional theory that the people of South Africa have an "unassailable right" to maintain neutrality in any war in which the rest of the British Commonwealth may be engaged—a theory which, if once it were put in practice, would mean the separation of South Africa from the Commonwealth.† The same tendency is to be found, though less marked perhaps and less dangerous, among French Canadian nationalists. M. Bourassa, for instance, deplors that his English fellow-Canadians have lost "what was once an exclusively Canadian patriotism" and that "Canada is now merely regarded as one of the component parts of a great whole, the British Empire."‡

Such a widespread nationalist agitation would suggest to an uninstructed observer that nationality was as unfree in the British Commonwealth as in the German or Austro-Hungarian or Turkish Empires; whereas, in truth, freedom of national development in all its wealth and variety is one of the basic principles on which the British Commonwealth of Nations rests. Irishmen, Dutch South Africans, French Canadians are as free to cherish and preserve their

* The possibilities of separatist movements in Asiatic Russia are discussed in the article in this issue entitled "Turkey, Russia and Islam."

† E.g., Speech at Stellenbosch, May 11, 1917. See *THE ROUND TABLE*, No. 28, p. 821. See also the Republican movement described in the South African article in this issue.

‡ *Conscription* (articles in *Le Devoir*, republished and translated), p. 24.

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national characteristics—their laws and customs, their faith and tongue—as any of their English fellow-citizens. Except in Ireland, moreover, they possess the full measure of local self-government ; and the British Government has pledged its assent to any political status for Ireland within the British Commonwealth on which the Irish Convention can agree. But the extremists are not content with their local or domestic freedom. They wish to stand by themselves in the world, not free nations merely, as they can all be within the boundaries of a commonwealth of nations, but independent States, free to arm and in the last resort to fight not only against foreign peoples but also against those who are now their fellow-citizens.

The position of Ireland is clearly different in this respect from that of the Dominions. For the Irish people are represented together with the people of the United Kingdom—and indeed more fully—in the Parliament which controls the foreign policy of the Commonwealth. And to the vast majority of British citizens the Sinn Fein claim seems as empty and illegitimate as it is unreasonable. An independent Ireland could enjoy no real freedom in its foreign relations without the protection of the British or some other fleet : nor could it justify its independence by rendering through it any better service to humanity. Its weakness would endanger the security of Great Britain and the whole Commonwealth : and it would directly injure the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world by thus impairing the strength of the strongest Power that defends it. It might be said, in fact, that Sinn Fein is fighting not so much for freedom as against unity ; and if *Myself alone* is not the noblest watchword for an individual, *Ourselves alone* is little better for a nation.

The recent history of Europe provides a pertinent example of the interdependence of freedom and unity in the contrast between Switzerland and Belgium. If the peoples of French, German and Italian origin in Switzerland

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had not bound themselves so fast together into a single State—so fast in fact as to acquire a sense of a single nationality—but had set themselves up as little independent national States, they would long ago have suffered Belgium's fate. And Belgium herself might have escaped it if only she could have maintained her union with Holland. The Congress of the Great Powers at Vienna deliberately united Belgium and Holland in order to make the Low Countries the strongest possible bulwark of the peace of Europe. They thus attained a unity, which had it been preserved, might well have saved Belgium from the disaster of 1914. But unhappily it proved to be unity without freedom. The misguided attempt of King William to force the Belgian people into the mould of Dutch nationality by handicapping their language and attacking their religion drove them to assert their independence; and the Powers, recognising that an effective union of the Low Countries was now impossible, confirmed its dissolution.

Such historical lessons apply not only to the case of Ireland, but also to that of the Dominions. The peoples of the Dominions are in a different position from that of the Irish people because they have not hitherto enjoyed any effective share in the control of foreign policy. But, since it is not impossible to make good that deficiency in the scope of their freedom without destroying the unity of the Commonwealth as a whole, those nationalists who make the sovereign independence of the Dominions their ideal are no better justified than the followers of Sinn Féin. How better could the peoples of the Dominions perform "their function in the universal Providential scheme," how better serve the cause of peace and justice among all mankind, by breaking up a system which maintains the reign of law over a quarter of the world? Extreme nationalists would do well to remember the common-sense plea against the dissolution of the United States made by that great American from whose deep and enduring wisdom the forces of freedom have more than once drawn inspira-

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tion during the course of the present war. "We cannot remove our respective sections from each other," said Lincoln in 1861, "nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends?"

It is true that Lincoln had in mind the immediate physical contiguity of the American States; but the force of his argument is not lost because the nations of the British Commonwealth are sundered by the sea. Through the triumphs of science the world has shrunk immeasurably since Lincoln's day and is shrinking still; and the war itself has proved that no peoples now, in any corner of the globe, can keep themselves in their economic and political relations "beyond the presence and out of the reach of each other." Nor are the possibilities of political organisation any more exhausted than the possibilities of applied science. Only those who regard the capacities of the democratic State as already proved and discredited can doubt that its structure can be expanded and its principles adapted to include a commonwealth of many nations. But the constitutional framework of unity is a secondary question. A way will be found to embody the ideal if the ideal itself is not undervalued and abandoned. And to abandon the ideal of a super-national democratic State and to exalt in its stead the ideal of isolated self-regarding nationalism is to set back the political progress of humanity. Everyone now recognises that the chief crux in world politics, the chief obstacle to world peace, lies in the rivalry of independent nations who have no effective means of settling

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their disputes save war. The institution of a world-wide commonwealth, free and yet united, wherein five nations can settle their disputes by means of law instead of force, is a living proof that the obstacle is not insuperable and points the way to overcome it. England once saved Europe by her example: by its example the British Commonwealth may help to save the world.

It is the belief that the free peoples of the world are fighting to inaugurate a new era for humanity that inspires them to "dedicate their lives, their fortunes, everything they are, everything they have" to destroy for ever the power and prestige of military despotism. But despotism is not the only enemy to peace and good-will among men; and those golden hopes of the future will quickly fade if the free peoples, in their revulsion from despotism, forget, as they are now being tempted to forget, that, as it is only by unity that this war for freedom can be won, so it is on the ideal of unity as well as the ideal of freedom that the peace of a new age must rest.

TURKEY, RUSSIA AND ISLAM


AMONG the Western democracies public interest in the Russian Revolution is primarily concerned with European Russia. Attention is concentrated on the naval and military operations along the European front, on the nationalist agitation in Finland and the Ukraine, or on political developments at Petrograd. For most men the Russian horizon, so to speak, is bounded by a line drawn from Archangel through Moscow to the Black Sea. Beyond that all is vague and remote and out-of-mind. But it should not be forgotten that the Russian, like the British, Empire is more than a European State. It occupies about a sixth of the land surface of the globe, and contains about a tenth of its population. Clearly, then, a crisis which, if the worst came to the worst, might mean the disruption of so vast a political system is not limited in its importance to the affairs of Europe, nor even to the immediate issues of this world-war. Peace in Europe must prove a transient blessing without peace in Asia ; and there can be no real peace in Asia as long as the political future of the peoples of the Russian Empire, in all their diversity of race and tongue and standards of civilisation, remains uncertain.

Similarly, it is not in Europe only that the enemies of Russia and of freedom are striving to hinder by all means in their power the consolidation of the new-born Russian democracy. While the German Government plans for herself a glacis of vassal States, and fosters anarchist and separatist movements in European Russia. the military

Sketch Map of CENTRAL ASIA

English Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Chief railways Inter-state boundaries



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The Pan-Turanian Movement

oligarchs of Turkey, apt pupils of their Prussian masters, are cherishing yet wider ambitions of aggrandisement. They mean to reverse the historic rôles. Russia is now to be the "Sick Man"; and just as autocratic Russia once freed the Slav and Christian peoples in the Balkans from Turkish tyranny, so now they dream of "freeing" the Turkish-speaking and Mohammedan peoples from democratic Russia. How serious these aspirations are and how dangerous they might become in the disastrous event of a complete breakdown of order and cohesion within the Russian Empire will be made clear by a brief examination of Turkish policy and especially of that factor in it which is known as the Pan-Turanian movement.

I. THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

TURAN is a Persian word. In Persian mediæval poetry it means the steppes and deserts of Central Asia, in contrast to the settled country of Iran or Persia. The "people of Turan" are the nomads of many different languages and races who constantly overran Persia from the north-east, till the Russians pacified Central Asia half a century ago. It was with little regard, therefore, for its precise origin that European philologists appropriated the name *Turanian* for the languages of north-eastern Europe and Asia which are "agglutinative" in structure, in contrast to the Indo-European family. It was really a negative term—a provisional label for an unexplored mass.

The work of exploration was first taken up seriously by the Magyars, who speak one of these agglutinative languages (of the Ugro-Finnic group) and have always felt themselves isolated among the Latin, Slavonic, and Teutonic speaking peoples of Europe. A mediæval Hungarian monk once made a pilgrimage eastward to discover his lost kinsmen, and lighted upon the Bashkirs of the

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Ural region; and during the present war Magyar professors are said to have conducted a propaganda among Russian prisoners of war belonging to easterly Finnish tribes, to prove to them that the Magyars are their brethren and Buda-Pest their cultural home. It was the same idea that led the famous Hungarian *savant*, Vambéry, to undertake his travels and researches among the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia, but the main field of Magyar Pan-Turanianism lay nearer home. When the Magyar struggle for independence in 1849 was crushed by the combined Austro-Russian armies, many leading Magyar refugees had found an asylum in Constantinople; and in 1867 these exiles returned to Hungary and became a power in the newly constituted Dual Monarchy. During the Balkan upheavals of 1875-8 the Magyars were violently pro-Ottoman, and a deputation of Magyar students presented a sword of honour to the Sultan during the Serbo-Turkish War.

This Magyar-Ottoman *rapprochement* was not really racial but political. Magyar Pan-Turanianism, in fact, was following in the wake of Russian Pan-Slavism. When the Russians remembered their kinship with the Balkan Slavs and this movement took on a political form, the Magyars looked about for "Turanian" anti-Slav allies, and found them, naturally enough, in Russia's ancient enemies—the Turks. Thus the *rapprochement* between Buda-Pest and Constantinople was manifestly political. It did not really rest on a common consciousness of "Turanianism," but on a common hostility to certain Slavonic States. The same political motives have led to the acceptance of the Turanian label in Bulgaria since Czar Ferdinand's intervention against Serbia and Russia in the European War. Yet the Bulgars are as much Slavs as any other Slavonic-speaking people, and owe their existence as an independent State to Pan-Slav sentiment. The original founders of Bulgaria, thirteen centuries ago, were, it is true, "Turanian" nomads from the steppes;

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but they have left far less trace on the Slavs upon whom they imposed themselves in the Balkan Peninsula than the Normans have left on the people of England. Modern Bulgaria is a Slavonic State which has played for its own hand in defiance of Pan-Slav sentiment and wishes for new sentimental catchwords that conform with its *Realpolitik*.

Thus Pan-Turanianism, in its origin, is both artificial and European. The Osmanlis did not extract it for themselves from Persian literature (though they study Persian as we study the Greek and Latin classics); it was offered to them from Europe, and they have not been the wooers, but the wooed. The Osmanli has no genuine sentiment for the Bulgar or the Magyar, who are both ex-subjects of his, like the Serb and the Greek. If supposed self-interest induces the Bulgar and the Magyar to fight his battles, to subscribe to his loans, to give his young men technical instruction, and to supply him with machinery, he will take full advantage of their services. But he feels no more kinship with them than with the other Christian nations of Europe; * and his principal object in this war is to rid the Ottoman Empire of external European influences, whether these are "Central" or "Entente," "Turanian" or "Teutonic."

A trained philologist may be conscious of some unity of structure in all Turanian languages as contrasted with the Indo-European family, but to the uninitiated Osmanli there is no visible relation between his own language, which belongs to the Turkish group, and Magyar, which is Ugro-Finnic. On the other hand, the relation of the various Turkish dialects to one another is obvious to anyone. It can be seen on the map in the names of rivers,

* This is true even of the Turkish doctrinaire Pan-Turanians, as may be seen from the following quotation from Tekin Alp: "It is a matter of congratulation that the *rapprochement* between Magyars and Turks is being so well received here. . . . Yet the Turk's national idea cannot be the race theory, because the latter is really nothing but a Utopian dream."

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mountains, and towns. The Turkish-speaking peoples stretch from Turkey-in-Europe through Anatolia, Trans-Caucasia, Northern Persia and Afghanistan, to Russian Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, and, in a more broken chain, round the northern shores of the Black Sea, through Bulgaria, Dobrudja, Crimea, the Volga provinces and Siberia, to the neighbourhood of the Arctic Ocean. They cover an even more extensive though less compact area than the Slavs, and the different Turkish dialects are at least as closely related as the different Slavonic languages. Their kinship strikes the ear. It was only natural, therefore, that as soon as the Ottoman Turks became linguistically conscious of their nationality, they should become conscious at the same time of their affinities with other Turkish-speaking peoples, just as the national revival of the separate Slavonic populations produced a common sense of Pan-Slavism among them.

Pan-Turanianism, then, in the sense of a Pan-Turkish movement originating among the Ottoman Turks, is part and parcel of Ottoman Turkish nationalism, and can only be understood in relation to it.

II. THE RISE OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

THE consciousness of nationality, like the word "Pan-Turanian," has come to the Osmanlis from Europe. The Ottoman Empire began as the very opposite of a national State. It is not called after any people who inhabit it, but after the prince who founded it—Osman. It is true that Osman and his tribe were Turks, but they were only one out of a dozen Turkish States in Anatolia, and their Turkish neighbours were their worst rivals and enemies. They built up their power by conquests in Europe. Their best taxpayers were Christian subjects, their standing army

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Christian converts, their most loyal supporters apostate Albanians and Slavs, who changed their religion but kept their language. Till a century ago the Turkish nationality contributed practically nothing to the Ottoman State except the literary and official language of the governing classes, and that language was so diluted with Persian and Arabic that it had little left in common with the vulgar Turkish of the Anatolian peasantry. The bulk of Anatolia was a comparatively late acquisition of the Empire. It was a neglected region, to a large extent practically independent, under local feudal chiefs.

During the last century, however, Anatolia has taken the place of the Balkan Peninsula as the "home country" of the Ottoman Empire; for while the Balkan provinces have been breaking away, the Asiatic provinces have been brought more and more under central control. The same Sultan who lost Greece broke the power of the feudal aristocracy in Anatolia and Kurdistan. The process of disintegration in Europe reached its climax in the Balkan War of 1912-3; the process of centralisation in Asia Minor has been completed by the Committee of Union and Progress since the treaty of Bukarest, and especially since Turkey's entry into the European War.

The most significant change has been in the composition of the Ottoman Army. The Janissaries, a hereditary professional army descended from forced Christian converts of all races, were destroyed in 1826. The modern Turkish Army is organised on the nineteenth century European basis of conscription from the civil population. Down to 1908 the conscripts were nominally drawn from the whole Mohammedan population of the Empire, and since the Revolution Christians and Jews have been made liable as well. But the Government never got hold of the nomads and mountaineers; the settled Arab population was not good military material nor easily mobilised on the most threatened frontiers, which till the present war were those in Europe. Both before and after 1908 the Mohammedan

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Turkish-speaking Anatolian peasantry have been the staple of the Ottoman conscript army—its most amenable recruits and its toughest soldiers—and the Anatolian upper classes have more and more supplied the centralised Empire with its officers and officials. Thus, when the conscious Turkish national movement began, the Ottoman State was already resting on a practical foundation of Turkish nationality.

The cultivation of national consciousness by the Ottoman Turks was partly an imitation of older nationalist movements in Europe and partly the spontaneous product of similar conditions. Like most European nationalisms it started by being cultural rather than political. The first nationalist society was founded at Salonika in 1909, in the comparatively free atmosphere that prevailed during the first three years after the Young Turk Revolution. The founder of this society was a provincial notable—one Ziya Bey, of Diarbekir, who had come up to attend a Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress. Diarbekir is a Turkish enclave in Kurdish and Armenian territory, and it is characteristic of nationalist movements that their most fanatical leaders come from the debatable borderlands.

Ziya Bey's group started a campaign to purge the literary Ottoman language of its Arabic and Persian borrowings, and to replace these by old Turkish words which had never been admitted into Ottoman literature. This might seem a fantastic aim, for it is only through the adoption of foreign words, idioms and rhythms that Turkish has been given literary form at all. Yet submerged languages in Europe have been revived under circumstances of almost equal difficulty, and this "Pure Turkish" movement claims to have had complete success. The Turkish writers of the traditional school were routed, and the use of Arabic was even attacked in the ecclesiastical field. The Nationalists wished to translate the Koran, Friday Sermon, and Khutba (Prayer for the Caliph) into Turkish, and to remove the Arabic texts from the walls of Turkish mosques; but they

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had to drop this part of their programme, which was far in advance of ordinary Turkish opinion.

This phase of Turkish Nationalism lasted from 1909 to the Balkan War of 1912-13. It was a doctrinaire imitation of the linguistic Nationalism of Europe, impossibilist and unpolitical. The chief source of information about it is a book on *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal*, by Tekin Alp,* a pseudonym which is believed to cover the name of a certain Salonika Jew.† This is a good illustration of the artificial origins of the movement, and it throws some light also on its prospects of success. For the Salonika Jews are inseparable from the Committee of Union and Progress, and one of their number would hardly have taken up Pan-Turanianism so strongly unless he thought it had found favour in the eyes of the Committee. Tekin Alp evidently feels it politic to identify himself with the Nationalism of the ruling race in Turkey, as the Jews in Hungary have identified themselves with Magyarisation. But his book has to be used with caution; for though it has been written since the Committee of Union and Progress have taken up the Pan-Turanian idea, it is impossible to tell how much (if any) of its contents represent their policy. On the whole it is safer to take "Tekin Alp" as representing the doctrinaire school of Ziya Bey, and to judge the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee solely on the evidence of their political actions since the Balkan War.

The Balkan War made Pan-Turanianism practical politics. The shock of that disaster penetrated to wider circles than had been affected by the academic movement of the previous years, and seems to have kindled a genuine desire for national regeneration among all educated Turks. A number of societies, with local branches in Anatolia, the Caucasus and Turkestan, were founded to promote education, physical culture, the emancipation of women, and other

* Published in German by Kiepenheuer, Weimar, 1915.

† By residence only and not by race, to judge by his fore-name. His residence in Macedonia is proved by allusions in the book itself, where he actually calls himself a Macedonian.

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really constructive aims ; and from this time onwards the Government lent its support. The Ministry of Aukaf or Religious Endowments has made grants out of its enormous funds for the multiplication of national schools ; there has been a scheme for reforming the Medressés—the reactionary Mohammedan ecclesiastical seminaries ; and during the present war the Government has challenged the whole existing ecclesiastical order by sweeping legal reforms which will bring much of the former domain of the Sheriat (Sacred Law) under the civil jurisdiction. The Sheikh-ul-Islam resigned over this, but he was and remained an active "Unionist," and the *fait accompli* was accepted by his successor. It is possible that both were acting in collusion with the Government—calculating that this formal protest would be a safety-valve for discontent among the humbler members of the ecclesiastical body.*

All these activities were inspirations from Europe, like the crusade for a pure Turkish language, but they were of a much sounder kind. The Osmanlis seem to have been impressed by the example of the Balkan States, which had built up their strength by internal reforms till they were able to beat Turkey in war. Unfortunately they also borrowed from Europe another idea—irredentism.

"Observers," Tekin Alp writes, "who like myself are Macedonians and like myself had ample opportunity of gaining an intimate knowledge of the irredentist propaganda of the Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs and Vlachs, are able to judge the significance of this national ideal, and how sweet and inspiring it is to go through the greatest dangers for such a cause"—and he proceeds to sketch the life history of several young Macedonian Christians who, before the Balkan War, had sacrificed everything to work for their national unification. This may, of course, simply represent Tekin Alp's personal philosophy, but it is probably true that the Balkan War did influence such public opinion as

* See *Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel*, by Harry Stuermer, ex-correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* (Payot et Cie., Lausanne).

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exists in Turkey in this direction. During the century ending in the years 1912-13 the centre of gravity of Turkey had actually shifted from Europe to Anatolia. After 1913 there was a corresponding change in the national consciousness. The Turkish nation abandoned the tradition of being a dominant race in Europe, resolved to develop its own latent possibilities in Anatolia, and conceived the ambition of making up for lost alien subjects by attracting to itself the scattered branches of the Turkish race outside the Ottoman frontiers.

III. THE POLICY OF THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS

IRREDENTISM gave a new significance to the linguistic reforms of the Ziya Bey Group, for the Ottoman literary language, relieved of its special Arabic and Persian borrowings and reinforced by an eclectic pure-Turkish vocabulary, might become a *lingua franca* for all who spoke the various living Turkish dialects. The Pan-Turanian movement was thus advancing on to purely political ground, and at that point it was taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Committee were not Nationalists to begin with, chiefly because they ignored the nationality problems of the Ottoman Empire. Their primary aim was to maintain the integrity of the Empire, especially in Europe, and in this they agreed with Abd-ul-Hamid and all previous rulers of Turkey. They only differed as to the means; for, while Abd-ul-Hamid believed in despotism at home and a balance of jealousy among the European Powers, the Committee held that Turkey's best safeguard was internal strength, and the best source of strength political liberty. Their ideas of liberty were drawn from the French Revolution. "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" would be proclaimed, all inhabitants of the Empire would rally to

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the State as free Ottoman citizens—just as Picaids and Marseillais and Alsations rallied to the French Republic after 1789—and the question of Nationality would solve itself.

This actually happened for the first six weeks after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908. Men of all creeds and races embraced each other in the streets. But then they drew apart again and considered how they might turn the new *régime* to their own advantage. The Balkan nationalities rejected the offer of a liberal Turkey altogether, and determined to take the first opportunity of completing their own unity and independence at Turkey's expense. Others, like the Arabs, the Armenians, and the Constantinopolitan and Anatolian Greeks, recognised that secession was impossible, but took measures to defend their own national individuality within the Ottoman State. The Arabs formed the main opposition in the new Parliament; the Armenians also wished for decentralisation, though they co-operated in Parliament with the Committee. The Committee found, in fine, that the Turks were the only element in the Empire that was not opposed to centralisation and had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State idea. They therefore fell back upon their Turkish nationality, and came to think of Turkification as the natural means of achieving their ends. After the Balkan War they incorporated Turkification in their programme, but it is important to examine precisely what place they gave it.

It has been shown above that the Turkish version of Pan-Turanianism contains two general ideas: to purify and strengthen the Turkish Nationality within the Ottoman Empire, and to link up the Ottoman Turks with the other Turks in the world. These objects were first pursued in the cultural sphere by Ziya Bey's private group of "Intellectuals" and were promoted by peaceful propaganda. After 1913 they took on a political form and were incorporated in the pro-

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gramme of the Committee of Union and Progress. But while for Ziya Bey's followers Pan-Turanianism was an end in itself, for the Committee it is only an instrument. They will not give up movements that conflict with it, like Pan-Islamism, if these movements can still serve their turn, and they will not persist in it indefinitely in circumstances where it does not pay, as it is not paying at present in Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia.

The contrast between academic Pan-Turanianism and the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress* can be drawn with precision.

The first aim of the Ziya Bey group was to purge the *Turkish language and culture* from foreign (*i.e.*, chiefly *Arabic*) influences. They were ready to violate some of the strongest prejudices of Islam for the sake of carrying this aim to its logical conclusion. The first aim of the Committee is to purge the *Turkish State* from foreign (*i.e.*, chiefly *European*) influences: extra-territoriality of foreign subjects, foreign control of Ottoman finance, railways, raw materials, and education. The doctrinaires dared to defy Islam; the Committee are far too prudent to defy Islam, but they have defied Europe. When the Concert of Europe broke down, they intervened in the war and denounced the Capitulations. And in 1916 they passed a "language ordinance" making the use of Turkish compulsory, after a year's delay, for banks, newspapers, trams, railways, steamship companies, book-keeping of private firms, and all business of a remotely public or legal character.†

Secondly, the doctrinaires proposed to strengthen the

* Of course some C.U.P. leaders have taken up Pan-Turanianism in its academic form. Dr. Nazim, for instance, is said to have been converted by a book he borrowed from the French Consul-General at Salonika, *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie: Turcs et Mongols à 1405*, by M. Léon Cahun, a French *savant*, whose thesis it is that the "Turaniens" were a brilliant race ruined by the adoption of Islamic culture. But Dr. Nazim was always a doctrinaire, and since the Balkan War he has not been one of the dominating personalities in the C.U.P.

† The stringency of the original draft was afterwards somewhat relaxed in the passage of the Bill through the Senate.

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Turkish nationality in Anatolia by education and social reform. The Committee's method has been to exterminate the non-Turkish nationalities scattered through the country—first the Armenians and latterly the Greeks—and to give their lands and houses to "Muhajirs" (Mohammedan refugees from the provinces lost in 1912-13, partly Turks, but partly Slavs from the Balkan peninsula and Greek-speaking Mohammedans from Crete). Another motive for the atrocities has been to make the war popular among the Turkish population by sating it with Armenian plunder—a purely temporary and opportunist aim—and they were also an appeal to that reactionary spirit of Mohammedan fanaticism against which the doctrinaires have declared war.

Thirdly, Tekin Alp seeks to change the political ideal of the Ottoman Turk from Imperialism to Irredentism—from ruling over alien Christian nationalities in Europe to "liberating" kindred Turkish populations in Russia and Central Asia. For the Committee it is rather a quantitative problem. In the Balkan War they lost territory, population and military prestige on their European frontiers. In the European War they hope to compensate or even out-balance these losses by corresponding gains in Asia and Africa; and here appears a fourth motive for the Armenian massacres, for the Armenians are an alien block separating the Ottoman Turks of Anatolia from the Azerbaijanis of Northern Persia and Russian Trans-Caucasia.

It is clear from the foregoing analysis that Pan-Turanianism is not the only weapon used by the exponents of Turkish aggrandisement. They possess another and an older weapon in Pan-Islamism. And in nothing is the opportunism of the Committee of Union and Progress more evident than in their attempt to use them both together. For, as has been shown above, the two creeds conflict. If Pan-Islamism were really a religious doctrine it would not be so incompatible with Pan-Turanianism as it is. But just as Pan-Turanianism is not really a racial

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movement, so Pan-Islamism is not really a religious movement. Both of them are political programmes for increasing the power of the Ottoman Empire abroad—rivals in the same field.

Most of the religious revivalism in Islam during the nineteenth century has been definitely anti-Ottoman. The Wahabis of Nejd and the Mahdists of the Egyptian Sudan both regarded the Turks as little better than Franks and Infidels; the Senussi retired to the Libyan desert to escape the contamination of Stambul. It is noteworthy that the supporters of all these movements were Arabs, were uncivilised, and were independent, by force of arms, of either Ottoman or European control. The Ottoman doctrine of Pan-Islamism appealed, on the other hand, to settled, civilised Mohammedan populations under the government of European Powers like Britain, France, and Russia. These populations had seen enough of European institutions to wish for them themselves. They aspired to become self-governing nations playing an independent part in international politics, and they admired Turkey because they believed her to be a Mohammedan State which already realised their ideal. They were not sufficiently well-informed to see through Turkey's European masquerade to the weakness and corruption underneath; they only saw in Turkey a model of what they hoped themselves to become, an existing guarantee for the political future of the peoples of Islam. For Islam is theoretically a political as well as a religious society. The Caliph is the temporal ruler of all good Mohammedans, as well as their religious head. It is true that this political unity broke down within a century of Mohammed's death, and has never been fully restored. But if the Caliph cannot exercise this universal power, the best alternative is that he should be an independent sovereign, powerful enough to make his wishes felt by the other sovereign Governments of the world, and this condition is fulfilled by the Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople; for the Ottoman Empire is the strongest and most

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enduring Mohammedan State there has been since the fall of the Abbasids.

The possibilities of political propaganda on these lines were perceived and cleverly exploited by Abd-ul-Hamid. The Ottoman strategic railway from Damascus to Medina, largely built out of the contributions of the Faithful from foreign countries, is a good example of his diplomacy ; and this policy has been continued by the Committee of Union and Progress. In Tripoli, for instance, before the Italian conquest, the Ottoman Government was regarded by the natives as an irksome foreign oppression, but Enver Bey succeeded in winning over native sympathies ; the Libyan Arab now looks on the Turk as his natural ally against the European invader ; and even the Senussi have made common cause with him during the European war. It will be seen presently how the same policy has been developed in Asia.

Now this Pan-Islamic propaganda would be crippled at once by a logical following-out of the Pan-Turanian idea. If the Ottoman Empire is not an Islamic Great Power but a Turkish National State, and if Turkish Nationalism and Islam are ultimately irreconcilable, then the special ties which link the Mohammedan populations of other States to Turkey are broken. There is no more salvation for them in Turkey than in the British Empire or Russia or France, and the Committee of Union and Progress have no more claim on them than their established Governments. The Committee are well aware of this, and have avoided committing themselves openly to the Pan-Turanian creed where it is in flagrant contradiction to the Pan-Islamic. The Allies have laid hold of anti-Islamic and anti-Arab declarations by Pan-Turanian writers and acts of tyranny and repression by officials of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Arab provinces, and these have served excellently as anti-Turkish propaganda in the Arab world. But it would be difficult to convict the Committee, as a party or a government, of a Pan-Turanian programme which would discredit their Pan-Islamic professions.

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The policy of the Committee, in fact, is to exploit both movements at once. While they find Pan-Islamism the more useful of the two abroad, it is clear that they set more store by Pan-Turanianism at home. Their object being to convert the Ottoman Empire into a highly organised militaristic State on the German pattern, they naturally find a more appropriate basis in common language than in common religion; and the following passage occurs in a resolution passed at the Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress in October, 1911 :—

“The character of the Empire must be Mohammedan, and respect must be secured for Mohammedan institutions and traditions. Other nationalities must be denied the right of organisation, for decentralisation and autonomy are treason to the Turkish Empire. The nationalities are a negligible quantity. They can keep their religion but not their language. The propagation of the Turkish language is a sovereign means of confirming the Mohammedan supremacy and assimilating the other elements.”

This smooth assertion of contradictory principles is an excellent example of the Committee's attempt to blend the two ideas in their internal policy. It also reveals on which they lay more stress. The suggestion that the subject nationalities “may keep their religion but not their native language” is a complete reversal of the traditional policy of the early Ottoman conquerors, who allowed the Albanian and Bosnian nobility to keep not only their language but their estates when once they had accepted the Mohammedan faith.

IV. TURKISH POLICY IN PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN

SUCH, in outline, is the double-edged policy adopted by the present rulers of Turkey for the consolidation of the Turkish State and the extension of its dominion or its

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influence beyond its existing bounds. It may now be considered how this policy is operating in Central Asia.

The Eastern frontier of the Turkish Empire is separated from the Indian frontier of the British Empire by the two independent States of Persia and Afghanistan. The inhabitants of both are almost wholly Mohammedan and in the northern districts of both there is a considerable Turkish-speaking population. The migrations from the Asiatic midlands, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries A.D., which carried Turkish-speaking tribes to Anatolia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, deposited them also in the provinces of Persia north of the Central Desert, especially in the most north-westerly province, Azerbaijan. Similarly, the provinces of Afghanistan between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus are occupied by a predominantly Turkish population. They were once independent Turkish (Uzbek) Khanates, like Khiva and Bokhara, and they were only annexed by Afghanistan during the years 1850-9.

These Turkish-speaking peoples provide an obvious opening for the propaganda of the Pan-Turanian school, and in Persia, at any rate, its exponents have been quick to seize it. But there are serious obstacles in their path. The Turkish-speakers of Persia have at present no consciousness of Turkish nationality. They are separated from their neighbours in Turkey by sectarian differences; they are Shias, like the Persians, not Sunnis, like the Anatolian Turks. Moreover, as Tekin Alp himself admits, they still write letters in Persian and read Persian newspapers. But the chief obstacle to the spread of a Pan-Turkish Nationalist movement is the existence of a Persian Nationalist movement, of which, as it happens, Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, has been the centre. Yet the Pan-Turanian doctrinaires are not discouraged by these difficulties. Tekin Alp proposes to give the Azerbaijanis a "Turkish soul"; and he tries to prove that this happy consummation would increase the internal strength of

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Persia. As a matter of fact, it would divide and weaken it. The forces of Persian Nationalism would be split asunder, and the Persians proper would be driven into hostility towards the Ottoman Empire.

The Committee of Union and Progress show no signs of committing such a blunder. Neither in Persia nor in Afghanistan, where the school of Tekin Alp might aspire to rouse the Uzbeks also to a sense of Turkish nationality, are they likely to press the Pan-Turanian aspect of their policy. Here, as in North Africa, their political instrument is rather Pan-Islamism. They pose as the liberators of Mohammedan States caught in the toils of British or Russian "imperialism," as the standard-bearers of the "Holy War" proclaimed in the name of the Caliph by the Sheikh-ul-Islam in October, 1914. They have suggested a Triple Alliance of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan based on the principle of political independence for Islamic States. In the districts of Western Persia which they invaded they succeeded in persuading the Persian Nationalists to give them armed support; and they sent a mission to the Amir of Afghanistan which seriously embarrassed him in his neutrality. If this Pan-Islamic propaganda has so far borne little fruit, if the "Holy War" has proved a fiasco, it is mainly because Turkey has on the whole suffered military defeat. For the mainspring of Pan-Islamism, the presupposition of Turkey's championship of other Mohammedan peoples, is the prestige of the Ottoman armies. If those armies had marched victoriously into Tiflis, Cairo and Teheran, or if the Allies had never threatened Constantinople and captured Baghdad, Pan-Islamism might have produced far-reaching military and political results. And, even now, it is by no means bankrupt.

It was because it offered the wider possibilities of Ottoman aggrandisement that the Committee of Union and Progress have thus adopted the Pan-Islamic policy in Persia. But, if it finally fails, if it becomes clear that they cannot overthrow the Anglo-Russian *régime* and replace it

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by an Ottoman hegemony, they can fall back upon Pan-Turanianism and play for the smaller prize. They can try to detach from Persia her Turkish-speaking peoples and especially the Azerbaijanis, just across their eastern frontier. The Osmanlis have always coveted Azerbaijan; they occupied it more than once during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; in the winter of 1914-15 they overran it for a few weeks as an incident in their Caucasian offensive; and their designs upon the province might conceivably be assisted by domestic developments in Persia. If the Persian Nationalists came into power, they might adopt a chauvinistic policy, as Nationalists have all too often done in multi-national States. In that case the Azerbaijanis might be roused at last to the consciousness of being Turks and might desire to cut themselves loose politically from Persia. But they might not turn in the first instance to the Ottoman Empire. While Azerbaijan borders on Turkey to the west, it borders on Russia to the north; and across the Russian frontier dwell the Tatars of the Caucasus, who belonged to Persia, like the Azerbaijanis, before the Russian annexation, and are closer to them in every way than to the Armenians and the Kurds across the Turkish frontier. It may be said, in fact, that the political destiny of the Azerbaijanis and the Caucasian Tatars will ultimately be the same. They are bound in the end to gravitate in the same direction; and whether it will be westwards or northwards depends on the fate of Russia.

V. THE MOHAMMEDANS AND TURKS IN RUSSIA

IT is from the uncertainties of the future of Russia, as was suggested at the beginning of this article, that the leaders of the Pan-Turkish movement can weave their most ambitious dreams. For within the Russian State there is a far greater Mohammedan population and a far greater Turkish-speaking population than in the Ottoman

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State. The number of Mohammedans in Russia may be estimated at something under twenty millions; and of these over sixteen millions speak Turkish, whereas the Turkish-speaking population of the Ottoman Empire is not more than eight millions. A vast field is thus opened in Russia for Pan-Turanian or Pan-Islamic exploitation.

The Mohammedans of Russia are distributed in large but not contiguous groups between the central plain of European Russia and the fringes of the mountain frontier of Northern India. The first of these groups, in geographical order, is that of the Tatars of Kazan, who live along the middle course of the Volga between Nizhni Novgorod (which is only some 250 miles east of Moscow) and Samara. Their centre is Kazan, where the river makes its great bend from east to south. They constitute an almost isolated enclave, surrounded by Great Russians on the west and Finnish tribes* on the north and south. Beyond the Urals, in Western Siberia, there is another group of Tatars, some fifty thousand strong, around Tobolsk; and southwards, where the Volga joins the Caspian Sea, are the Tatars of Astrakhan. The Tatars of Kazan and Astrakhan together number about one million and a half. West and south again come the Tatars of the Crimea (under 200,000) and the Mohammedans of the Caucasus (about 2,500,000 Tatars and 1,500,000 others), cut off from each other and from the rest of the Russian Mohammedans by a broad belt of Ukrainians, Russians, Germans and Kal-mucks, while nothing but the Black Sea and an artificial land-frontier divide them from the Mohammedans of Turkey and of Persia. But by far the largest Mohammedan district in Russia is that which stretches from the south-east corner of Europe for fifteen hundred miles across Central Asia. First come the Chuvashes on the fringes of

* Nominally Christian, virtually still Pagan, possessing no culture of their own, and capable of being assimilated by Tatars or Russians—whichever gain the final ascendancy in this region.

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the Volga plain, and the Bashkirs of the Urals ; next, on the great midland steppe, the flourishing tribal confederacy of the Kirghiz, and among the Trans-Caspian oases a dwindling remnant of Turkmens ; and beyond these again the Turks of Russian Turkestan and the dependent States of Khiva and Bokhara—in sum, a body of about twelve million Mohammedans, occupying an almost unbroken area between the Volga and the Caspian on the west, the line of the Trans-Siberian railway on the north, and the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan and the Chinese Empire on the south and east.

With the exception, then, of this Central Asiatic mass, which is itself broken up by belts of desert, the Mohammedans of Russia possess no geographical unity. They are only linked together by the great strategic lines of communication constructed by the Russian Government—the Trans-Siberian, Orenburg-Tashkend, and Trans-Caspian railways. And even the political unity which their common inclusion in the Russian Empire gives them is somewhat superficial. For the different Moslem populations have been incorporated in Russia at widely different dates—the Volga and Siberian Tatars in the sixteenth century ; the Crimean Tatars not till 1783 ; the Moslems of the Caucasus between 1783 and 1868 ; the Kirghiz in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ; the Uzbek Khanates (Bokhara, Khiva, and Khokand *) between 1868 and 1876 ; the Turkmens of Trans-Caspia between 1873 and 1886. And these historical differences are reflected in differences of administration. Kazan, for example, lies in the heart of modern Russia, and has long been in possession of ordinary Russian civil institutions ; the Caucasus has been a vice-royalty containing some civil governments and some military provinces, but not endowed with “zemstvos” ; Trans-Caspia and Turkestan have been under military administration ; Khiva and Bokhara have never been

* Khokand was annexed by Russia in 1876, and made into the Province of Ferghana.

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administered directly by Russia, their status being similar to that of the Native States in India.

Thus the Mohammedans of Russia are divided politically as well as geographically, and the two systems of grouping do not coincide. Yet another and a more important cross-division is created by their differences of culture.

In the first place, the Russian Mohammedans are not all of one sect. Central Asia and the Volga are more or less uniformly Sunni; but in the Caucasus there is an important Shia element in those districts which belonged to Persia before the Russian conquest, and the Caucasian Mohammedans have so far been partitioned between two rival religious primates, the Sunni Mufti and the Shia Sheikh-ul-Islam; while even among the Sunnis there has been no All-Russian ecclesiastical organisation. The Sunni community in the Caucasus, like the Shia, has been kept in isolation. The "Mohammedan Ecclesiastical Court" of Orenburg,* an official organ of the Russian Government, has exercised jurisdiction over the Mohammedans of European Russia (in the administrative sense); but the Crimea and the former territories of Lithuania were excluded, and its authority has not extended over Central Asia. In some Central Asiatic districts—for example, the Province of Siemiriechensk—the local Mohammedan ecclesiastical institutions appear to have been suppressed by Russia, while, on the other hand, the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara have naturally retained ecclesiastical as well as political autonomy.

Secondly, there are profound social and economic diversities between different sections of the Mohammedan population.

In the upper basins of the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya † the population is sedentary and comparatively dense. During the last fifty years the Russians have done much

* Its actual seat is Ufa.

† The Arabs call this district "Mawera-al-Nahr"—"the country beyond the River (Amu-Darya)."

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to meet the need of irrigation, and have successfully fostered the cultivation of cotton.* There are large urban centres—Tashkend, for example, the capital of Turkestan and the ninth largest city in the Russian Empire—and ancient seats of Middle-Eastern culture, pre-Islamic and Islamic, like Bokhara and Samarkand. This region, in fact, belongs to the ancient civilisation of the East. It is analogous to India. As in India, European rule has been imposed on it from outside at a relatively recent date; and it is separated from the rest of the Russian Empire by a zone of deserts and steppes, as India is separated from the rest of the British Empire by the sea.

The Turkmens of the Trans-Caspian oases and the Kirghiz of the steppes, on the other hand, are still mainly pastoral nomads; their Mohammedanism is a comparatively recent acquisition, and sits lightly upon them; and, possessing no ancient culture of their own, they are distinctly more susceptible than the first group to "Russification." The Bashkirs of the Urals and the Chuvashes of the Volga fringe, who are in a transition stage between nomadism and agriculture, are still more amenable to Russian influence. And, further west and north, the process of "Russification" is far advanced. The Tatars of the Crimea, Astrakhan, Kazan, and Tobolsk have been practically assimilated, socially and economically, by Russia. They might almost be defined as Russians professing the Mohammedan religion; and they stand at the opposite pole to that first far south-eastern group who are Asiatics under Russian rule.

The Mohammedans of the Caucasus, finally, are sharply divided amongst themselves. There are mountain tribes as wild as any on the North-West Frontier of India and only held down by military force. There is a Moham-

* In Chinese Turkestan, on the contrary, where European organisation has not yet come to the rescue, agriculture is fighting a losing battle against wind and sand.

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medan agricultural peasantry in the Trans-Caucasian steppes. And a Mohammedan working class and *bourgeoisie* are growing up in the oil-fields of Baku. Baku itself is a typical product of the European economic enterprise which has followed in the wake of Russia's territorial expansion. Beside the ancient walls and Oriental bazaars of the old Tatar town lie the wide streets, the public buildings, the shops and the business offices and the private residences of a prosperous modern city of the west. Its population has grown as rapidly as its trade. It is linked by railways with mid-Russia and with the Black Sea. From its port the steamers cross the Caspian to the railhead for Merv and Bokhara and Khokand or to the main entry into Persia by the Russian-built road from Resht to Teheran.

Thirdly, there is the division of language.

Over a million of the Russian Mohammedans belong to indigenous tribes of the Caucasus, speaking a variety of tongues; another million and a half, scattered through the Caucasus and the settled regions of Central Asia, speak Iranian dialects; the remainder, more than 16,000,000 in all, speak Turkish. But, while this vast Turkish-speaking element gives the Russian Mohammedans a certain predominant colour, its unifying effect is diminished by the existence of dialectical differences, which, heightening and also heightened by differences of culture and history, break them up into three main groups gravitating towards three distinct poles.

(i.) The centre for the Tatars of the Caucasus is Baku. They speak the same dialect as the Turkish-speaking population of the Persian province of Azerbaijan, and nearly the same as the Ottoman Turks of Anatolia. The Tatar Press at Baku employs the literary Ottoman language of Constantinople, which is Anatolian Turk diluted with Arabic and Persian. The dialect of the Crimean Tatars is also closely related to Osmanli and Azerbaijani, and there is considerable intercourse between the Crimea and Baku.

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(ii.) The Tatars of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Tobolsk, with the Chuvashes and Bashkirs, are centred on Kazan. For the peoples of this group Turkish is, in the main, an adopted language. The Bashkirs and Chuvashes were originally Finnish-speaking tribes. The Tatars of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Tobolsk are a hybrid race, with Mongol conquerors imposed from above and Christian slaves introduced from below. The genuine Turkish element in them is small, and Kazan was Mohammedan in religion before it became Turkish in speech. The Tatar Khanate of Kazan was the direct successor of the Ugro-Finnic Kingdom of Bolghari or "White Bulgaria," and the "White Bulgarians" were converted to Islam in the tenth century, about fifty years before the Ukrainians and Russians were converted to Orthodox Christianity.

Kazan is thus an ancient Mohammedan, though a comparatively recent Turkish-speaking, centre. Its Islamic culture, which declined after its incorporation in Russia, has notably revived within the last generation. This revival is said to have begun in 1886, when two elementary school-teachers were imported from Constantinople. From that time onwards schools were founded and students sent to Mohammedan universities abroad; but the great impetus came from the Russian Revolution of 1905, which struck off some of the shackles from the non-Russian languages in Russia and obtained a measure of freedom for the Press. Thus, whereas before 1905 the Volga-Ural Tatars had their Korans printed for them in Russian printing-works, since 1905 a dozen large printing businesses are said to have been started by the Tatars in Kazan, Orenburg and Ufa, where books are printed in Arabic for markets as distant as Egypt, the Hejaz, India, and the Dutch East Indies. In the same centres, it is said, between twenty and thirty weekly and daily newspapers have been established, printed for the Tatars themselves in their own Turkish dialect.

(iii.) The Turkish-speaking Mohammedans settled in

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the upper Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya basins are diverse in origin and blood; but they all speak the Chagatai dialect. Chagatai Turkish (or Eastern Turkish) differs widely from the Osmanli-Azerbaijani (or Western Turkish) dialects. Some of the commonest roots and suffixes are used with quite different meanings in the two groups, and each developed into a literary language on independent lines. Literary Chagatai has borrowed much less than literary Osmanli from Persian and Arabic. Famous books have been written in it—the *Memoirs of Baber the Moghul* in the sixteenth century, and *Abu'l Ghazi's history* in the seventeenth—and the literary tradition has never died out. Such Turkish newspapers as have yet been started in Tashkend and other cities of the Amu-Darya-Syr-Darya region are published in the Chagatai dialect, and it is unlikely to give way either to Osmanli or to Kazan Tatar.

The Kirghiz of the steppes and the Turkmens of the Trans-Caspian oases have yet to be dealt with, and they occupy a somewhat indeterminate position. As far as the Kirghiz tribesmen are developing any desire for culture and education, they appear to be gravitating north-westward towards the Kazan group rather than south-eastward towards the Chagatai group. The Turkmens, on the other hand, whose dialect belongs to the same "Western Turkish" group as that of the Caucasian Tatars, the Osmanlis of Anatolia and the Azerbaijanis, are drawn by their geographical position towards the Chagatai group.

The Mohammedans of the Russian Empire are thus split up by a number of cross-divisions, geographical, social or economic, and linguistic or cultural; and none of the groupings coincide.

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VI. THE POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF THE RUSSIAN MOHAMMEDANS

THUS vast and thus varied is the Mohammedan population in the Russian Empire. What, it may now be asked, is its political attitude? and what possibilities does it offer to the ambitions of the Turkish Government?

In the days before the war Russia would scarcely be regarded as a very promising field for Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turanian propaganda. It is true that nearly all the Mohammedan peoples now included in the Empire offered a determined resistance to the Russian conquest; but, once the conquest had been completed, revolt and even unrest were rare. In general the Russian Mohammedans have been loyal, conservative, and somewhat narrow in their political outlook. Their lack of organisation, moreover, has prevented them from overcoming their manifold divisions, from strengthening the consciousness of common ties and interests, or from attaining political influence as a united body. Stronger in numbers than any other non-Russian group, with the possible exception of the Ukrainians, they have been politically as weak as the weakest. The "Russian Mohammedan Party" only dates from 1905 and had no more than nine representatives in the last Duma.

Nevertheless, the Pan-Islamic propaganda, started by Abd-ul-Hamid and carried on by the Committee of Union and Progress, was not wholly unsuccessful among the Russian Mohammedans. Its authors possessed one peculiar advantage. Mohammedan pilgrims to the Hejaz from almost all parts of Russia used habitually in peace-time to take steamer at Batum or Odessa and pass through the Black Sea Straits. A visit to Constantinople was a natural incident in their journey and the Ottoman Government knew how to exploit it to good effect. By such means they succeeded at any rate in widening the political horizon of

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the Russian Mohammedans. It was significant that when the Balkan War broke out, a number of the latter went to Constantinople to help their Ottoman co-religionists in their adversity.

How limited, however, were the effects of the Pan-Islamic movement in Russia was revealed by the sterner test of the present war. The Russian like the Indian Mohammedans were not shaken in their political allegiance by Turkey's alliance with the enemies of the Russian and the British Empires. An insignificant Mohammedan tribe of Georgian nationality, the Adshars, joined the Turks when they invaded the Batum district for a moment in the winter of 1914-5; but the revolt did not spread. In 1916 there was a rebellion of a more serious kind in Turkestan, but that was directly caused by a decree of the Czar, dated June 25 of that year, ordering the industrial conscription of the Mohammedans of Central Asia and Siberia, who are exempt from military service.* This misguided policy has been reversed since the Revolution, and with the removal of the cause the unrest has abated. It had no wide political meaning nor any bearing on the issues of the war. In fact, a Turkestan division had been taking an active part in the operations against the Turks, which resulted in the capture of Erzerum and Trebizond, only a few months before the Turkestan peasantry were driven into rebellion by the Czar's decree.

But the whole situation has been transformed by the Revolution. The political future of the Russian Mohammedans as of all their fellow-countrymen is in the melting-pot. And from the eventual outcome the cause of Turkish aggrandisement stands to gain or to lose far more than it could have gained or lost from the war alone.

A precise and detailed analysis of recent developments in Russia is impossible, but the main effects of the

* The rescript had an unfortunate precedent in the action of the Committee of Union and Progress, who drafted their Christian conscripts into labour battalions as a preliminary to their massacre.

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Revolution on the Russian Mohammedans up to the present are clear. Like almost every other class or group in Russia they welcomed the downfall of the Romanoff régime. Sympathetic revolts against the absolutism of the Khans occurred in the distant "Native States" of Khiva and Bokhara. And the Mohammedans shared also in the general sentiment of Equality and Fraternity which sprang from the consciousness of a common Liberty. In many places there were scenes of fraternisation recalling those in Turkey during the first weeks after the Revolution of 1908. On the second Sunday of the Revolution (March 25, 1917) the Tatars of Tiflis marched in procession through the streets, were greeted by the Armenians and Georgians, and were followed by a procession of soldiers from the Caucasus Army. The Congress of the Mohammedan Daghestanis met simultaneously with the Congress of the Terek Cossacks, whose profession it had been to chastise the Daghestanis for the last three hundred years; and the two assemblies decided to combine into one. The Mohammedan Congress at Baku at the end of April was inaugurated by the Sunni Mufti and the Shia Sheikh-ul-Islam embracing one another in public.

But in Russia in 1917, as in Turkey in 1908, the merging of old divisions in a universal sentiment of brotherhood was a transient phase. The various groupings, reacting from the centralisation of the absolutist system, began to think more of their own national or sectional freedom than of the freedom of all Russia, and this "particularist" tendency was inevitably strengthened by the instability of the Revolutionary Government. The growing uncertainty of the political future awakened throughout Russia, in individuals and local communities and national groups, the instinct of self-preservation. And the Russian Mohammedans, like other groups, recognised the need of looking after themselves. To that end the first essential was organisation, in which, as has been noticed, they had hitherto been so deficient, and a series of conferences were

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arranged without delay. The Pan-Caucasian Mohammedan Congress met at Baku on April 28, the Mohammedan Women's Conference at Orenburg during the same month, the All-Russian Mohammedan Congress at Moscow on May 14, and the Mohammedan Military Congress at Kazan at the beginning of August. To consolidate and carry on the work of organisation the Moscow Congress appointed an all-Russian Mohammedan Council. It is too early yet to prophesy the failure or success of these efforts; but political organisation is a more difficult task for a group so widespread and so diverse as the Mohammedans than for any other group in Russia.*

A second and no less important tendency has shown itself among the Russian Mohammedans since the Revolution. Together with a quickened sense of internal unity has developed a warmer sympathy with Mohammedans abroad.

The fact that the Mohammedans throughout the world have been falling into political subjection more and more rapidly during the last hundred years was always the chief weapon in the armoury of the Pan-Islamic propagandists. The French protectorate over Morocco and the Anglo-Russian agreement in Persia left Turkey the one really independent Mohammedan State; and, as the fortunes of the war developed, Turkey itself seemed to be threatened with dismemberment. But the Russian Revolution seemed in two respects to mean the turning of the tide. In the first place it gave to the Mohammedans in Russia a potential political equality with their fellow-citizens such as they had never before and nowhere else enjoyed except in a Mohammedan State. And, secondly, the Revolution was regarded as a challenge to "imperialism" all the world over. By contrast with the ideals of the new Russia the precepts and practices of other States containing dependent and particularly Mohammedan peoples were conceived as more

* *E.g.*, the delegates to the Congress at Moscow were obliged to conduct their proceedings in the Russian language for want of any common medium of their own.

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or less despotic and corrupt. Thus the Provisional Government's renunciation of the old Russian ambition to annex Constantinople and of the old Russian policy of interference in the internal affairs of Persia was greeted by the Russian Mohammedans as the inauguration of a new era of political freedom for Islam.

The development of these ideas may be illustrated by a few significant examples.

The Moscow Conference in May 1917 defined the formula of "the self-determination of nationalities" as applying to Europe, Asia and Africa, and demanded that "all treaties founded on the partition or occupation of any territory in Europe, Asia or Africa should be cancelled at once."

In the second week of July the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Mohammedan Council published in the Russian Press an open letter to M. Tereschenko, protesting against the proclamation by Italy of her protectorate over Albania :

The fate of Albania is a new illustration of European robbery in the history of imperialism, and again the victim is a mainly Mohammedan people. . . .

Your dubious and indecisive attitude towards the Albanian problem rouses suspicion and doubt among the Mohammedans of Russia, particularly in consequence of those bitter experiences of centuries past during which the Mohammedans all the world over have learnt the meaning of what is called European justice. . . .

These declarations may have little practical weight, but they reveal the opinions and aspirations of a large body of Russian Mohammedans. Less representative but more startling is the following extract from the *Turmush*, a Tatar paper of Kazan. In August last it published a rumour that the Turks had recaptured Bagdad and Kut, and took occasion to attack both the Arab movement and British policy in the East :

The expulsion of the British troops from the Jeziré by the

The Prospects of Turkish Irredentism

Turks has upset British policy in the East and compelled the British Cabinet to resign.

It is most desirable for England, which already dominates the world, to swallow this delicious morsel too. England is vitally interested in keeping the Jeziré in her hands . . . and concentrated all her colonial forces in this region . . . but the colonial troops were unable to resist the Turkish troops.

This new defeat is likely to cost England dear. It will strengthen the political position of Turkey in Europe and in the East . . . and will be a powerful factor in the downfall of England's Eastern policy. It is very probable that it will react throughout the East—in India and Egypt in particular.

This is an echo straight from Constantinople, and if it is heard in Kazan at the heart of European Russia, it must be sounding still louder in Baku, Tashkend and Bokhara.

VII. THE PROSPECTS OF TURKISH IRREDENTISM.

THESE developments in Russia have doubtless raised the expectations of the exponents of Ottoman aggrandisement. The "liberation" of the Turkish-speaking peoples of Russia has been the frankly confessed ambition of the Pan-Turanian school. The "break-up" of Russia is the presupposition of Tekin Alp's irredentist programme; but, writing before the Russian Revolution, he only contemplates its achievement as the result of action from without by the armies of Turkey and the Central Powers. It would seem now to depend mainly on the internal development of Russia whether or not the political reunion of the scattered branches of the Turkish race shall emerge from the realm of dreams and become—what it is not at present—a practical possibility.

The potentialities of the future are different in the different groups; but the determining factor may possibly be the attitude of the Tatars of Kazan. The other Turkish-speaking groups in Russia incline at present to follow their lead, and it has been mentioned already how in the last few years their printing

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presses have spread their influence widely throughout the Mohammedan world. Pan-Islamic propaganda has had some effect on them. They contributed Red Crescent workers and relief funds to the help sent to Constantinople in the Balkan War ; and the quotation given above from a Kazan newspaper shows how sensitive their sympathies have become with Mohammedans abroad. They are not likely, on the other hand, unless circumstances compel them, to give these sympathies a political form, nor will they readily acknowledge the irredentist claims of the Pan-Turanian doctrinaires. They have been under Russian government for more than three hundred years, and the barrier between Islam and Christianity has been broken down more successfully here than anywhere else in the world. The Kazan Tatars are prosperous and educated. Geography and material interests bind them to Russia, and they have a conservative temperament which would disincline them to break away violently from a State under which they have lived for so long. They naturally objected to the Czarist *régime*, and in particular to its policy towards the non-Russian nationalities. Before the Revolution their point of view was roughly that of the Cadets.* But in the present situation they will agree neither with the anti-nationality policy for which the Cadets are coming to stand, nor with the extreme separatism of the Finns and Ukrainians, which would leave them isolated, by independent and probably chauvinistic States, from the Tatars of the Crimea and the Caucasus. They are almost certain to declare for the programme of national autonomy within a federal Russian Republic ; for if Russia is successfully reorganised on this basis, they have a brilliant future before them as the possible leaders of the Turkish-speaking element in a democratic State containing a considerable majority of the Turkish-speaking populations of the world.

* In internal policy, that is. In foreign policy they are violently opposed to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, which the Cadets desire.

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In this event Ottoman Irredentism will collapse. The rallying point of Pan-Turanianism will be not Constantinople but Kazan, and so far from the Anatolian Turks attracting the Tatars into the Ottoman Empire, the Tatars of Russia will attract the Anatolian Turks.

This very desirable solution is chiefly endangered by the possibility of a Russian reaction. A movement now in Russia for centralised military government and the repression of nationalities, leading in all probability to civil war, might produce among the nationalities a *sauve qui peut*, in which the Tatars would be carried away. They would then turn for support to the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman Irredentism might gain the day, with disastrous results to the civilised world.

The Tatars of the Crimea and Western Siberia will follow the lead of Kazan. The Tatars of the Caucasus are also under the influence of Kazan, but, on the other hand, they have been under Russian government less than a century; they live close to the Ottoman frontier; they have adopted Ottoman-Turkish as their literary (*i.e.*, newspaper) language; and they have a strong interest in common with the Anatolian Turks in their fear and hatred of the Armenians. In 1905 there was a racial war between the Tatars and Armenians in the Caucasus, and on the whole the Armenians had the best of it.

When Enver Bey launched his disastrous invasion of the Caucasus in the winter of 1914-5, the Committee of Union and Progress sent out propagandists to follow the troops and drew up a scheme for partitioning the Caucasus and part of Turkish Armenia into autonomous Tatar, Georgian, and Armenian national States under Ottoman suzerainty. They tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Ottoman Armenians to co-operate with them in this scheme. It was completely frustrated, of course, by the defeat of the invasion. The Ottoman armies never reached the Tatar districts of the Caucasus, and the only Russian subjects

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who sided with them were, as has been mentioned, the little tribe of the Adshars.

Since the Russian Revolution the idea of national autonomy for the Caucasus and the occupied districts of Ottoman Armenia has been revived, but this time on the basis of federalism under Russia instead of Turkey. Tatars, Georgians, and Armenians are already wrangling over the delimitation of the national frontiers, and it is noticeable that, whereas formerly the Tatars and Georgians tended to combine against the more vigorous and progressive Armenians, there is now a Georgian-Armenian *rapprochement*, while relations between Georgians and Tatars are strained because both are claiming the Adshars of the Batum district and the Lazes of the Ottoman Vilayet of Trebizond—the Georgians on the ground of race, the Tatars of religion. This, however, may only be a passing phase; and in the land question, which is as important in the Caucasus as the demarcation of national boundaries, the old grouping of Georgian and Tatar *versus* Armenian is appearing again.

The Tatars of the Caucasus are backward and paralysed by their sectarian division into Shias and Sunnis. If there is a government in Russia liberal enough to grant national autonomy, and strong enough to do justice between the various national claims, they will remain loyal to Russia; and in that case it may be predicted that Baku will in the end supersede Kazan as a political centre for the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia, and perhaps ultimately for all the Turks in the world. Kazan leads at present in virtue of its older culture, but Baku, with its oilfields, has a greater industrial future; and while Kazan is on the periphery of the Turkish world, Baku lies at its middle point. Round it in a circle and in easy communication with it are Kazan and the Crimea, Anatolia and Azerbaijan, and, linked by the Trans-Caspian railway, the Central Asiatic *bloc*. At the moment, too, the Baku Tatars seem to have produced stronger personalities among their leaders than the Tatars of Kazan. But the prospects of Baku

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depend upon the achievement of Russian federalism. If there is chaos or repression in Russia, the Tatars of the Caucasus will certainly turn to the Ottoman Empire. They could easily be incorporated in it ; for they are almost in touch geographically with the Anatolian Turks, have accepted their literary language, and have not yet out-distanced them in culture. In this event they would vegetate as an outlying province of the Ottoman Empire, and the brilliant prospects of economic and cultural development at Baku would be abruptly overshadowed and fade steadily away.

What, lastly, are the prospects in Central Asia ? The news from that south-eastern corner of the Russian Empire since the Revolution is scanty but bad. Khiva has extorted a constitution from her Khan and elected a parliament ; but in Bokhara the Russian Resident was anti-revolutionary, and with his help a reactionary movement has prevailed. The reactionaries—who appear to be a league of merchants, officials and mollahs—are stirring up religious fanaticism and claiming that the whole of the Chagatai area should be incorporated in the Bokharan State. The Constitution-alists are powerless, and the unrest is spreading across the Afghan and Persian borders.

The situation is equally serious at Tashkend. The Workmen and Soldiers' Committee, representing the tiny Russian colony, is in open conflict with the native Mohammedan population, and, before the last disturbances at Petrograd, the Provisional Government was on the point of sending an army there to bring both parties to order.

It is impossible to predict how the situation will develop ; but one assumption can safely be made. If Russia were to fall to pieces, Central Asia would be the first fragment to break away. It is part of the Orient, far more aloof in spirit from Western civilisation than the Mohammedan and Turkish-speaking districts of European Russia. Cut the Orenburg-Tashkend and Trans-Caspian railways, and it is isolated from Russia by a difficult belt of steppe and

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desert. In the nineteenth century it took the Czardom twenty years to traverse this belt and conquer the provinces beyond it. If in a moment of chaos they were lost, Russia would need to regain all her strength and solidity before she could attempt to recover them.

It is in Central Asia, then, that the uncertainties of Russia's fate open up the widest opportunities for Ottoman irredentism. The district fits in geographically with those Ottoman designs in Persia and Afghanistan to which reference was made in an earlier part of this article. And Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism do not there conflict with each other as in Persia and Afghanistan. The whole population of Russian Central Asia is Turkish: the whole population is Sunni. If the authority of the Russian Government were to disappear in Central Asia, there can be little doubt that Ottoman diplomacy would strive to create there a powerful Turkish-Islamic State, to be added as a fourth member to the projected alliance of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. If, on the other hand, Russia surmounts her present difficulties, preserves her unity, and retains those distant provinces within the Russian Commonwealth, then their religious and national sentiment will gravitate towards Baku and Kazan and away from Constantinople.

This is, roughly, the relation in which Russia, Turkey and Islam stand to one another. Our analysis cannot be complete, for, as anyone who reads this article will realise, the situation is changing from moment to moment, and the future is obscure. But the possibilities can be grouped broadly into two alternatives—a constructive and a destructive solution.

The issue depends chiefly on Russia, for the great experiment she is making is bound to affect the destinies of the world. If she transforms herself from an autocratic empire into a commonwealth of nations, if she secures both liberty and unity for all who live within her borders, she will

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have solved a problem that confronts us all. And just as in that western fringe of Russia which absorbs so much of our attention a solution in this sense would have a beneficent influence on the Balkans and Central Europe, so, in the Russian hinterland towards the east, the reconciliation of the Turkish-speaking and other Mohammedan populations would inaugurate a better future for Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and the whole of the Middle East. The British Commonwealth, as a society with a vast Mohammedan membership, would welcome this improvement in the condition of so important a part of the Islamic world, and we should also gain by it as regards our political interests as a State. What better neighbour could we wish for India than a democratic Russian Federation? Or what happier substitute could be found for the ancient rivalry of Russia and Britain in Asia than that we should advance together along the same liberal road?

But if Russia were to break down the outlook would be grave. Unity and reconciliation would break down with her; vast regions between the Indian frontier and Europe would return to chaos; and the initiative there would pass into Ottoman hands. Wielding the weapons of Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism, according to expediency, the Committee of Union and Progress would set religion against religion and race against race. We know their work, for we have seen it during the war in the economic ruin of the Ottoman Empire and the campaign of extermination waged against its Armenian, Greek and Arab inhabitants. With Germany to back them, they would extend their operations into the Russian hinterland and the Middle East, and the British Commonwealth would be left single-handed to stem the devastating tide of their aggression.

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STATISTICAL TABLE OF TURKISH-SPEAKING POPULATIONS.*

Yakuts	250,000	
Kazan (and Astrakhan) Tatars	1,500,000	
West Siberian Tatars	50,000†	
Crimean Tatars	200,000—	
<hr/>		
Total in Western Russia and Siberia		2,000,000
Tatars in the Caucasus		2,000,000 +
Bashkirs and Chuvashes	2,400,000	
Kirghiz	4,692,000	
Turkmens	290,000	
Other tribes in Russian Central Asiatic provinces (mostly sedentary)	2,772,000	
Tatars of Altai	?	
Sedentary Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	1,000,000	
Nomadic Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	500,000	
Turkish population of Chinese Turkestan	1,000,000 +	
<hr/>		
Total in Central Asiatic Area		13,000,000 ±
Ottoman Empire (Constantinople and Anatolia)		8,000,000—
Persia, Afghanistan, and lost Ottoman provinces in Europe		2,000,000 ±
<hr/>		
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±
<hr/>		
Turks in the Russian Empire	16,000,000 +	
Turks in the Ottoman Empire	8,000,000—	
Turks under other Governments	3,000,000 ±	
<hr/>		
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±

* Statistics can only be given in round numbers. Russia is the only country inhabited by Turks where there has been an official census, and even in Russia the last (and first) census was in 1897. The figures here given for Russia consist of estimates made in 1911 on the basis of the census of 1897. The rest of the figures are more conjectural still.

† Not including about 100,000 semi-Tatarised aliens (mostly Ugro-Finnish).

NOTE.—In 1909 the Mohammedan Ecclesiastical Court of Orenburg, an official body which, under the old Régime, exercised authority over the Mohammedans of the Russian Empire, excluding the Caucasus, Crimea and Central Asiatic provinces, and which, among other duties, kept a record of births and deaths, estimated the number of Mohammedans under its jurisdiction at 5,283,618. This is more than a million in excess of the figures given above for the Kazan, Astrakhan, and West Siberian Tatars, Chuvashes and Bashkirs combined. The difference is probably to be accounted for by the inclusion of certain sections of the Kirghiz, whose territory is reckoned administratively as part of European Russia.

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I. THE OUTLOOK FOR RECONSTRUCTION

The Country and the Government

THE last three months have been a relatively uneventful period in the domestic history of the war. After the Russian disappointment in the summer the country realised that a speedy end of the war was not to be expected, and the Italian disaster, coming on the heels of the Russian, has found men's minds steeled equally against despondency and disillusionment. Whatever successes the Germans may achieve in lesser theatres, confidence in our ultimate victory remains undimmed, and the memory of the Napoleonic parallel, when even America was, for a time, against us, makes men ashamed of the very thought of discouragement. It is true that confidence is still to a large extent instinctive and uninstructed. We are still so used to thinking on old-fashioned military lines, in terms of armies and war-maps, that the real leverage of victory—the concentration of the world's economic power and resources in the hands of the Allies—escapes men's notice; and statements such as that of General Smuts, that we have substantially won the war already, left the general public, who cannot see the siege of Central Europe through German eyes, puzzled and a little indignant. But if the plain man cannot understand the higher strategy of the war, or see in our command over the supply of such humdrum things as cotton, wool, silk, jute, rubber,

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oil-seeds, hides, phosphates, copper and nickel the equivalents, and far more than the equivalents, of the German command over Central and South-Eastern Europe, he is becoming increasingly alive to the ideal aspects and possibilities of the struggle. The adhesion of the United States to our cause is everywhere felt to be the grand event of the year. The sense that the New World, where democracy has not been challenged for a century, is making ready to vindicate the cause of freedom in the Old, not only steadies our purpose in the present but keeps alive our highest hopes for the settlement.

The temper of the nation is, indeed, more set and steady than at any previous period in the war. Pacifism, which still commands a small handful of members in the House of Commons, is so little in evidence in the country as to have passed out of sight as an element of controversy at bye-elections. In recent contests in London and Manchester agreement on the main question before the country was taken for granted. Discussion turned on matters of local and domestic interest, such as food prices and air-policy, and, in Manchester more particularly, on the issues of social reconstruction after the war. The election of Mr. Ben Tillett, the dockers' leader, and a strong supporter of the war, by a substantial majority against a somewhat colourless Coalition candidate, is a significant indication of the way in which the war has broken up the ruts of our political system and set men's minds moving to seek a new orientation and more courageous policies. A ferment of thought is at work, both in the army and in the civil population, of which we shall not realise the full scope till the enlarged body of voters chooses its leaders and records its opinions at the election after the war.

The Government still retains the confidence of the country. It is generally recognised that it is the best Government under the circumstances, and it is felt, inside the House of Commons and out of it, that its

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displacement would be hailed as a disaster to the whole Alliance. General Smuts, in particular, has achieved a unique personal position in the country, and his speeches in South Wales and elsewhere have been consistently successful in expounding the war policy of the Government and interpreting the feeling of the British people. The country is also beginning to appreciate better the hitherto enigmatic personality of Lord Milner: his handling of various recent questions, in which issues of personal freedom and social policy were involved, together with his association in office with General Smuts, have done something to destroy the legend that had grown up in wide circles about his name.

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the Government, as a whole, has fulfilled either the hopes or the pledges of its early days in the field of domestic policy. Indispensable abroad, it is in imminent danger of missing the tide of opportunity at home. Its promised reforms are proving laggards. The Education Bill, so loudly trumpeted beforehand, has been put off till next session, in spite of the urgent need of passing it in time to make proper preparations for its coming into force immediately on the end of the war, when the condition of the labour market will facilitate the industrial readjustments which it involves. As Mr. Fisher, who has staked his reputation on the achievement of education reform, still remains in office, it may be assumed that the Bill will not be dropped. Its postponement on the plea of lack of parliamentary time is due partly to the pressure of vested interests and partly to the hostility of the local Education Authorities to some administrative changes proposed in relatively minor clauses of the Bill. That the Government should have yielded to such influences shows how little it understands the nature of the forces at work in the country. A similar fate has overtaken the urgently needed measure for the establishment of a Ministry of Health, on which Lord Rhondda, during his short term at the Local Govern-

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ment Board, had fixed his hopes. In this case the impediment arises partly from the claims of competing departments—besides the Local Government Board, the Insurance Commissioners, the Board of Education, the Ministry of Pensions, and the Home Office, amongst others, are involved—and partly from the necessity of reconciling outside influences, among whom the industrial insurance interest is one of the chief. But here, again, difficulty should have been the spur to opportunity. No department or vested interest would consciously, at this moment, set itself against a measure known to be needed for the saving of English lives. The delay in meeting a case which has been proved up to the hilt is due purely to want of imagination; and it is not creditable to the Government that it should have acquiesced in it. A third disappointment has been the Government's failure to proceed with the scheme for the State purchase of the liquor traffic. Here, again, action is overdue, and will be far more difficult if postponed till after the war. No doubt, in all these cases, congestion of business, as usual, affords an explanation of the delay. But it does not justify it in the eyes of the country.

The Trades Union Congress

In the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE* reference was made to the crisis which arose over the question of the Stockholm Conference. The story must be briefly concluded. At the Labour Party Conference on August 21 the decision to be represented at Stockholm, made at the previous Conference on August 10, was reaffirmed, but by a very narrow majority, the miners on this occasion casting their vote on the other side. This left the Labour Party divided into two almost equal parties on the subject, and made it impossible to apply pressure to the Government to rescind its decision not to grant passports. A few days

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later, on August 28 and 29, the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference, planned in Petrograd in the spring by M. Vandervelde, M. Thomas, and Mr. Henderson as the necessary preliminary to any full international gathering, assembled in London. Russia, Belgium, France, Portugal, Greece, and South Africa were represented. No detailed report of the proceedings was published, but the general result of the two days' deliberations was very disappointing. Mr. Henderson, indeed, went so far as to speak of it as "lamentable." The fact that no decision could be come to against the vote of any one country made success improbable from the outset, and the differences of opinion among the delegations of individual countries added to the confusion. The Conference began by setting up two committees, one to report on the Stockholm Conference and the other on the war aims of the Allies. The first, whilst agreeing that passports, if asked for, ought to be granted, failed to agree as to the advisability of holding the Conference at all. The second prepared a number of divergent reports which made it clear that there was no possibility of agreement. The British Labour Party's draft peace-terms were therefore not endorsed.

After this sharp reminder of the difficulties involved in international action, it became clear that the Stockholm Conference could serve no useful purpose; and the way was paved for an agreement between the two sections of opinion inside the British movement. The Trade Union Congress which met at Blackpool on September 3rd provided a useful opportunity for healing the temporary difference. The following extract from the report of the Parliamentary Committee, which was carried by an overwhelming majority, gives the substance of the compromise arrived at:

In view of the divergence of opinion, we have come to the conclusion that a conference at Stockholm at the present moment could not be successful, and in the light of all the circumstances we make the following recommendations:—

1. We recommend that the Parliamentary Committee attempt in

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every possible way to secure general agreement of aim among the working classes of the allied nations, as, in our opinion, this is a fundamental condition of a successful international conference.

2. We are strongly of opinion that an international Labour and Socialist conference would be of the greatest service, and is a necessary preliminary to the conclusion of a lasting and democratic peace, and we recommend that the Trades Union Congress Parliamentary Committee be empowered to assist to arrange and take part in such a conference.

3. We think that the participation of the Trades Union Congress should be subject to the conditions outlined in recommendation (1) and to the further condition that the voting should be by nationalities, sectional bodies within nationalities to be governed by the majority of that nationality, or alternatively that each section should be given voting powers according to the number of persons actually represented.

It will be noted that the Conference which it is proposed to hold at some future date is not to be a Socialist but a "Labour and Socialist" gathering, and that the participation of the British Trade Union movement is contingent upon the abolition of the system by which Socialist societies of insignificant membership have enjoyed a voting power out of all proportion to their representation of national or working-class feeling. Here for the moment the matter rests. But it was clear from Mr. Henderson's speech on the subject to the Congress and from the enthusiasm with which it was received that the recommendation on the subject of the holding of a future conference is not regarded by him or by British working-class feeling as a mere pious opinion. When the situation admits of it, Stockholm or its equivalent will be heard of again.

Amongst the other proceedings of the Congress, which is assuming more and more significance in the public mind year by year, the most important were the discussions on the subject of the Whitley Report, food prices, the question of craft *versus* industrial unionism, the demobilisation of women workers, and Free Trade. The recommendations of the Whitley Report were explained by Mr. Smillie and Mr. Clynes, and in the discussion which ensued the only

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serious opposition to its proposals came from Mr. Hodges, of the South Wales Miners, who desired that "the Trade Union Movement" should "work out its own industrial future." Representatives of the General Workers, the Dock and Riverside Workers, the Shop Assistants, and the Pottery Workers spoke in support of the proposals, which were referred to the Parliamentary Committee for any necessary action. On the question of food prices strong feeling was manifested, especially on the question of the alleged waste through delay in transport. The issue between the craft and industrial unions came up in the form of a report on the negotiations between the National Union of Railwaymen and various unions open to craftsmen working on the railways. It appeared that, thanks to the mediation of the Parliamentary Committee, an agreement had almost been reached. The one outstanding point of difference was whether men employed in a railway shop and desiring to join a Union should be allocated to the Union by a Joint Committee of the Unions concerned or left free to decide for themselves which Union they should join. The treatment of this thorny question by the Congress showed much self-restraint and statesmanship on both sides.

The resolution on the subject of female labour after the war, which was passed unanimously, is of sufficient importance to bear quotation, since the matter is one on which the public is anxiously waiting for guidance, and the policy embodied in it is understood to represent an agreement between the women's organisations and the Congress Parliamentary Committee :

This Congress, believing that when peace comes the problem of women's labour will be primarily one of the organisation of labour rather than one of surplus of labour to be absorbed, calls upon the Government Departments concerned to adopt the following recommendations as measures calculated to minimise distress and the involuntary unemployment of women :—

- (a) Reorganisation of the whole system of unemployment

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insurance to secure that (1) it shall apply to all workers, provision being made to allow those Trade Unions already making satisfactory arrangements against unemployment to contract out; (2) it shall be non-contributory as far as workers receiving less than a living wage are concerned; and (3) it shall provide a sufficient benefit to enable the worker to live at a decent standard during the time of unemployment.

(b) General inquiry beforehand as to firms which will require workers to put in hand private work on the cessation of war work. Such information to be distributed through the Employment Exchanges and Trade Unions with a view to having the workers informed before they finish their engagement as war workers. At the same time, all war workers and women substitutes to be supplied with forms, which they may fill up as to their desires for future employment.

(c) In all Government factories and controlled establishments reasonable period of notice, or wages in lieu of notice, to be given. In the case of workers who have left their homes to take up employment railway fares to be paid through the Employment Exchanges.

(d) Workers in munition and other trades in which there has been excessive overtime to have four weeks' furlough, with full pay, in order to recruit their strength.

(e) The use of the new Government factories as centres of production of a national kind, steadying the labour market by providing additional employment when necessary, and also being used experimentally for trying better methods of using labour for the advantage of the workers.

(f) Provision of training, with maintenance, for women who cannot find employment in their own trades, to equip them for new occupations.

A few words must be added about one other resolution of the Congress, that reaffirming its belief in Free Trade as "the broadest and surest foundation for world-prosperity and international peace in the future" and rebutting "protective duties" as "unjust in incidence and economically unsound, subsidising capital at the expense of labour." This was passed by a majority of nine to one. The general opinion of the delegates was probably most pithily expressed by Mr. T. Shaw, of the Weavers, when he remarked:

I am aware that the war has taught us we are an island and that

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we cannot altogether go back to the old condition of affairs ; but are we to protect certain industries or are we to say, " these things are vital to the nation and the nation shall make and use them " ?

The Labour Outlook

Since the Congress took place, in the first week in September, there has been a distinct improvement in the general situation. " We have at this moment," said one of the best-informed of the Labour members in the House of Commons on November 6, " a much better atmosphere, in which there is far less industrial tension than there was some time back." The chances of a real " reconstruction " after the war, which were seriously endangered in the summer, are now much brighter, and practical schemes of reform are assured of a better hearing on both sides. The change is mainly due to the efforts that have been made to understand the ordinary workman's point of view. The Reports of the Industrial Unrest Commissioners have been of the greatest service, and the administrative action taken centrally and locally to deal with the serious grievances revealed by them has undoubtedly borne good fruit. It is true that progress has in some cases been slow. Inexplicable delay due to " departmental difficulties " has, for instance, arisen in remedying the horrible housing conditions at Barrow : but, on a general view, the authorities may be said to have awakened—none too soon—to the serious position into which matters were drifting. In a very businesslike speech in the House of Lords on November 7 Lord Milner gave a *résumé* of the Government action taken on the Commission's reports. Some of the matters he instances may seem of minor importance, but it must be remembered that the cumulative effect of single grievances is often more provocative of discontent, as it is also more difficult to trace to its source, than a single substantial abuse. The £1 maximum weekly award under the Workmen's Compensation Act has been raised to meet the increased cost of living. The legitimate grievance of

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skilled supervisors and other workmen on time-rates, who were in many cases receiving considerably less than the unskilled piece workers whom they supervised, has been met by a $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. bonus. This directly affects between 200,000 and 300,000 men, and must inevitably be extended to other classes of workers not directly under the Ministry of Munitions. It must indeed be remarked in passing that the order granting the increase was evidently not fully considered beforehand in all its bearings, and affords a striking example of the urgent need for the establishment of a single authority for dealing with labour matters. Again, in response to another recommendation, the local Pensions Committee have had their freedom of action enlarged in dealing with cases of men discharged from the Army and the bureaucratic control of the Central Authority has been relaxed. Further, as a result of the passing of the Corn Production Act, agricultural wages have been raised to a minimum of 25s., to which in some parts of the country they had not yet attained, and an Agricultural Wages Board, containing representatives of the Unions concerned, has already been constituted. This, of course, will react in various ways upon the position of other wage-earners and their families. A more active cause of discontent has been removed by the abolition of the leaving certificate system, which tied the movements of workers employed under the Munitions Act. It was anticipated that the restoration of freedom of movement, which came into force on October 15, would lead to a considerable migration of labour, but the Under-Secretary for the Ministry of Munitions was able to state on November 6 that the movement so far had been "comparatively slight," far slighter indeed than was anticipated. The successful carrying through of this rather hazardous reform must be attributed not simply to the granting of the $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. bonus but to what Mr. Anderson, a Labour member who has in the past been the Department's severest critic, termed the "courage and a certain quality of imagina-

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tion brought to the task of dealing with labour questions" by the new Minister of Munitions, Mr. Winston Churchill. It must, however, unfortunately, be added that the action of the Department has been nullified in a few cases by private leaving-certificate arrangements between employers.

Two other recent reforms may also be mentioned here. One is the establishment by the Ministry of Labour of Local Committees in connection with the work of the Labour Exchanges, so as to counteract their excessively bureaucratic character and to enable them to regain some of the popularity which they had undoubtedly forfeited. The committees will be composed of representatives of employers and workpeople, in equal numbers, nominated by local associations, together with a small number of additional members nominated direct by the Minister. They will be entrusted "with the widest functions of advice and guidance in connection with the working of the exchanges" that are consistent with the responsibility of the Minister to Parliament. It is to be hoped that this is not intended to preclude them from exercising some measure of executive power, as a purely advisory status will not meet the widespread feeling in response to which they have been created. As the exchanges will be the instrument through which employment will be secured for soldiers, sailors, and munition workers on demobilisation, the importance of the work which will fall to the committees can hardly be overestimated. Another long-standing reform has been carried through by the organisation, under Sir Auckland Geddes, of the new Ministry of National Service and the transference to it from the War Office of the machinery of recruiting and medical examination. The whole question of man-power has thus, at last, been put into civilian hands and on to a scientific basis, and the demands of the army will in future be treated in exactly the same way as those of the Ministry of Munitions and the Board of Agriculture. The new Minister took early

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occasion to disclaim his intention of introducing industrial conscription, which he declared, " apart from the complete taking over by the State of all enterprises," to be " absolutely impossible." It is, however, still felt, especially in labour circles in close touch with the Department, that the transformation from a military to a civilian personnel and method of working remains far from complete. The new Minister's speeches have created a favourable impression ; but he has a difficult piece of work before him in the coming months, and it is indispensable that he should be able to allay all suspicions as to the outlook and intentions of his Department.

Much has, therefore, been achieved in straightening out the tangles of social and industrial administration : but one potent source of trouble still remains—the multiplicity of Government Departments and authorities dealing with industrial questions. There is still a needless amount of overlapping and friction between the Ministry of Munitions, the Admiralty, the War Office, the Home Office, the Ministry of Labour, and the numerous other Boards and Controllers who have a hand in the matter. It is only necessary to refer to the recent action of the Coal Controller in offering the Miners' Federation an advance of 1s. 6d. a day for adults and 9d. a day for youths, and its effect upon the minds of other less fortunate classes of workers. Some fixed standard or principle in wages policy is still as urgently needed as ever. Both for this and for other reasons the time would seem to be ripe for the establishment of a single authority, a Ministry of Labour, or, rather, of Industry, which would constitute the sole channel of State action in industrial questions and devise appropriate means for keeping in touch with the recognised associations and representatives of employers and workpeople. We have passed beyond the period of inquisitorial State action and bureaucratic control. What is needed is a form of departmental organisation better qualified to guide and stimulate the corporate

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spirit and the self-governing associations that are fast springing up in the industrial field.

The Whitley Councils.

This reflection leads naturally on to the most important and far-reaching domestic event of the quarter, the acceptance by the Government of the Whitley Report as an integral part of its policy in the field of industrial reconstruction. The Report, some account of which was given in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*, was submitted in the course of the summer to numerous employers' associations and Trade Unions, over a hundred in all, for their considered opinion. Its proposals excited great interest and some time necessarily elapsed before full replies were available. By October, however, it was possible to tabulate them. Taken as a whole, the answers, especially from the Trade Unions, but also from the bulk of the employers' associations, were, in the words of Lord Milner, "overwhelmingly in favour of the adoption of something on the lines of the suggestion in the Report." Press comments were equally favourable. As a result, the Government felt emboldened to proceed with the scheme, and on October 20 the Minister of Labour addressed a circular to the principal Employers' Associations and Trade Unions informing them of the Government's adoption of the Report. In the course of a document which may well be regarded as historic, the Minister stated that the Government were very anxious that Joint Standing Industrial Councils on the lines proposed in the Report should be established in all the well-organised industries with as little delay as possible, and added that the Councils would be recognised as the "official standing Consultative Committees to the Government on all future questions affecting the industries which they represent," and would be "the normal channel through which the opinion and

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experience of an industry will be sought on all questions with which the industry is concerned." At the same time it was made clear that the Government were anxious not to impose any "cast-iron" mode of organisation on the industries from above. The Councils are to be "independent bodies electing their own officers and free to determine their own functions and procedure with reference to the peculiar needs of each trade." They are to be "autonomous bodies" and their establishment will, in fact, "make possible a larger degree of self-government in industry than exists to-day." They will, it is expected, in most cases be established on the basis of existing organisations.

There is no time to be lost if the Councils are to be in working order in time to deal with the problems which it is intended to submit to them at the close of the war, amongst which the circular specifies "the demobilisation of the Forces, the resettlement of munition workers in civil industries, apprenticeship (especially where interrupted by war service), the training and employment of disabled soldiers, and the control of raw materials."

Fortunately, however, steps had already been taken, even before the publication of the Report, in some of the industries which lend themselves most easily to the proposed mode of organisation, amongst which the building and pottery trades may be mentioned; and the stimulus of example, so much more persuasive than Government exhortations, is therefore already being exerted. It is too early to report progress, but it is already clear that, high as are the hopes excited, their realisation will not be easy. In some important trades, such as shipbuilding, the existence of a number of craft unions cutting across industrial divisions makes it difficult to organise the labour side of the representation. The difficulty of a multiplicity of organisations is in some cases even more marked on the employers' side. Their associations are often ill-devised for the purpose in view and are both incomplete and overlapping.

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Another difficulty is presented by the case of the clerical staff, which is still in most cases unorganised and, in a time of rising prices, has not unnaturally suffered considerable hardship in consequence. One result of the adoption of the Report will be to draw the attention of salaried workers to the importance and desirability of organisation, which they have too often in the past considered as beneath their dignity. A still greater difficulty arising out of the voluntary character of the Councils' membership is that which will be presented by employers and workpeople who prefer to remain unorganised and refuse to be bound by the decisions of the Council of their industry. Compulsory membership, either of a Trade Union or an Employers' Association, is contrary to British practice and would destroy the character of the organisations concerned. It may, however, be found desirable for the Government to give binding force to any decision arrived at by three-quarters of the membership of each section of the Council.

Still, when all the difficulties have been measured, the adoption of the Report by the Government is a momentous event in the ordering of British life. It lays firm the foundations of the new industrial order which the country expects to see after the war—and upon a basis of absolute equality between the two chief partners in the industrial process, management and labour. Henceforward the Trade Unions, the self-governing associations which embody the corporate spirit of the industrial working class, will enjoy a status and responsibility equal to the organisations of what has so long been, in the workman's eyes, "the master class," and it is for them to rise to the height of the new opportunity. "The real solution" of the industrial question "is to be found," as Lord Selborne truly said in the House of Lords on November 7, "in an increase of the strength of the Trade Union organisation: in the recognition and acceptance of their *status*, and the assumption and acknowledgment by them of their responsibility." When one

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remembers that only four years ago the managing directorates of one of the largest of our national services, the railways, almost unanimously refused to recognise the existence of the men's union, one can measure the distance which we have travelled, in our social relations and social thinking, under the stress of war. Discipline at the front depends on confidence; and on confidence alone, not on arbitrary command, the working of our social system must rest. Englishmen understand no other way. The working class, which has saved the country on the battlefield, has now at home, as Lord Salisbury said at the close of a frank and eloquent speech to his fellow-peers, "to work out its own salvation. They will," as he said, "make many mistakes. Very likely they will adversely affect the property of many of your lordships. All these things are small matters. I earnestly hope that they will believe in us. I am quite sure that in the long run their good sense will prevail. But whatever happens, we intend to trust them, my lords, and I believe that they will return the trust."

It is the voice of the old England speaking to the new; and to an appeal made in that spirit there can be but one answer.

The Reorganisation of the Labour Party.

Meanwhile the Franchise Bill is making steady progress through Parliament, and is expected to become law by Christmas. It will add some eight million electors, men and women, to the voters' roll. The influx of so many new voters, whose opinions no one can foresee, together with the improved arrangements for the holding of elections, will entirely alter the conditions and atmosphere of our political system, and the party organisations are beginning to adjust themselves to the new situation. By far the most important step taken in this way has been the action of the Executive of the Labour Party in drafting a new

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constitution for the Party, which will be submitted to the Annual Conference at Nottingham on January 23. Hitherto the Labour Party has not been, in the strict sense, a national party. It has had no individual membership or rank and file of its own, but has been governed by its three constituent elements—the Trade Unions and other working-class associations, the Independent Labour Party, and the Fabian Society. It is now proposed to enrol individual members, who will be attached to local Labour Parties in the various constituencies, so that the Party will in future consist both of affiliated societies (including Trade Unions, Socialist Societies, Co-operative Societies, and Trades Councils), and of individual men and women “who subscribe to the constitution and programme of the party,” and are enrolled in its local branches. The governing body of the reconstituted party will be the Party Conference. This will be composed of representatives of both sides of the movement. Trade Unions and other affiliated societies will be entitled to send one delegate for each thousand members on which fees are paid, the fees amounting to a yearly 2d. per member, with a minimum of 30s. Each local Labour Party will be entitled to a single member, or in constituencies returning two members, to two. Local Labour Party delegates may be either men or women, but an additional woman delegate may be appointed whenever the membership of the women’s section exceeds five hundred. Candidates for Parliament will be chosen by the local Labour Parties in co-operation with the National Executive, whose sanction will be required in all cases. They will receive assistance from the Party funds on the basis of £1 per 1,000 electors in Borough constituencies and £1 15s. per 1,000 electors in County Divisions.

These arrangements are chiefly of interest as showing the way in which the new Party proposes to deal with difficulties which have, in some cases, hitherto proved insuperable to the older Parties; and the very publicity

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and straightforwardness of the arrangements proposed will probably attract many electors who have hitherto regarded Party activities as a matter for cliques and wire-pullers. On the other hand, the continued reliance of the Party on Trade Union contributions, inevitable though it doubtless is, cannot be regarded as satisfactory: for with the best intentions in the world the outlook of a Trade Union cannot be national in the broadest sense any more than that of some of the "Trade" influences which have exercised undue dominance over the older Parties. The time may come when all our Parties will be exclusively controlled by a rank-and-file political membership.

But the new constitution is chiefly interesting because of its statement of objects, which explicitly extends the meaning of "labour" to include brain workers. The clause in question is best quoted in full:

"To secure for the producers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service."

It will be observed that the formula adopted is not Socialistic in the ordinary sense of that term. "Common" ownership does not necessarily mean State or public ownership. The words are, indeed, so vague as to cover a large part of the business organisation of the country at the present time. Their adoption is doubtless intended to enable the co-operative movement to link its fortunes more closely with the Labour Party.

Two further clauses are worth noting. One, significantly headed "Inter-Dominion," speaks of co-operation "with the Labour organisations in the Dominions and Dependencies . . . to take common action for the promotion of a higher standard of social and economic life for the working population of the respective countries."

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The other deals with common action in the international sphere with Labour organisations in other countries "for the maintenance of Freedom and Peace . . . and for such International Legislation as may be practicable."

A few words must also be said about another interesting political development—the movement among co-operators towards the formation of a Co-operative Political Party. The Co-operative Movement, although it has hitherto kept out of politics, has a powerful and widespread influence. The distributive societies number some three and a half million members, of whom 2,000,000 are already Parliamentary voters, and their turnover last year was £121,000,000, to which £70,000,000 must be added from the Co-operative Wholesale and the hundred productive societies. How far the new movement towards political action will go it is still too early to say. What has brought it to a head is an accumulation of grievances against the authorities, of which the imposition of the excess profits tax and the threat of an income tax on their "dividends" (which really, in the vast majority of cases, represent savings) is the chief. There is also a feeling that the movement has been prejudiced in the allotment of sugar supplies, and has been unduly omitted from various Committees and Commissions, whilst their employees have often been unfairly treated by the military at tribunals. If the new Party is actually brought into being it will not formally attach itself to any existing Party, but it would naturally work in close touch with the Labour organisation in the constituencies chosen for its candidatures.

Food Control.

These activities suggest a subject on which a brief concluding statement must be made—the progress of Food Control. The policy of Lord Rhondda, described

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in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*, by which supplies are controlled and profits fixed at every stage, has been rapidly extended during the last three months, and, on the whole, with conspicuous success. Control now extends right from the field of production to the shop counter in the case of all the principal foods—*i.e.*, bread, flour, meat, potatoes, sugar, tea, bacon, butter, and cheese. It has also been applied to such subsidiary foods as peas, beans, and pulse; rice, sago, tapioca; and oat and maize products. In all these cases “profiteering”—that is, the taking of undue profits—has been eliminated, and what is regarded by the Department as a fair remuneration is paid for services rendered. Food producers and sellers have, in other words, become practically Government agents working on a fixed commission. Thanks to this system, which is one of the real administrative successes of the war, and to the subsidised loaf, the average price of all the principal foodstuffs fell from 105·6 per cent. above the 1914 level on September 1 to 97·3 on October 1. By November 1, however, partly owing to developments of policy in connection with European neutrals, over which the Department had no control, it had again risen to 106, the chief increases being in tea, salt butter, bacon and eggs. The detailed execution of the Department’s policy still requires closer attention. It is one thing to fix prices and another to make sure that the available supplies are put on the market. Much vigilance and pertinacity will be required to prevent the holding up of stores by wholesalers and the innumerable possibilities of evasion by retailers, especially in the poorer districts. The Department is necessarily working short-handed and without an adequate supply of inspectors; but for that very reason offenders, when discovered, should be all the more severely punished. The comparative leniency of some of the fines recently inflicted by magistrates, especially in rural districts, has excited very unfavourable comment.

Meanwhile shopping, especially in working-class dis-

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tricts, remains a fine art. The shortage of shipping, though it has touched bottom, is very serious. The world-shortage of cereals, meats, and fats, and the increasing needs of our European Allies, are more serious still. In spite of the co-operation of the United States the outlook is critical and there is every need for economy and self-denial. We seem likely to see a considerable extension of communal kitchens and possibly of rationing, which has hitherto only been applied to sugar and coal. But now that the need is better understood there can be no doubt that, if only the scales are held evenly as between different sections of the population, the country will prove equal to the emergency.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN IRELAND

AT the time of the last Irish article the Convention held the centre of the stage in Irish politics. In a sense it may be said still to do so. Everyone is aware of its importance and looks forward to its conclusions ; but the charm of novelty has worn off, and the secrecy which still veils the proceedings allows the public interest little to feed upon. Meanwhile outside events of a more or less sensational character have on more than one occasion threatened to make all the Convention's work ineffective. It is natural that this fact should lead to recriminations. There is, perhaps, no charge so darkly damaging or so easily made in these days as that of conspiring to wreck the Convention. There are those who suggest—and they are not confined to the chosen orators of the Nationalist Party—that a deliberate intention exists in high official quarters to bring about this result by "Hidden Hand" methods. Others charge Sinn Fein with darker intentions than the silent contempt with which it professes to regard the Convention. These are matters which must be left to speculation, of which there is no lack in Ireland. It will suffice here to record the actual facts.

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The death of Thomas Ashe was the culminating event of a series of clashes between the Irish Executive and the Sinn Feiners. Meetings had been proclaimed, arms seized and many persons arrested for such offences as drilling, carrying weapons or uttering incitements to rebellion in speeches. Among those arrested in this way were a group of men well known as leaders, most of whom had already been imprisoned at Lewes on the charge of complicity in the rising of Easter Week. A hunger strike was begun at Cork, and the prisoners were then brought to Dublin and lodged in Mountjoy Prison, presumably in order that they might be under the supervision of the highest authorities. They proceeded, as is shown by the evidence at the inquest, to organise a committee and to appoint leaders, as was done at Lewes, and to continue the hunger strike. Forcible feeding was resorted to with tragic results in the case of Thomas Ashe. The verdict found by the jury was probably a fairly accurate reflection of public feeling.

But, apart from details which stand out from the rest because of their sensational characteristics, the policy of both sides remains the same. The extremists continue to hold their meetings, wear their uniforms, and carry out military operations. The Government continue to arrest in some cases, to proclaim some meetings, and to turn a blind eye in other cases. As a consequence they lay themselves open to attacks on the one hand for acting in a provocative manner, on the other for being weak-kneed. Supporters of Sinn Fein claim that the Executive is trying to terrorise them; the Nationalist Party supports this allegation by the statement that the "Castle" is implicated in a plot to break up the Convention. Unionists on the other hand—as represented by the *Irish Times* and the *Northern Whig*—have announced that Mr. Duke's weakness makes his recall imperative. The average citizen cannot help being struck by the fact that to be sufficiently strong to impress the public seems to be a guarantee against

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being arrested. It is certainly hard to discover any justification for a policy which allows Mr. De Valera to be at large while others are arrested for seditious speeches, or which contemplates with equanimity the spectacle of an imposing quasi-military funeral conducted in the capital city, while it sends a force of police to arrest boy scouts belonging to the same organisation for drilling in a field in the country.

Whatever may be the ultimate political fate of this country, stable conditions are impossible so long as the present system of government continues, together with the fluctuating policy which it seems inevitably to pursue. The fluctuation has not failed to have its effect on the Convention. The news of Ashe's death, announced during the visit to Cork (where hostile elements were already very much in evidence) had roused some members to a considerable state of excitement; the concessions made in respect of his funeral had a correspondingly exasperating effect on others. In the same way the rumour which gained credence at one time that Mr. De Valera had been arrested threatened the peace of the Convention and even of the country, while the failure to interfere with him at all made Ulster members deeply distrustful. Truly, the science of constitution-making must be a hard one to practise in the atmosphere in which Ireland lives to-day.

It is doubly reassuring to find that in spite of all disturbances the Convention continues to maintain harmony and to make progress. Once only has the veil been lifted—when on the last day of the Session in Cork Sir Horace Plunkett was able in a speech made for publication to report that the stage of general discussion had been brought to an end and that various schemes would now be submitted to a committee for drafting purposes. This marks real and substantial progress, and we must be content to wait patiently until another stage is safely reached.

Two further complications in the situation have to be considered. The first is the beginning of the Parliamentary

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Session, the second the holding of the Sinn Fein Convention in Dublin. The former event may be considered something of a disaster from the Irish point of view. If the leaders of the Irish parties who represent them in the Convention could have been persuaded to issue an inverted "whip" to the members of their party urging them to stay away from Parliament they would thereby have done the country a great service. Nothing could have been lost, for Parliament will take no action on Irish matters until the Convention comes to an end. As this drastic measure was not carried out we have been driven back on the old unrealities—the stage armies causing infinite smoke with their blank cartridges, confusing the people, with no hope of practical results. In two debates the Irish parties, which seemed likely to compose their differences under the shelter of the Convention, have relapsed into their old attitudes. The admission of the Irish question into the Representation of the People Bill first revived party strife. Mr. Redmond was bound to claim the benefits of a wider franchise for Ireland, because the Sinn Feiners had said in the country that he dared not do so, as the wider franchise would be fatal to his party. But once he put forward the claim that Ireland should be included in the Bill, it was inevitable that the Ulstermen should demand redistribution. So the party fight was joined once more. The only method of averting it would have been for the Government to refuse absolutely to entertain the idea of Ireland being included in any part of the Bill, on the ground that it did not propose to make any changes in the system of representation in Ireland, however beneficial and however overdue, until the Convention had reported.

Mr. Redmond's motion of censure on the Irish Executive also contributed something to party bitterness, and, on the whole, it is a matter of congratulation that it passed off so smoothly as it did. This was perhaps due to a universal sense of the unreality of the debate. In general

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it may be said that there is a very widespread feeling of resentment throughout Ireland at the reopening of the Parliamentary combat—a fact which is perhaps the best augury for the future of the Convention.

The two-day meeting of the Sinn Fein Convention deserves more attention. This was probably the first occasion in history when a large number of delegates have been known to assemble in an open and orderly manner in the Mansion House of a capital city for the avowed purpose of framing a constitution which would enable them to overthrow the Government under whose auspices, so to speak (for the police were on duty at the door), they met. Cynical people expected, and enemies confidently looked forward to, a split such as has marred so many Irish movements. Indeed, there were some threatenings of this in Madame Markievicz's attack on Professor McNeill; but the danger was averted, and in the election of officers and committee all parties achieved representation. The retirement of Mr. Arthur Griffiths from the presidency in favour of Mr. De Valera showed the quality of diplomacy at work. The main business done, besides the elections, was the adoption of a constitution and a scheme of organisation which gives to what was hitherto a chaotic body of feeling a definite political system. This result, while obviously a step forward on the part of Sinn Fein, may also be considered a hopeful sign in so far as it forces the leaders both to announce a constructive policy and to consider carefully and in a rational manner the policies of other parties—including that of the Convention. As a matter of fact, it appears that various schemes which are at present before the Convention were discussed at some length by the rival body (which points to a certain amount of leakage somewhere), and, although they were naturally not approved, the fact of their discussion reveals a significant and satisfactory tendency.

The policy of the Sinn Fein Convention was somewhat vague in outline, but quite definite in purpose. Briefly

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stated, the intention is to get rid of English government and English influence and to obtain international recognition of Ireland as an independent State. Once this objective is achieved, the people of Ireland are to be left free to adopt whatever form of government they think best. The question of physical force seemed to be a somewhat delicate one and provoked some difference of opinion; an academic resolution was finally passed which practically amounted to a statement that all good Sinn Feiners ought to be prepared to risk their lives for their principles if called upon to do so.

The declaration that "any and every means" should be used to expel England drew a protest from two priests, who wished to put in a limiting clause. Mr. De Valera met this objection by affirming that the members might be trusted to confine themselves to ethical and legitimate proceedings. Perhaps the most remarkable part of the whole meeting was the rendering of a financial statement showing the amount spent on the various elections, on salaries, travelling expenses, printing, etc. The total funds accounted for were less than £5,000, and a balance of £1,000 was carried forward—a result which should cause envy to many an administrator. The statement was made, in refutation of the charges of "German money," that every penny of this fund was collected in Ireland. It would be interesting, however, to know how much was spent simultaneously on the same objects by bodies technically different, such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood; it is in the interrelation of these bodies that the mystery of the present Irish situation lies.

The economic position continues grave. The appointment of an Irish Food Control Committee—and a very good one at that—is a welcome though belated advance. At present most of its work has been confined to the discovery of the many iniquities which exist, and the Ministry of Food appears most reluctant to give it the powers which it must have to make it effective. Meanwhile a milk

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famine in Dublin has been narrowly averted, and at the time of writing serious industrial disturbances, including a bakers' strike, are threatening us. These and similar matters must be reserved for separate treatment.

Dublin. November, 1917.

CANADA

THE UNION GOVERNMENT

SINCE the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE* Canada has undergone a political revolution. Just when the prospects of a Union Government seemed hopeless, the negotiations between Sir Robert Borden and the Western Liberal leaders were quietly resumed. Indeed, there is reason to think that the negotiations were never wholly abandoned. It was difficult to make headway under the immediate shadow of the Western Liberal Convention. In early August this great gathering of Western Liberals assembled at Winnipeg. It was expected that the leadership of Sir Wilfred Laurier would be repudiated and resolutions in favour of conscription and union government adopted. Instead, the position of the veteran Liberal leader was endorsed, and a war resolution accepted which carefully evaded any declaration for or against the draft. An amendment to the resolution, declaring that, if necessary, reinforcements for the army should be secured by compulsion, was rejected by an overwhelming majority. Devotion to Sir Wilfrid Laurier and confidence in his wisdom and patriotism were expressed by the chief spokesmen for the Convention, while the Borden Administration was described as incapable and corrupt, the agent of corporate interests and the ally and champion of Eastern protectionists.

Following the Convention the Western Liberal leaders announced that they could not enter a coalition under

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Sir Robert Borden, but that they were in favour of a national as distinguished from a party Government, and would take office under Sir George Foster, Sir William Mulock, Sir Adam Beck or Hon. Lyman P. Duff. Sir William Mulock, now Chief Justice of Ontario, was a member of the Laurier Government; Mr. Duff was active in the Liberal party of British Columbia before he was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, where he has achieved a position of exceptional distinction and authority. Sir George Foster and Sir Adam Beck are Conservatives of reputation and standing in Canadian affairs. It has to be said, however, that none of these four names excited the imagination of the country or by contrast gave force to the demand for the Prime Minister's removal. This is a tribute to the Conservative leader rather than a reflection upon the nominees of the Western Liberal group. Sir Robert, however, called a caucus of the Conservative parliamentary party and offered to resign in favour of Sir George Foster. Foster himself firmly opposed the resignation, as did all his associates in caucus. Indeed, the occasion will be memorable in Canadian parliamentary history. Not only was there complete unanimity in the declaration of allegiance to the Prime Minister, but there were striking manifestations of affection and confidence. It was made clear that, if the Liberals would not enter a Union Government under Sir Robert Borden, there could be no union. The Prime Minister was authorised by caucus to continue the negotiations in complete assurance that he would have their undivided support as leader of a national Government or a Conservative Government, but with equal assurance that, as he had borne the heavy burden of war from the beginning and had sought with great patience and persistence to effect a coalition with the Liberal party, Conservatives would have no other leader nor support coalition under any other leader.

It is understood that most of the Western Liberal leaders did not differ greatly from the Conservative caucus.

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They believed that Sir Robert Borden was the necessary and inevitable head of any national Government. Only a fringe of Liberal support for such a Government could be obtained, and therefore, if a majority of the constituencies were to be carried, the Conservative party must not be divided. The Western leaders, however, doubted if they could hold their followers against Sir Wilfrid Laurier, particularly in consideration of the fresh pledges to party registered at the Winnipeg Convention. For this reason they hesitated, took counsel with their followers, and smoothed the way to decision. Finally, national overcame personal, party, and provincial considerations, and coalition was effected.

It may be, too, that delay was prudent and in the interests of union. There is reason to think that outside of Quebec and Ontario the official Liberal organisations will be carried by the federal unionists to the support of the new Government. In other words, in the impending election the Liberal Governments of Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia will co-operate with the Unionist leaders at Ottawa instead of with Sir Wilfrid Laurier or his successor if the official Liberal party continues to oppose conscription and coalition. In Ontario Sir Wilfrid still controls the Liberal organisation, while Quebec is divided between Liberals and Nationalists.

Apart from the Prime Minister there is an equal representation of Conservatives and Liberals in the Union Cabinet. The Liberal side is strong in political genius, experience and capacity. It is believed that when the Western leaders decided to coalesce they required an equal division of portfolios and the inclusion of representative Liberals from the older provinces. Hence the admission of Mr. N. W. Rowell, Liberal leader in the Legislature of Ontario, Hon. A. K. Maclean, Premier of Nova Scotia, and Mr. F. B. Carvell, of New Brunswick. Hon. C. C. Ballantyne, of Montreal, Major-General Mewburn, who becomes Minister of Militia, and Hon. Hugh Guthrie,

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of South Wellington, also belonged to the Liberal party, but they were chosen by the Prime Minister before coalition was arranged. The West gives Hon. A. L. Sifton, Premier of Alberta, Hon. J. A. Calder, of Saskatchewan, and Hon. T. A. Crerar, of Manitoba. There is no more capable public man in the West than Mr. Calder. He has a clear head, a resolute temper, and the skill of a politician with the prescience of a statesman. No one has done more than Mr. Calder to give Liberalism its ascendancy in the Western Provinces ; and, when all is said, that ascendancy rests upon solid achievements. It is believed that throughout the long negotiations for coalition Mr. Calder was distrusted by many of the lesser Conservative politicians, but possessed from the first the confidence of the Prime Minister. He was never evasive nor arrogant, but he had a clear comprehension of the position of himself and his Western associates and of what coalition involved ; and he held himself in hand until he was convinced that the real objects of union would be achieved. Mr. Crerar is said to have statesmanlike qualities and a natural genius for administration. But the remarkable fact in connection with his acceptance of the office of Minister of Agriculture is that he is one of the most trusted leaders of the organised grain growers. The formidable body which he represents is committed to low tariff, closer trade relations with the United States, an immediate increase in the British preference to 50 per cent., and ultimate free trade between Canada and the mother country. As to fiscal policy Mr. Calder and Mr. Sifton are probably in substantial agreement with the grain growers. All are suspicious of the "Eastern Interests" and concerned for a greater recognition of the demands of Western Canada in federal legislation. It is assumed that they did not enter coalition without some understanding of the disposition of the Prime Minister towards Western conditions and Western problems. How far this understanding goes has not been disclosed. It may not be fully disclosed until peace comes.

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It is no secret that Sir Robert Borden has been greatly concerned to remove causes of suspicion and difference between East and West, and aside altogether from the immediate supreme issue of war he would rejoice in this union with Western leaders as clearing the way to reconciliation between the newer and older provinces and complete and enduring national unity.

There is a glowing prospect that in the flame of war we shall burn up many old grievances and forge stronger bonds of union between all sections of the Dominion. It can hardly be doubted that, when leaders trusted by Western Radicals sit round a common table with leaders trusted by Eastern Conservatives, differences can be adjusted and harmonised in the common interest. There are the roots of national patriotism in all those who have joined the new Government, otherwise coalition could not have been accomplished. For the moment, indeed, Quebec is isolated as never before since Confederation ; but this is not so much the result of deliberate design as of the conditions which have developed. In the Union Cabinet there are only two French Ministers, and these have less political experience and less authority than most of their colleagues. But they have courage and patriotism, and in the years to come they will have an honourable reputation in Canadian history. It is certain that the Prime Minister has a sincere regard for the French people of Canada, and deplors their attitude towards the war and the Government. As the *Vancouver Daily Province* has said, the grave defect in the Union Cabinet is the under-representation of Quebec. But the public men of Quebec declined to co-operate in the course which Canada must pursue in loyalty to the decimated regiments in the trenches and in obedience to the supreme obligation which lies upon every free nation to restore freedom in Europe and to sustain the elementary rights of civilisation. The composition of the Union Government, however, guarantees that the constitutional privileges of Quebec will not be

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circumscribed, nor the electoral campaign disfigured by inflammatory appeals to racial and sectarian prejudices. Here also is a gain for national harmony and unity; for patriots looked with apprehension to a contest in which denunciation of Quebec would be the chief appeal for support in the English provinces.

Already there are indications that the best minds of the French province are gravely concerned over the situation, and it is conceivable that there may yet be a revolt against the influences which have separated its people from their English-speaking fellow-citizens in this crisis of destiny for Canada and the Empire. It must be remembered that throughout the war Sir Robert Borden himself has treated Quebec with great consideration. He has had nothing but praise for the valour of the French regiments. He has never uttered an angry or provocative sentence. Whatever may develop, he has nothing to withdraw, and sooner or later Quebec will understand and perhaps not be ungrateful. Mr. Rowell, Mr. Maclean, Mr. Carvell, and the Western Liberal leaders have shown equal reticence in references to Quebec if equal firmness in urging the duty of Canada to reinforce the army and prosecute the war with continuous vigour until victory is achieved. Indeed, the Liberal delegation in the Government has had the confidence of Quebec to a degree which it denied to the Conservative leader, although he too deserved what has been so firmly withheld. There is assurance, therefore, that Quebec will not be defamed; and possibly, when the election is over, Sir Robert Borden will be able to say as Lincoln said from the window in the White House on the night of his re-election to the Presidency:

It has long been a grave question whether any Government not too strong for the liberties of its people can be strong enough to maintain its own existence in great emergencies. On this point the present rebellion brought our republic to a severe test, and a Presidential election occurring in regular course during the rebellion added not a little to the strain. If the loyal people united were put

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to the utmost of their strength by the rebellion, must they not fail when divided and partially paralysed by a political war among themselves? But the election was a necessity. We cannot have free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us. The strife of the election is but human nature practically applied to the facts of the case. What has occurred in this case must ever recur in similar cases. Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. Let us, therefore, study the incidents of this, as philosophy to learn wisdom from, and none of them as wrongs to be avenged. But the election, along with its incidents and undesirable strife, has done good too. It has demonstrated that a people's Government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war. Until now it has not been known to the world that this was a possibility. It shows, also, how sound and strong we are. . . . But the rebellion continues; and, now that the election is over, may not all having a common interest reunite in a common effort to save our common country?

It cannot be doubted that the electoral outlook for the Government was improved by the franchise measures adopted towards the close of the session of Parliament. There was substantial agreement upon the details of the Act, which gives votes to the Canadian Expeditionary Forces and to Canadian nurses in military hospitals in France and England. Certain of its provisions were opposed, but not with much heat or energy. It was argued, for example, that a ballot which required the men in the trenches to choose between "Government" and "Opposition" involved a decision upon party programmes rather than upon the merits of individual candidates. The Government held, however, that it was impossible for the soldiers to have knowledge of the candidates in 234 constituencies and that to require voting for individual candidates could only result in uncertainty and confusion. There was objection also to the proposal to enfranchise men who were not residents of Canada when they enlisted, and to empower the Government to determine the particular constituencies to which

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such votes should be assigned. Manifestly in closely divided constituencies the result could be decided by a judicious distribution of these ballots. If over the whole country the parties ran nearly even, it is conceivable that the ballots of non-residents could be so allocated as to decide the election in favour of the Government. As a concession to the Opposition it was finally determined that non-residents should vote at the places in Canada where they enlisted. In support of the proposal to enfranchise non-residents it was insisted that men who were willing to fight for Canada should have the right to vote for Canada. During the first months of the war many British subjects living in the United States joined the oversea regiments, particularly those recruited in the Western Provinces. Many of these have served in the trenches long enough to qualify for the franchise. It was not convenient, however, to consider the period of service any more than it was thought necessary to insist that minors should be disfranchised. The Government contended that all men on active service with the Canadian forces should vote and, except as regards non-residents, the Opposition agreed. The time of voting in the army will extend over twenty-seven days in order that the troops, however situated, may have full opportunity to cast their ballots. Naturally, as a result of this arrangement, there will be serious delay in tabulating the vote in many constituencies. The Government made all necessary concessions to the Opposition in the endeavour to establish joint control of the election machinery and to guard against personation and other possible electoral improprieties.

There were far more radical differences of opinion in Parliament over the War-Time Election Act. It was only by the free application of closure that the measure was adopted; but, however the Act itself may be regarded, this procedure was apparently approved in the country. It will be remembered that power to curtail debate was taken by the Government in 1912 when the proposal to

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build Dreadnoughts for the Imperial Navy was subjected to desperate and continuous obstruction. In four subsequent sessions, however, closure was never applied. It is doubtful if it would have been used during the recent session if Parliament had not been on the verge of dissolution. The Government suspected that, unless closure were applied, the Opposition would obstruct the passage of the Election Act until October 7, when Parliament would expire by effluxion. There was vigorous resistance, but no such stormy scenes and dramatic incidents as characterised the memorable struggle over the Dreadnoughts. Moreover, as has been said, the country was seemingly impressed by the value of closure as a method of checking the interminable loquacity for which the Canadian Parliament is distinguished. It is likely that in the future closure will be used more freely, and perhaps any evils that may follow will be more than offset by a partial eradication of the abuses which have flourished under the old rules of procedure.

The War Time Election Act, so repugnant to the Opposition, disfranchises Mennonites and Doukhobors who came to Canada under guarantees that they would be relieved from military service, as also all natives of enemy countries who have lived less than fifteen years in the Dominion. It is estimated that under these provisions 35,000 natives of enemy countries will be debarred from voting. These reside chiefly in the Western provinces, and are mainly Germans and Austrians. The German communities of the older provinces will be only slightly affected. Nor will the Germans and Austrians on the Prairies be completely disfranchised. According to the quinquennial census of the Prairie provinces just issued 21·4 per cent. of the population of Saskatchewan, 13·21 per cent. of the population of Alberta, and 12 per cent. of the population of Manitoba are of German or Austrian origin. Moreover, in the three Prairie provinces, of the males between the ages of 20 and 34 there are 169,685 of Canadian and British

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origin and 111,304 of other stock. Thus the males of British origin exceed those of other origin by only 58,381, while there have enlisted from the three Western provinces 105,000, of whom at least 90 per cent. are between the ages of 20 and 34 and chiefly of British origin.

The proposal to disfranchise natives of enemy countries who have been less than fifteen years in Canada was denounced by the Opposition as a violation of the word of the Crown and the honour of the State, as a recrudescence of Krugerism, as making British citizenship "a scrap of paper," as comparable only to the Prussian spirit revealed in the attack on Belgium. The champions of the Government sought to create the impression that the Liberal attitude was explained by the expectation of alien support. They argued that Germans affected by the proposal, even though naturalised, were not relieved from the obligations of German citizenship. They held that to permit those of doubtful loyalty or those embarrassed by a double loyalty to affect the policy of Canada when its very existence as a free country was threatened would verge upon treason and disloyalty. It must be said, however, that these arguments were not supported by many conscriptionist Liberals in Parliament nor by Liberal journals whose attitude to the war is beyond suspicion. In the Commons and in the Senate little support could have been secured, outside the regular ministerialists, for any proposal to disfranchise those of any race or nationality who had acquired citizenship before the war and who during its continuance have been orderly and submissive to authority.

The Opposition also resisted the proposal to give votes to the widows, wives, mothers and sisters of soldiers. It was argued that many women who had devoted themselves to relief and patriotic movements had a clear if not equal right to the franchise, and that injustice would be done if these were excluded. It was pointed out that in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, where equal suffrage has been established and where hitherto

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the provincial lists of voters had governed in federal elections, many women would actually be disfranchised. Therefore either the provincial lists should be adopted or all women should vote. But on behalf of the Government it was contended "that the Act was a war measure and that the object was to recognise the suffering and sacrifice of those women upon whom the consequences of war fell most heavily. Parliament had never extended the suffrage to women in federal elections. The Act, therefore, enfranchised thousands of women and disfranchised none." The Prime Minister intimated that, if the Government should be sustained, all women would receive the franchise when peace was restored, but the immediate purpose was to give votes only to women whose fathers, husbands or brothers were in uniform, and for this exceptional reason deserved special consideration. Under closure the Act substantially as introduced by the Government was adopted. It is remarkable that many leaders among women suffragists and the most influential women's organisations have expressed approval of the Government's action in consideration of the sacrifices entailed upon many households, the fact of war, and the necessity for adequate expression of the forces favourable to its vigorous prosecution.

It is estimated that by the War Time Election Act 500,000 women have been enfranchised. The households from which men have enlisted will have power at the polls three times greater than will be exercised by those from which none have gone or which had none to go. Moreover, if the provincial lists had been adopted, all women, whether in favour of the war or not, whether for or against conscription, would have voted. As it is, in the provinces which have equal suffrage, as in those which have not, only the women who have relatives in the war can go to the polls. It has been suggested that the passage of this legislation assured the return of the Borden Government and explains the final acceptance of coalition by the Western Liberal leaders. Possibly, if a Union Government had been

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organised during the session of Parliament, such action would not have been taken. Even the Western Liberals in Parliament who gave their votes for conscription could not be convinced that any measure of disfranchisement was wise or necessary. The facts, however, do not necessarily support the view that the Liberal leaders were coerced into coalition. It would rather seem that by the passage of the measure coalition was made more difficult for public men in the West who depend for support upon many racial elements and have maintained a sympathetic attitude towards the non-English population. The truth is that the Liberal leaders who have entered the coalition have been actuated by high motives. It is only ungenerous and mischievous to question their sincerity or their patriotism. They have taken office under a leader to whose general public policy they were opposed, have estranged many devoted followers, and have forsaken a leader who commands the affection of associates and the respect of opponents however strongly they may divide on public policy. Sir Wilfrid Laurier approaches his 77th birthday. It is believed that Mr. Carvell or Mr. Rowell would have succeeded to the leadership of the Liberal party. Sir Wilfrid's resignation was said to be under consideration while the Liberal conscriptionists were engaged in the conference which resulted in coalition. Men who rise to this conception of public duty are far removed from the common rank of time servers and self-seekers. They redeem politics and honour democracy.

There is, no doubt, a sullen feeling among the patronage element in both the old parties, but the masses of the people reveal a temper as sound, disinterested, and patriotic as animated the Conservative leaders who made union possible and the Liberal leaders who set aside differences and prejudices in order to unify and strengthen the nation for the supreme crisis in its history. No one has stated the significance of what has been accomplished more clearly and strongly than Sir Clifford Sifton, who

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was himself instrumental in achieving the result. Its meaning, he says, is that the Coalition Government will undoubtedly carry the country at the approaching general election; that the Military Service Act will be vigorously enforced; that we shall be able, if necessary, to send our fifth division to the front and take the field with five full divisions and abundant reinforcements to keep them up to strength, no matter how long the war lasts; and that Canada has asserted its ability to pull itself together in the face of an emergency and assert its national will to stand by its allies in full strength to the end. With characteristic courage and doggedness Sir Wilfrid Laurier seems to have resolved to retain the leadership of the Liberal Party and make conscription the chief issue in the election. He will not, however, agree to repeal the Military Service Act, as the Nationalists and the more irreconcilable Liberals of Quebec demand. This may expose him to attack by the Nationalists; for Mr. Bourassa is not reconciled to the Liberal leader even by his resistance to the draft or by the schism among English-speaking Liberals. There is little prospect, however, that the Coalition Government can be defeated or that any group from Quebec can hold the balance of power in the next Parliament.

Canada. October, 1917.

AUSTRALIA

I. THE LABOUR PARTY IN DEFEAT

THE Federal elections in May resulted in the most crushing defeat for the Labour Party that any political party has sustained since the establishment of Federal Government in Australia. The loss of every Senate seat and a complete victory for the Government in the House of Representatives contests revealed the deep distrust which had been excited throughout the country by the ill-concealed disloyalty of one section of the party and the weakness of its leaders. In the new Parliament the party is not sufficiently numerous in either House to affect seriously the shaping of policy, whilst its personnel shows what an irremediable loss the party suffered when it expelled Mr. Hughes and his colleagues. By that act, as an election poster put it, the Labour Party "blew out its brains."

From the point of view of those who recognise that the Labour Party has done good work and has much that is salutary in its ideals, the disconcerting fact is that its present system of organisation and control gives no promise of improvement. The groups who really "run" the party frankly dislike men of outstanding personality, as their press organs have frequently proclaimed. An Australian Labour member must not be in any sense vigorously independent to his selection committee. The extreme section of the party, which has captured its machinery, is bent on driving the principle of complete control to the utmost limits. Mr. Arthur Rae, an ex-Senator, has

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described in the Sydney *Worker* the methods by which the "industrial section for securing Labour solidarity" conducts its operations. It will be seen from this that, "no matter what new facts or arguments may be adduced," the machine grinds out its mechanical purpose with automatic thoroughness. The "extreme section" is to control the Labour Conferences; the Conferences are to control the Labour members of Parliament. The italicised phrases in Mr. Arthur Rae's description make the process clear:

Now as to the methods of the industrial section for securing Labour solidarity.

They have a code of rules of their own; issue a badge of membership; charge affiliation fees to leagues and unions; elect an executive of their own; issue an annual report; have a printed form of pledge, which all delegates must sign; draw up an election list or ticket of their own members only to fill the position of president, vice-presidents, or secretary of the whole Labour movement of the State; also the New South Wales members of the Federal executive, and the six delegates to the Inter-State Labour Conference, and even the returning officer and the two scrutineers to conduct the elections. Furthermore, they discussed the Conference business paper, and whatever they decided to support or oppose every delegate on the "section" was pledged to vote solidly upon in Conference, *no matter what new facts or arguments might be adduced.* The "section" also has a rule that its members must vote in threes—that is, each member must show his ballot-paper after voting to two others; and *every candidate of the "section" for any office in the movement must sign an undated resignation and leave it in the hands of the "section" to hand in when dissatisfied with his conduct.*

Unless this complete subordination of the Labour Party to the commands of a few aggressive and not always very responsible persons be broken, the present Opposition in Parliament is likely to remain an opposition for a very long time, and to be as weak in personal ability as it is at present. Machines can manufacture automata, but men fit to govern are not produced in that way. Quite apart from errors of policy and distrust generated by unpatriotic

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action, a political party cannot with impunity expose itself to public derision by killing out the qualities in its representatives that are most needed in public men.

The tactics which have been pursued since the elections have afforded ample evidence that the lessons of defeat were not well learnt. The Victorian State Labour Conference in July passed an assortment of mutually contradictory resolutions dealing with the war and many other things; one of them favouring "the establishment of international arbitration to *finally* settle international disputes"; whilst a second expressed the view that, "though international arbitration may reduce the numbers of wars, lasting peace can only be won by the union of the working people of the world to overthrow the capitalist system"; and a third favoured the expansion of the existing machinery for international arbitration "to embrace a concert of Europe, ultimately merging into a world-wide Parliament." An inclination to pass any resolution if filled with phrases familiarised by frequent repetition in Labour newspapers was even more characteristic of this Conference than of its predecessors. By 112 votes to 52 the Conference favoured the "total abolition of compulsory military training," and urged that "the compulsory training clauses be deleted from the Defence Act." So that the party wirepullers, who have done their utmost to prevent Australia from fully exerting herself to defend the Empire, would also destroy the means whereby alone this country is able to equip itself for self-defence. An indication of the real disposition of the "advanced section" towards the war was revealed by a resolution passed by the Melbourne Trades Hall Council on July 19, which demanded that Labour members of Parliament should "refuse to assist in recruiting." The president of the Trades Hall Council and the seconder of the resolution were fined under the War Precautions Act at the Melbourne City Police Court on August 14 for prejudicing recruiting. The Labour members referred to have, in the best of cases

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rendered a minimum of service in that direction, whilst some have been openly hostile to efforts to secure enlistments. These various symptoms of the spirit actuating the small groups of men who have control of the wires by which the Labour movement is manipulated, both in its political and industrial phases, indicate that the chastisement inflicted by the electors at the polls has taught them little. Mr. Hughes has uttered the warning that "the unions are being led to destruction." They are still in the hands of men who, if in danger of falling over a precipice, would pass resolutions against the law of gravitation as the wicked work of capitalist exploiters.

The Labour Party under its present regime is still so far political as to be anxious to have office and a majority in Parliament. But the predominance of the "industrial" section stands for a readiness to resort to direct action for the attainment of any of its ends, an increasing belief in the efficacy of these methods as compared with political methods, and a disposition to use the strike in one form or another as a means of maintaining power in the hands of "class conscious" organised labour, whatever government is in office. The prevalence of such doctrines was bound to lead to an increase in the interruptions of industry and to menace the whole commercial and industrial activities of the country.

II. THE GREAT STRIKE IN SYDNEY

AT the time of writing (August 24, 1917) New South Wales is in the throes of an industrial upheaval which threatens to assume the scale and importance of the great Maritime Strike of 1890. Traffic and industry in other States have already been seriously affected, even to the extent of holding up transports and other essential war services. The Commonwealth Government has therefore become deeply concerned in the dispute, though the main struggle,

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in fact and principle, is between the Government of New South Wales and the Trade Unions. The true issue is fundamental; it is no passing phase, no sudden eruption.

The trouble ostensibly arose through the introduction by the Railways Commissioners of a card system of recording particulars of times and jobs into the State tramway and railway workshops. The men stigmatised this action as an attempt at "speeding-up," and after a few days of restless discussion, the Commissioners declining to withdraw the system, the men delivered a 24-hours' "ultimatum," on the expiry of which (August 2) they came out on strike. The trouble so far involved nearly five thousand men. The unions formed a "Defence Committee," invested with very full powers. Three days later the Committee called out all men in the railway and tramway departments, and declared "black" all coal in the service of the Railways Commissioners. The great majority of men came out, though enough remained to enable the Government, with higher officials and volunteers, to maintain a very restricted but exceedingly useful service. A week after the beginning of the strike the Sydney wharf labourers resolved, by mass meeting, to join the strikers, and the coal miners also ceased work. On the tenth day the seamen and firemen employed on coastal and inter-State steamers came out. The slaughtermen and several minor unions have since been added, while all unions have refused to handle goods declared "black," including wheat, flour and all other goods seeking transport by rail or sea. After much deliberation the large ferry employees' unions and a few others have resolved to remain at work "until called out by the Defence Committee." The total number of men on strike is estimated to be about 75,000.

The attitude of the Government and the Commissioners has been firm throughout. On the eve of the strike those authorities offered (1) "That if, in three months, it could be shown before a public inquiry that the card system was

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unjust, it would be revised." (2) "That every man should, each day if so desired, inspect and initial his card relating to the previous day's work." As regards the second part of the offer it should be explained that a very general impression prevailed amongst the men that the foreman would fill in the individual cards without giving the men concerned an opportunity to check the details. The men refused this offer, proposing instead (1) That the Railways Commissioners revert to the position as on June 1. (2) "That the Government appoint a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the subject matter of the trouble, consisting of representatives of the Unions and of the Railways Commissioners." (3) "That the men return to work upon the granting of this."

In subsequent negotiations the Government has declined to vary its terms. The men have submitted only slight variations of theirs, except for an extraordinarily disingenuous offer to submit the alternatives to a ballot of the unions, both sides to be bound by the result. Meanwhile the Government, by proclamation and otherwise, has roundly denounced the strike as an organised rebellion against constituted authority, without a shadow of a real grievance, and inspired by disloyal leaders and I.W.W. (Independent Workers of the World) influence. It announced that all men in its service who did not return to work a week after striking would be dismissed and lose all the rights and privileges of their positions. The dismissal was formally pronounced in due course. A train and tram service sufficient for minimum public needs has been maintained, and some 2,500 volunteers, mainly from the country, are established in an encampment, being utilised mainly for wharf labour. There is little doubt that, with the numbers of men who have returned to work—though the actual figures are uncertain—and the volunteers, the community's chief requirements can be met, in spite of inconvenience, for an indefinite period. This situation is largely the result of the sympathy of the general public with

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the Government, and the readiness with which the men of the country districts have come to the city to do the work of the strikers. The Federal and State Governments are co-operating to secure the loading of transports and the passage of food supplies. A Bill has been rushed through the State Parliament to enable the mines to be worked by recruited labour. The cancellation of the registration of several unions on strike has been granted in the Arbitration Court. Three of the strike leaders have been arrested for conspiracy to incite public servants to withdraw from their employment. It is now rumoured that in a few days the Unions' Defence Committee will appeal to the unions in all other States to cease work in sympathy with their comrades in New South Wales.

As to the merits and demerits of the original cause of dispute—namely, the card system—little need be said. The actual form of card introduced appears to differ very little from the time sheets in operation in the Government and many private workshops. Moreover, it does not of itself entail speeding-up; in that respect everything depends upon the spirit and method of its administration. However, the men are quite convinced that it is merely an instalment of the complete "Americanisation" of their work.

Public feeling runs strongly against the men, because it is held that the cause of the strike is in itself trifling; and that, even if it were not so, every expedient of conciliation should have been exhausted before such drastic steps were taken during the continuance of the great war. It will be seen that a very thin line divides the proposals of the Government from those of the unions. The Government insists on resumption of work while the card system is on trial. The men ask for suspension of the card system until an inquiry has been held. There is much talk amongst the unions of the implacability of the Government, but they do not sufficiently realise that for the Government to give way is to present the appearance of weakness in the control

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of its business and inevitably to bring upon itself a future crop of stoppages. The coal strike of last year ended in a victory for the men. It has been followed, not by industrial peace, but by more strikes and disputes than have occurred in any similar period for many years. In the present crisis the men do not realise what it would mean to the Government to yield on a point which seems to them comparatively unimportant.

There is, however, much more behind this strike than its immediate cause. It is not an isolated outbreak, but rather a culmination of a series of developments of the past two years. Some of these were dealt with in *THE ROUND TABLE* for December, 1916, under "Industrial Unrest in Australia." A few may be specially mentioned: (1) The rise in the cost of living. (2) The failure of Arbitration Courts and Wages Boards to fulfil the somewhat extravagant anticipations of the workers. (3) The success of the campaign against conscription, which gave extremists in the Political Labour League an exaggerated sense of power. (4) The rise to power of the extremist section in the political Labour movement, which it now dominates to the virtual exclusion of all others. (5) The trial and conviction of twelve members of the I.W.W. on charges of sedition and arson. (6) The invasion of Australia by advocates of the philosophy of violence, mainly as members or representatives of the I.W.W.

The defeat of the Labour Party at the recent elections had only a slightly depressing effect upon its spirit; and it is a reasonable surmise that the present strike movement is deliberately designed as an effort to defeat the Government in the industrial field.

Developments are taking place every day: the trouble may extend to other States of the Commonwealth; and for many reasons it is preferable at this particular stage to do little more than place the bare facts before the reader.

The Strikes in Victoria

III. THE STRIKES IN VICTORIA

ON July 30, prior to the date of the outbreak of the railway strike in Sydney, the wharf labourers in Victoria had refused to handle foodstuffs for export unless it was shown that they were intended for war purposes. This action was taken as a protest against alleged "profiteering," and with the idea that it would have the effect of forcing the price of foodstuffs down to the level that existed before the war. Though the wharf labourers' original decision was that they would not load foodstuffs, they were advised that if they partly loaded a vessel with merchandise and then refused to complete the loading (either with foodstuffs or any other cargo) they would render themselves liable as strikers under the penal provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act. They accordingly decided not to commence loading at all, with the idea of protecting themselves from any possible legal proceedings if they refused to load foodstuffs only.

On August 7 the Prime Minister received a deputation from the Melbourne Trades Hall of delegates who wished to place before him the views of the unions regarding the high cost of living. While Mr. Hughes promised to place the views of the deputation before the Government, he dealt at length with the position created by the raising of wages and the increased cost of production, and with the disastrous effects on industry of the repeated stoppages of work on the part of the wharf labourers. Two days later the question of the increase in price of certain staple commodities was referred by the Government for immediate enquiry to the Inter-State Commission.

Though there was a partial and temporary resumption of work by the wharf labourers, on the following day an entirely new element was introduced. It had been customary for the wharf labourers in Melbourne seeking work

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to muster at certain places—called “picking-up points”—adjacent to the wharves where the particular vessels were due, pay beginning from the time the men were engaged. The men now demanded that one particular place, situated at a considerable distance from some of the wharves, should be the sole “picking-up” locality. If this question had been the only one with which the shipping companies had to deal, the solution might not perhaps have been a matter of great difficulty. There were, however, the other problems of the men’s attitude on the cost-of-living question and the extension of the New South Wales strike, the latter event in itself promising to disorganise the whole of the shipping trade. In commenting on this development and on the extension in Victoria of the Sydney strike the Prime Minister stated that the wharf labourers had thrown off all disguise and had lent themselves to a conspiracy against the general community.

While these troubles were developing in Victoria, the strike of the shunters and gantry hands in Newcastle and other parts of New South Wales, who stopped work in sympathy with the railway and tramway men early in August, made it impossible for vessels in that State to be supplied with coal, so that the inter-State and coastal steamship services were immediately dislocated. The transport trade was further interrupted through the action of the railway men in the northern parts of Queensland, who ceased work owing to their dissatisfaction with the result of a State award under which certain increases in wages were not made retrospective. After being out on strike for three weeks these men decided by ballot on August 28 to resume work.

In the meantime there had been various minor extensions of the strike in Victoria. On August 14 certain stevedore labourers, who had hitherto expressed their willingness to work while the wharf labourers were on strike, refused to start unless they were granted an increase of pay over and above the rate provided for by an award of the

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Federal Court. On the following day the watchmen employed at the wheat stacks near Melbourne and men engaged on shifting wheat at Murrayville went on strike, while the coal-lumpers employed at the Naval Depot at Williamstown declared the coal "black." On August 15 and 16 the crews of certain vessels in Melbourne gave 24 hours' notice of their intention to leave their ships. This individual action was taken with the object of protecting the officials of the union and the union's funds from the penalties of the Federal Arbitration Act. The men claimed that they were not on strike, but had only relinquished individually their positions by giving notice as prescribed by the award under which they were working. A large number of carters and drivers and of timber workers have also ceased work as they refuse to touch cargo that has been handled by non-unionists. On August 17 wharf labourers at Geelong refused to resume loading, and on about the same date the coal miners in Victoria ceased work.

In other States also there were various stoppages of work. On August 13 the wharf labourers at Brisbane went out on strike in sympathy with the movement in the southern States. On the same date the platelayers at the head of the eastern section of the transcontinental railway stopped work because they were refused pay for three days' work lost through a recent dispute, while the wharf labourers at Fremantle refused to load flour on the pretext that "it might reach Germany." On August 20 the miners at Broken Hill, to the number of 6,000, decided to join the ranks of the strikers. Tasmania is thus the only State to which the strike has not yet actively extended.

The dislocation of the shipping industry and the cutting off of supplies of coal from Newcastle soon began to affect others than those directly concerned. Many carters and drivers were thrown out of work, while employers in various manufacturing industries were compelled to dismiss a

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number of hands owing to the disastrous effect of the stoppage of shipping on inter-State trade.

The attitude of the Federal Government to the strikers is reflected in a statement made by the Prime Minister on August 10, when he appealed to the common sense and loyalty of the trade unionists of Australia. "I believe," Mr. Hughes said, "that at the bottom of this is the aftermath of the 5th of May (*i.e.* the date of the Federal elections, when the official Labour Party was defeated). It is an attempt . . . to take the control of the country out of the hands of the Government. . . . The citizens may rest assured that the Government will most certainly not permit irresponsible persons to usurp its functions, but will exhaust all the resources at its disposal to carry on the work of the country and to enable Australia to do its duty in this great war." Four days later the Federal Government issued a proclamation declaring that the upheaval was due to "wild extremists and secret agents of Germany" and appealing to the trade unionists to repudiate by word and deed the policy of the "disloyal, reckless men who are responsible for the present state of affairs." The men were asked to return to work within 24 hours, and warning was given that any person who attempted to interfere or dissuade or influence loyal citizens from carrying on the work of the country would be dealt with promptly and effectually. On August 15 regulations were issued under the War Precautions Act imposing a penalty upon anyone interfering with the discharge or loading of shipping, and providing for the safeguarding of wharves and ships. Though pressed to do so by deputations from the Melbourne Trades Hall, Mr. Hughes refused to grant Federal intervention with a view to settling the strike, on the grounds that the matter in dispute is between the New South Wales Government and its employees, that he is not prepared to intervene unless both parties agree, and that the New South Wales Government is not prepared to accept Federal intervention.

The Strikes in Victoria

The efforts made by the Federal and State Governments to deal with the situation arising out of the strike have met with a large measure of success. A central National Service Bureau has been established in Melbourne, with branches in other towns and States, and several thousand "free" workers have already been enrolled and put to work. In all cases men engaged through these bureaux are being paid the award rates in force. The Federal Government has, moreover, appointed a committee of the Cabinet to deal with all matters arising out of the strike, while the State Government has appointed a similar committee to deal with the Victorian situation.

A considerable amount of criticism has been levelled against the Federal Arbitration system by reason of the inability of the Court to deal with the present crisis. Mr. Justice Higgins, the President of the Court, has pointed out that the root of the trouble is in New South Wales, and that there are two reasons which render the intervention of the Court impossible. One is that the Court cannot, under the Federal constitution, deal with the relations of State railway servants and their employers. The other is that the main dispute does not extend beyond one State. The strikes of the waterside workers and seamen are not on account of any dispute with their employers about any "industrial matter"; these men are in dispute with the Government either with respect to the card system in the railway workshops, in so far as the strikers are sympathetic, or with respect to an economic matter, in so far as the strikers are concerned with the cost of living. In an application by the steamship owners to strike out of the award the "preference" clause which provides that no member of the Waterside Workers' Federation shall be required to work along with any person who is not a member of the Federation, the President has taken the view that there was in Melbourne and Sydney a cessation of work on the part of the members of the Federation in combination, as a means of bringing pressure to bear,

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indirectly and in some remote manner, on the New South Wales Railways Commissioners, so as to force them to withdraw the card system. He has accordingly ordered that the preference clause be struck out unless the men return to work within a week. The Federal Government has carried a regulation under the War Precautions Act empowering the Governor-General in Council to deregister any union the members of which cease work. Deregistration will deprive the union of all the benefits conferred by any existing award of an arbitration court. In view of the grave situation created by the refusal of the wharf labourers at Port Pirie in South Australia to handle coke required in the making of munitions, the Prime Minister has applied for cancellation of the registration of the Waterside Workers' Federation.

Though it is stated that large numbers of the railway and tramway men are returning to work in Sydney, it is unwise at the present stage to speculate as to the future course of the strikes.

Australia. August, 1917.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE New South Wales railway strike collapsed during the month of September, the men returning to work under the card system and accepting the Government's terms. One by one the other unions followed suit, the coal-miners last of all; and by the end of October the strike movement was at an end throughout the Commonwealth. The Governments primarily concerned made no concessions to the demands made by any of the unions.

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THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA.

DURING the past year a remarkable development has taken place in South African politics by the definite adoption by the Nationalist Party of the policy of independence for South Africa. The first announcement of this policy undoubtedly came as an unwelcome surprise to many people of both races, and, as was to be expected in the present time of tense feeling, brought with it a recrudescence of dormant or, at any rate, quiescent racial antipathies. It was, however, a natural and logical outcome of the movement which led to the secession of General Hertzog and his followers from General Botha and to the ultimate formation of the Nationalist Party.

It may, perhaps, be remembered that nearly five years ago General Hertzog left the Botha Ministry, or, as his friends say, was driven out of the Ministry, because of the incompatibility with the Government policy of the views which he held and expressed on the relations of South Africa to the Empire. The German war menace was already a cloud on the horizon and the question of what the position of South Africa would be in the event of war had already begun to occupy attention. General Hertzog came out as the spokesman of the view that the true attitude of South Africa in such a war would be one of neutrality, and this idea of neutrality became a centre of controversy in the Press and on public platforms. General Botha definitely pronounced against it, and it then became

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clear that a definite separation between him and the champions of the other view within his party was only a matter of time. Other causes no doubt contributed to the decisive step. The unsettling effects of the establishment of Union, the abolition of the old seats of Government which the people had been accustomed to regard as peculiarly their own and the removal of Government and Parliament to Pretoria and Cape Town, the economic and political isolation of the Orange Free State, perhaps even—as the public is apt to suspect on such occasions—the conflicting ambitions of political leaders—all these are causes to which the historian may trace in greater or less degree the events which happened.

But the ostensible cause of the secession was the real or, at any rate, the predominating one—the dissatisfaction of a section of the people with the position of South Africa as a Dominion of the Empire. It was not at first avowedly a separation movement, though no doubt most of the enthusiasm behind it came from men who had never at heart accepted the British connection and were ready to welcome any opposition to it. Ostensibly, however, it began by accepting the position of partnership in the British Empire, but demanding that Imperial interests should not be allowed to overshadow or prejudice those of South Africa. “South Africa first” was the shibboleth by which it was sought to distinguish those who were accounted as the true patriots from those who had been contaminated by Imperialist or, as it is called, “jingo” influence. This was interpreted as meaning that South African statesmen should disregard any obligation attaching to the British connection as soon as it involved any conflict with what seemed to be the interests of South Africa as a separate unit, but should acquiesce in the connection so long as there was no risk of conflict between the two.

At first, as has been said, and ostensibly, this was the attitude towards the Imperial connection adopted by

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political leaders who formed the Nationalist Party. It was even included in the statement of principles adopted by the party on its formation. Article 4 of the Programme of Principles of the Nationalist Party reads as follows :

It unequivocally accepts the Position of the Union in regard to its Connection with the United Kingdom resting as it does on the Good Faith of Two Nations, and it is convinced that the Maintenance of good Relations between the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom depends upon the scrupulous Avoidance of any Measure whereby the political Freedom of the People of the Union is in any way curtailed or hampered, or whereby any of the Liberties of the Country and its Government are withdrawn from the immediate Jurisdiction or Control of the People of the Union.

It was, however, obvious that the party could not rest there, because the theory of Imperial relations under which South Africa would take any benefits which might come from its membership in the Empire while repudiating any obligations arising from it was too much of a sham to live even in the soil of South African politics. The outbreak of war gave the final push towards clearness and sincerity.

There can be little doubt that disaffection to the British flag in South Africa was one of the contingencies on which the German Government counted in the event of war with the British Empire. It is probable that its agents, official and unofficial, did what they could to turn the eyes of the disaffected towards the rising power of Germany as the instrument of Providence from which the overgrown and decadent British Empire would receive its mortal stroke. But it is not necessary to ascribe to direct German activity in the shape of influence or money either the rebellion of 1914 or the present separatist campaign. Direct encouragement of this sort or a promise of it may have been at work in isolated instances, but the soil was so ready for the growth of disaffection that a seed dropped from anywhere was sure to grow.

The outbreak of war gave definite form to the somewhat

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vague sentiments of dissatisfaction with the British connection on which the Nationalist Party first took form. It seemed as if the long-expected day of reckoning for the British Empire had now dawned. As one of the Nationalist leaders said, the war "brought a message to the hearts of all true Afrianders." The opening moves, the seemingly irresistible attack of the German hosts, the evident absence in England not only of efficient preparation for the war but even of adequate grasp of its real significance, the obvious attempts of the Press to conceal awkward facts and minimise the gravity of the military situation, all confirmed the enemies of the Empire in their belief that its last hour had come. When, therefore, General Botha's Government decided to take an active part in the war by sending an expedition against the German colony of South-West Africa, all the forces and influences opposed to any participation by South Africa in the war and hostile to the cause of the Empire and its Allies came to a head, and the country drifted into civil war or, as it is commonly called, "rebellion."

From the military point of view the "rebellion" can hardly be taken seriously, but as a political event its significance can hardly be overestimated. It at once gave definite shape to the differences between the Nationalists and the Government and burned them into the hearts of the people. The old republican flag was raised again, and though those who tried after the suppression of the rebellion to justify or condone it described it as merely an "armed protest" against the Government's war policy, there can be no doubt that what inspired most of the leaders and many of those who took part in it was the hope of recovering independence and restoring the old republics. The suppression of the rebellion left that ideal stronger than it was before, and though the Nationalist Party (which justified and even glorified the rebellion) had necessarily at first to disavow the revolutionary aims of the rebel leaders while it was endeavouring to minimise their

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offence and obtain an amnesty, yet as soon as that immediate object had been obtained it was just as necessarily driven to the public adoption of the republican ideal as an object to be attained by political and constitutional paths.

The war has been the occasion rather than the cause of this development, though it has undoubtedly brought to activity feelings and ideals which might otherwise have smouldered long. At the same time it has made the propagation of such doctrines much more dangerous to the peace of the community. Even in normal times we are still too near the days of the Anglo-Boer War for it to be possible to advocate a policy of independence for South Africa without raising anew all the bitterness of the conflict which closed at Vereeniging in 1902. But these times are not normal. Even here the strain of the great struggle is keenly felt. Many have suffered bereavement or have their nearest relatives or best friends in daily peril at the front. Many more who have not the same personal stake at hazard are stirred to their depths by the daily reports of the ebb and flow of battle. There they feel that the supreme issues are at stake for the people to which they belong and for its ideals and the great political fabric which through generations of struggle and achievement it has built up. For these the propagation at such a time of doctrines of independence for South Africa, accompanied, as it too often is, by manifestations of ill-concealed sympathy with the cause of our enemies, seems to be nothing short of treason, and rouses passions which will not be kept within the ordinary bounds of civil order. For this reason the Nationalist leaders who are responsible for spreading their propaganda at the present time are literally playing with fire. Recognising this, the Federal Council of the Nationalist Party at its meeting in July last recommended that their members should refrain from urging their doctrines during the war, and some of their leaders—among them General Hertzog—have so far followed this counsel. On others, however, it has had no visible effect.

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The form which the movement has taken since it came out into the open as an acknowledged plank in the programme of a professedly peaceful and constitutional party is almost comically "correct." It professes to found itself on the declarations of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson as to the objects for which the Allies are fighting. From these it selects those which suit its purpose with the same adroitness and disregard of the higher verities as a smart lawyer selects for the consideration of a jury facts which seem to support the case for which he is pleading. Having proved from the utterances of the statesmen named that the objects for which the Allies are fighting are the protection of small nations and the rights of peoples to decide what shall be their form of government, the Nationalist leaders conclude that they have established an irresistible case against the Empire before the post-war tribunal of the nations for the granting of independence to South Africa, or at least for the restoration of the republics in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The latter object—restoration of the old republics—is asked for on the principle—sound enough in a court of law—that you must not ask for more than your cause of action will support. It is fairly certain that if it were offered now it would be rejected by a large majority of the people. It would mean for one thing the breaking up of the Union, which, after all, only a very small number of people would like to see. But besides that, even if a Transvaal republic could be brought back from the grave of the past, it would, unless the old restricted franchise is also to be restored, be a very different place from the old republic of 1889. To-day in the Transvaal Provincial Council the Witwatersrand and Pretoria between them return a majority of the members, and so they would in any republican Chamber which was based on a fair franchise. Such a state of things, needless to say, would make no appeal to those whose political outlook rests on keeping alive the sentiments of 1899-1902, and whose national ideals are those of the

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voortrekkers. Still it seems to be thought that if on the logic of the case the post-war tribunal of the nations is constrained to declare in favour of the restoration of the two republics it may, if convinced that this in itself is not practicable, be led farther, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*, to pronounce in favour of the granting of independence to the whole of the Union.

Such is what may be called the formal basis on which is rested the case which is now being put forward by the Nationalist leaders for the establishment in the Union of an independent republican government. That is intended, of course, to satisfy the lawyers, the constitutionalists—to show that nothing is being asked for which does not follow logically, at any rate by implication, from the accepted declarations of the leaders of the Allied Powers. What better guarantee of constitutional respectability could be asked for by the most exacting British patriot? But for the mass of the people something more substantial or, at any rate, less academic is required. For them there is first the appeal to the sentiment of independence deeply rooted in the Boer people for which many of them fought and suffered. Then there is the demonstration of the material loss which South Africa suffers from her interests being always subordinated to those of the Empire. The recent negotiations between the Imperial Government and the Union Government for the purchase of the wool clip have been seized on with avidity and proclaimed by every Nationalist editor and speaker as a convincing illustration of what they call the economic subjection of South Africa. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that since the rebellion nothing has touched the feelings of the farming community so much as what is known as “the wool question”; it is certainly not overstating the case to say that nothing has cost the Government so much political support. That is partly the fault of the Government itself, for it has been anything but happy in its manner of presenting its case to those with whom it had

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to deal, but much more it is due to the fact that this particular incident came just when the Nationalist leaders were looking for an object lesson of their favourite theme that the connection of South Africa with the Empire means invariably the subjection of South African interests, economic and other, to those of an outside Power. The wool question came to them as if it had been specially contrived for their purpose and the country has rung with it from one end to the other.

The price offered by the Imperial Government is 55 per cent. above the pre-war prices of 1913-14, but this is considerably below the prices at which last year's clip were sold by the farmers, and having once tasted prices two or three times as high as those of 1913-14 they naturally look coldly on a drop to a 55 per cent. increase. The fact that a large portion of last year's clip is still cumbering the warehouses of the ports for want of ships to take it away and that the prospects of moving the new clip are even more uncertain does not trouble the farmer as long as speculative buyers are prepared to offer him something like the old inflated price—as apparently, in some districts at any rate, is still being done. In these circumstances it is not difficult to persuade him that the Imperial Government is using its control of shipping in forcing him to sell his wool much under market price—in fact, that his wool is being commandeered by the Botha Government for the use of their friends in London, to whom the poor South African farmer is offered as a sacrifice. If South Africa were an independent country, so the Nationalists say, its wool would have access to what they call the open market, and would be bought by America and Japan at about twice the price which the Imperial Government is offering. But, as South Africa is a British Dominion, the Imperial Government is taking the wool at its own price by a sort of economic conscription, relying on its control of shipping to prevent any rival buyers from getting their purchases removed. This fiction of an "open market" to which the wool of

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South Africa would have free access if only South Africa were not part of the British Empire, and therefore compelled to sell its wool at whatever price the Imperial Government chooses to pay, may seem ludicrous to those who can look impartially at the facts, but it is one which has taken a strong hold on the mind of the South African farmers, and is eagerly fostered by those who find in it a most effective instrument for driving home their doctrine of independence.

Though some of the incidents associated with the entry of this movement upon the public stage may seem to suggest comic opera rather than serious politics, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of it and the dangers which its propagation may entail in the present condition of the country. To understand its significance one must look behind the speeches and arguments of the leaders, which are often only so much window dressing, to the sentiments, the traditions, and the economic condition of the people to whom they really appeal. If we look at these we shall find much to explain both the rise of the movement and its spread. When we further consider the far-reaching effects of the war in breaking down old restraints and traditions, the spectacle of the Russian revolution in which, as if by magic, a great people seems to have passed from the extremest autocracy to the most unrestrained freedom, it is easy to understand that we have here in South Africa a soil in which any plant which promises to grow up into independence and the restoration of the republic will readily take root.

Whether the movement will survive the end of the war if, as we assume, the end is a decisive victory for the Allies, is a question which at present is not easy to answer. That the republican sentiment will remain is certain. It will remain and be cherished as it is now even by many who are not prepared to see South Africa, at her present stage of development, cut herself off from the British Empire. It is equally certain that there will remain a section of the

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people who, on the question of imperial relations, will hold strongly to the narrowly "National" view. They will represent the view that South Africa should avoid anything that tends to establish closer relations with the other members of the British Commonwealth, or to bring about a common policy, and should aim at isolation from all imperial organisation and ultimately at independence. But after the Empire has emerged victorious from its present trial, and when the feelings which the war has created or revived here have had time to die down, it is probable that the independence movement will lose much of its present vigour. People will be able to look calmly at the practical difficulties which would face South Africa in breaking away from the protection of the British commonwealth of nations. Her geographical position and national resources have always hitherto entailed her dependence on the European Power which commanded the sea. Her European population, barely adequate to maintain itself in competition with the native and coloured races around it, is certainly in no position to defend her coasts. Considerations such as these are either overlooked altogether, in the stress of feeling evoked by the war, or they are waved aside by the easy assumption that after the war an era of universal peace is to dawn and the stronger nation will no longer desire or be allowed to impose its will upon the weaker. It is probable, however, that for some time at any rate, after the war, international relations will not be such as to justify that confidence or such as to lead responsible statesmen to think the time opportune for a country such as South Africa to exchange its present position for one in which it will be entirely responsible for its own defence.

Even if this forecast is correct, however, it does not justify the conclusion that nothing need be done to meet the movement now.

The first reaction caused by the public adoption by the Nationalist Party of the republican propaganda took the form of spasmodic efforts in different parts of the country

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to form constitutional parties or organisations which should unite persons irrespective of party in defence of the constitution. These efforts, as might have been expected, attracted little public support. Then a demand arose, or rather, perhaps, an expectation, in certain quarters that General Botha should form a Coalition Government from his own party and the Unionists to carry the country through the period of the war. The Unionist leader made it clear that he was prepared to consider any proposal in this direction which might be made by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, however, at his party Congress has definitely and emphatically declared that he will have nothing to do with coalition in any form. That means that he will endeavour to carry on the Government without a majority in the House of Assembly, relying on the support of the Unionists, in the hope that after the war the prestige of success will rally to his side a strong-enough party to give him a clear majority without embarrassing alliances.

Since the above was written there have been clear indications that what has been referred to as the practical aspect of the situation has already made itself felt. The Nationalist party has been holding its Congresses in the Cape, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and at each of them, though of course the cause of independence and the republic was not abandoned, the prevailing attitude was that of disavowing any active propaganda at the present time, and the adoption of academic resolutions about the ultimate freedom of South Africa and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny. Independence and a republic for South Africa will continue to be an aspiration with many, and a passion with some, but they are not likely for a long time to come to be a question of practical politics.

South Africa. October, 1917.

NEW ZEALAND

I. MINISTERS AND THE WAR CONFERENCE

THE War Conference of the Empire is now a thing of the past. Our delegates have long since returned to New Zealand from the Mother Country, bringing with them their sheaves in the shape of municipal and other honours. They have also brought back—what many people in this Dominion have been anxiously awaiting—a full account of their doings at the War Conference (and elsewhere) during their prolonged absence from New Zealand.

The Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance were away from the Dominion for fully ten months—from August, 1916, until June, 1917. Many important and difficult questions relating to the war had perforce to be decided in their absence by the acting Prime Minister (Sir James Allen) and his remaining colleagues. During that time, for example, Conscription was gradually brought into full working order and a dangerous coal strike had to be settled. Mr. Massey, and Sir Joseph Ward also, were blamed by the unthinking public for deserting their posts at a time of national stress, and their visit to England was by some held up to derision as a species of glorified picnic at the expense of the taxpayers of New Zealand.

The loudest complaints against our Imperial envoys were three in number: that they should have gone to England at all at such a time, that they should have stayed away so long, and that Sir Joseph Ward should have accom-

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panied the Prime Minister on his mission. The truth, of course, is that no one of these complaints was well founded. To deal with them in their order: As was clearly pointed out in these pages so far back as in December, 1915,* it was even then deemed eminently desirable that one or more of our Ministers should proceed to London and there ascertain from His Majesty's Government how New Zealand could best help in ending the war and framing the conditions of peace. This we have no reason to doubt our delegates have done to the best of their ability. In the second place, it was through no fault of our Ministers that they were detained so long in England. They left the Dominion in August, 1916, and had actually arranged to leave England at the end of December. A few weeks earlier the Asquith Government fell. The "National" Ministry was formed early in December, and one of the first acts of the new Administration was to summon a War Conference of the Empire to meet in London at the earliest possible date in 1917. Our Ministers promptly and properly cancelled their arrangements for returning to the Dominion, and attended the meetings of the War Conference. Mr. Hughes could not be present at this Conference on behalf of Australia, which in itself was a national misfortune. It would have been little short of a disaster if New Zealand also had not been represented—thus leaving Australasia without a voice at the first meeting of the Supreme Executive Council of the British Empire. The third count of the popular indictment also fails. Ill-natured people here have said, and are saying: What occasion was there for the Minister of Finance to go to England? Could not the Prime Minister alone adequately represent New Zealand? These people forget that Sir Joseph Ward, besides being Finance Minister in our National Ministry, remains also the Leader of the late Opposition—the head of the "Liberal" party in this Dominion. It has frequently been demonstrated,

* ROUND TABLE, No. 21, pp. 190-1.

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in THE ROUND TABLE and elsewhere, that it would be of great importance to have present at the Imperial War Conference, not only a Minister of the party in power, but also a representative of the Opposition, from each of the Dominions, so as to ensure so far as possible some continuity in the future foreign policy of the outposts of our Empire. We congratulate Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward on having been able in person to achieve this desirable result on behalf of New Zealand.

Mr. Massey and his colleague landed at Auckland on June 25th, 1917. The opening of Parliament took place at Wellington on the 28th. In the Governor-General's speech at the opening ceremony, the attendance of our Ministers at the War Conference was succinctly referred to as follows :

At the invitation of the Imperial Government responsible statesmen of the Dominions and of India met recently in England to confer on the present difficulties *and future constitution* of the Great Empire to which we belong. The attendance of our Prime Minister and Minister of Finance at this Imperial Conference has enabled them to obtain information of value to my Government and to this Dominion.

The presence of my Ministers with the Responsible Ministers of other Dominions at meetings of the War Cabinet was an event remarkable in our history. It indicates the recognition by the Imperial Government of the growth of the Dominions, the responsibilities of Empire, and *the right of the Dominions to representation* when issues vital to their safety and interests may be under consideration.

I have been glad within the last two days to welcome home my two Ministers and their families, and am confident you will find the course of your deliberations simplified and facilitated by the experience they have gained, not only in Great Britain, but at the seat of war on the Western front.

These paragraphs from the Governor-General's speech would appear, on the whole, to give a fair presentment of the Imperial Mission of our two Ministers, although it may with deference be suggested that His Excellency has somewhat magnified their office in respect of the two points underlined above.

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On June 29th Sir James Allen cordially welcomed the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance on their return to the House of Representatives, and it was arranged that the two returning envoys should give the House an account of their stewardship a few days later. On July 3rd, accordingly, Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward in turn addressed an expectant House at great length on the various aspects of their Imperial Mission. Before dealing with their actual work at the Conference itself they both laid stress on the efforts they had made at home on behalf of the producers of this Dominion, and it was quite apparent from their statements that ample justice had been done by our representatives—to their own constituents, at all events—in the way of securing good prices and shipping facilities for New Zealand produce. They also gave a very pleasing report of the welfare of our New Zealand soldiers, both in England and on the Western front. Having thus cleared the ground, our delegates went on to the most important and interesting part of their promised statement—an account of their doings at the War Conference itself. We may say at once that to the average man in New Zealand that account (as reported in Hansard) appears diffuse and difficult to understand. No doubt this may in part be explained by the obvious necessity for reticence as to what took place at the War Cabinet as distinguished from the War Conference. But some at least of the proceedings of our delegates at the War Conference itself (as narrated by themselves) seem hard to reconcile with their position and duties thereat.

For example, Sir Joseph Ward tells us in his statement to the House how he made it clear at the Conference that the people of this Dominion for the future would *claim as a right* to share with Great Britain in the control of the foreign policy of the Empire, on the ground that our services and sacrifices during the war had entitled us thereto. That he should have preferred such a claim at this time came to us with a shock of surprise. To begin

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with, surely such a claim did not come within the scope of the business of the War Conference at all. It certainly cannot be brought within the terms of the invitation to attend that Conference. It does not affect in any way the prosecution of the war, or the possible terms of peace, or any problem immediately arising therefrom. Further, we are quite sure that neither of our delegates held any mandate from the Parliament or the people of New Zealand to put forward such a claim at any time or place, or on any ground, however adequate. It is not a little difficult for an ordinary citizen of New Zealand to understand how this untimely demand came to be made by Sir Joseph Ward on behalf of the Dominion and yet without its authority. But this does not end the matter. Sir Joseph in his *apologia* then goes on further to develop his "claim" briefly as follows: (a) No doubt money will be required from each Dominion for its share of the cost incidental to this control of foreign policy; but (b) the finances of each Dominion must not be dealt with by any Parliament outside that Dominion; and finally (c) no Dominion must yield any part of the full powers of self-government that it at present possesses. Truly this is hard and novel doctrine! What does it all amount to when resolved into its elements? It means in effect that Great Britain is to surrender to the Dominions an undefined share of its existing and real autonomy, while the Dominions are to part with none of theirs. It means, further, that Great Britain is in the first instance to bear the whole cost of the foreign policy of the Empire, while each Dominion may or may not afterwards refund its proportionate share, according to the mere good pleasure of its Parliament for the time being. Apart from these considerations, it is difficult to reconcile the claim to the retention of the "full powers of self-government" at present supposed to be enjoyed by the Dominions (and of which they are to surrender no shred) with the practical experience of the war. Not only are the Dominions in

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constitutional law at all times dependent upon and subordinate to the will of the Imperial Parliament, but we are now in many essential respects controlled and, in fact, governed by the Imperial Parliament. The British Government has commandeered our produce. It has taken away our ocean-going steamers and diverted many of them to our competitors in South America. It declared war, and will make peace (along with its Allies) on its own initiative. In New Zealand now we are living not under our own statute law, but under War Regulations in effect dictated by the Imperial authorities. And all this is as it should be, for there *must* be one body responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs and of the war, and that body (for all our talk of "Dominion autonomy") is, and remains, the Imperial Government. To carry the matter one stage further, it may not yet be clear to our politicians, but it has already become apparent to many of their fellow-citizens, that if the people of the Dominions are to share in the government of the Empire they must bear their personal share of its obligations, and further that there must be one elected body (responsible to all of them) charged with foreign relations and the making of war and peace. If that body is really to govern the Empire, it must have three powers—Legislation, Administration and Taxation. If it lacks any one of these three, it will really be impotent.

The foregoing comments apart, we have no doubt that our delegates did good work at the Conference, that their work in time will bear precious fruit, and that the citizens of this Dominion will ultimately derive lasting benefit through being represented as they were at the War Conference of 1917. The mere discussion in public and private of the claim (thus prematurely advanced) by our delegates for a share in the foreign policy of the Empire has done much to stimulate and even to educate the public mind here on the subject. Nay, we believe that the "plain man" in New Zealand, who has thought out the

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matter for himself, has come to sounder conclusions than many of the politicians. Unlike some of our rulers, he is not so much concerned with the privileges as with the responsibilities of Empire. He is gradually coming to understand that in Imperial affairs as in local concerns he can have no rights apart from corresponding duties, that for him there can be no representation without taxation.

It is beginning also to dawn upon many of us that to this vexed question of our "right" to share in Imperial governance there is a previous question. Are we in these Dominions yet fitted for Imperial rule? Are we prepared, are we in any true sense ready, to take up our share of the "White Man's Burden"? Can the Dominions, for example, fairly claim at present to take any part in ruling the great Dependencies? That question almost answers itself. Our only outward and visible effort in this direction so far has been—the passing of stringent anti-Asiatic legislation! Of the effect of that legislation on India we have had a recent and timely reminder from a casual visitor to this Dominion. Sir Henry Richards, Chief Justice of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, gave a brief address to the New Zealand Club at Wellington on June 12th, 1917. In the course of his remarks Sir Henry Richards made it very clear to his hearers (amongst whom were two Ministers of the Crown) that educated Indians had most decided objections to any Imperial Constitution in which the Colonies were to be given any voice in Indian matters. He quoted a native friend of his as saying: "The very notion of allowing the Dominions to have one word to say in our affairs is unthinkable. They are the people who refuse to allow Indians to land in their countries."

The truth about the whole matter is that it is too early in the day for anyone as yet to dogmatise as to the true nature of the constitutional changes that we promise ourselves after the war. So far we have not had either the knowledge

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or the leisure to realise the full import of any such changes upon the people of the Dominions. All that we know, all that we can thoroughly grasp at present, is the outstanding fact that Indian and Dominion representatives have for the first time sat together as equal partners in the Imperial Cabinet. In view of our knowledge of that inspiring fact, we should be content to repeat and endorse the eloquent words of Sir Robert Borden : " It is not for me to prophesy as to the future significance of these pregnant events ; but those who have given thought and energy to every effort for the full constitutional development of the oversea nations may be pardoned for believing that they discern therein the birth of a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth."

II. THE THIRD WAR BUDGET

THE Minister of Finance (Sir Joseph Ward) introduced his third War Budget on August 1st and is generally considered to have acquitted himself exceedingly well. It is true that the " Dominion " describes it as " a staggering Budget "—language at which anybody familiar with the colossal burdens cheerfully shouldered by the British taxpayer can only smile ; while, on the other hand, Labour, eager for " the conscription of wealth," laments the introduction of " another compromise Budget." But between these two extremes the average common sense of the country recognises that under much more difficult conditions than those of last year the Finance Minister has introduced a much better Budget.

A good general idea of the effect of the war upon our finances is given by the following table showing the revenue, the expenditure and the amount of the public debt during the three last complete financial years of peace and the three subsequent years, and also as estimated for the current year :

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<i>As at March 31.</i>	<i>Revenue.</i>	<i>Expenditure.</i>	<i>Public Debt.</i>
1912	11,061,161	10,340,368	82,193,310
1913	11,734,271	11,082,038	87,457,121
1914	12,229,661	11,825,864	91,689,835
1915	12,451,945	12,379,803	96,644,455
1916	14,510,137	12,493,107	105,957,433
1917	18,367,547	14,058,770	125,572,515
1918	17,262,800	16,082,702	150,322,515
(estimated)			

Thus during 1916-17 we had increased our revenue by £6,137,886, or by 50 per cent., as compared with the last year of peace, while the public debt had been increased by £33,882,680, or 37 per cent. The war was, of course, in each case the chief cause. A year ago Sir Joseph Ward estimated that the war would shortly be costing us over £1,000,000 a month; the present rate of expenditure is, he tells us, £1,900,000 a month. Last year he raised £16,000,000 for war purposes, of which £11,000,000 was locally subscribed. He now asks for authority to raise £24,000,000 for the purposes of the war. Our total war expenditure to June 30th last was £28,439,912, and the Minister estimates that by June 30th, 1918, it will have reached £50,000,000.

Of the £3,857,410 additional revenue raised last year no less than £2,870,007 came from the income-tax, customs with an increase of nearly half a million providing the next largest contribution. The trebling of the proceeds of the income-tax was the result of two changes, both of which, though the placing of the main burden upon the land and income commended itself to public opinion, were widely condemned. A war profits tax had been expected and promised, but when an excess profits tax appeared which was levied indiscriminately on all increases of income, whether or not the war had been a contributing cause, there was much disappointment. A 90 per cent. tax on real war profits would have given far greater satisfaction than the 45 per cent. actually imposed on profits which

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more often than not owed nothing to the war but had even been hindered by it.

Much less defensible was the proposal to increase a scientifically graduated income-tax by a uniform 1s. in the £, which was a direct inversion of the ordinary principle of graduation since it operated with special severity on the lower taxable incomes, representing a 150 per cent. increase at this end of the scale and tapering off to less than 40 per cent. at the other. The reduction of the increase to 6d. on incomes below £900 reduced the scope of the absurdity but did not alter its essence.

Both these anomalies are now removed. The excess profits tax is frankly abandoned as inequitable in its incidence and inadequate in its results. At the same time the experience of England, Canada and other countries is cited to prove that "the difficulties of ascertaining exactly the actual profits resulting from the war were almost insuperable." Incomes are to bear about £340,000 more than they did last year and land about £500,000 more, and in each case the result is to be arrived at not by grafting anomalies on to the graduated system existing before the war but by replacing it with a more scientific and uniform system. The principle of progressive graduation is to be applied throughout. The existing exemptions of £300 in the case of income and of £500 in the case of land, the unimproved value being in the latter case the criterion both for exemption and taxation, are retained. The income-tax will reach its maximum on an income of £6,400 and the land tax on an unimproved value of £192,000. The rates and the estimated proceeds of the new taxation are summarised as follows :—

	<i>Minimum Rate.</i>	<i>Maximum Rate.</i>	<i>Estimated Receipts.</i>
	s. d.	s. d.	£
Land Tax . . .	0 1½	0 10½	1,250,000
Ordinary Income-tax	0 6	3 0	1,600,000
Special War Tax .	0 9	4 6	3,000,000
			<u>5,850,000</u>

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Other features of the Budget are the rejection of the proposals of the National Efficiency Board for restricting the importation during the war of certain luxuries on the ground that we cannot afford the loss of revenue involved ; the imposition of an amusement tax on the lines of that imposed in Great Britain by the Finance (New Duties) Act, 1916, from which £80,000 is expected ; and an increase of the customs and excise duties on tea, beer, spirits, champagne, cigars, cigarettes, silks, satins, velvets, plushes and imitation silks, which is estimated to produce £275,000. The last of these estimates is, however, admittedly uncertain. "The Customs revenue for the present financial year is most difficult to estimate," says the Finance Minister. "The difficulties of transport, risks of loss, high freights and restrictions upon the exportation of many classes of goods from Great Britain make it impossible to measure with any degree of accuracy the volume of trade which will reach New Zealand while the war continues." Last year the Customs revenue was £3,849,675, exceeding the estimate by more than half a million and beating all previous records. The causes were the great appreciation of the values of goods subject to *ad valorem* duties and the increase of imports following on a check during the previous year. The immense increase in the value of our exports made this appreciation of imported articles easy to bear. The necessities of Europe have brought an unexampled prosperity to our producing industries. Our exports, which in the last calendar year before the war were valued at £22,986,722, had risen in 1916 to £33,286,937—an advance of nearly 50 per cent. The storage of shipping, which has accumulated more than 3,000,000 carcases of mutton and beef in our ports and more cheese than there is storage for, is now threatening a check to this unnatural prosperity.

Progress of Compulsory Service

III. PROGRESS OF COMPULSORY SERVICE

WHEN Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward reached London less than a year ago the Military Service Act which had been passed during the session of 1916 had not been put into operation, and they were hoping that the necessity would not arise. They returned to Wellington on June 26 to find that the ninth ballot under the Act was in progress ; that in addition to thousands of volunteers more than 10,000 men had cheerfully answered to the compulsory call ; that the exhaustion of the First Division had been so nearly reached that it had been found advisable to abolish voluntary enlistment from this Division except that men not yet of military age were to be allowed a month in which to volunteer after reaching that age ; and that the country was calmly contemplating the extension of the call to the Second Division of married men in the course of a few months. Great indeed had been the revolution peacefully wrought in the ways of this democracy during the ten months' absence of the Prime Minister and his colleague, and they were handsome in their acknowledgment of the credit due to Sir James Allen for the great responsibilities which as Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Defence he had courageously and successfully discharged. Unfortunately, however, it cannot be said that they have been altogether judicious in the help they have since given him in his task. Replying on July 6 to a deputation of protests against the curtailment of the railway services which has been carried out in order to release more men for the front, Sir Joseph Ward said : "The only thing that passes through my mind is that we shall have to consider how much further this country can go in sending men at all. . . . The time will come—I cannot say when—when it may not be possible to let any more men go." Mr. Massey, who was also present at the inter-

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view, spoke to the same effect. He also said, however, that, while he was in England, the authorities made a special appeal to him for more men at the beginning of the year ; and that, if we were going to win the war within a reasonable time, then it would only be by a tremendous effort on the part of every country in the Empire.

Despite this qualification the interview had an unfortunate effect in suggesting the possibility of a reversal of the declared policy of the Dominion in regard to reinforcements. Sincere but weak-kneed patriots in both Houses were not slow to take the hint and improve upon it by urging that New Zealand could best serve the Empire by concentrating on the production of food and that the limit of her capacity to export fighting men without injury to this more important function was rapidly approaching or had already been reached. Talk of this kind came as a severe shock to men who had paid little heed to the handful of anti-Imperialists anxious to see the Dominion leave the war alone, but had been pleased to see some of the ring-leaders put under lock and key for speeches or writings of a seditious tendency or calculated to interfere with recruiting. So far as the two Ministers were concerned the public was glad to find that they had evidently spoken without full deliberation or consultation with their colleagues ; for the mind of the Government as promptly declared in answer to the Parliamentary critics above mentioned by Sir James Allen and Sir Francis Bell, and subsequently by Mr. Massey himself, left nothing to be desired.

Speaking in the House of Representatives, Sir James Allen said that we should be false to our pledges to the Empire, false to ourselves, false to our men in the trenches, and false to those who have fallen if we failed to keep the main bodies of the Expeditionary Force fully reinforced. Excluding the Samoan Force, we had, he said, sent about 74,000 men to the front, and there were 10,000 more in training ; there had been over 26,000 casualties, and 7,500 of the men who had gone overseas would never see New

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Zealand again. "The spirit of these men," said Sir James Allen, "whose bodies lie in many places of the globe call to us to-day, 'Keep up the main bodies to their full strength until the war is won.'" To a Socialist interjector, who suggested that this policy might "bleed New Zealand white," the Minister replied :

"Bleed New Zealand white," says someone. Sir, if we were to lose this war would not New Zealand bleed to death ? It would be a worse bleeding than the bleeding that will take place even by the sacrifice of our sons.

After a glowing tribute to the balloted men as having "played the game" in camp and as "actuated by the same spirit as the volunteers, though mostly weighted by heavier responsibilities," Sir James Allen disposed of the shabby plea that the United States would settle the business in a fine passage :

If they had 5,000,000 of men I, as a New Zealander, would be ashamed if we were to ask the Mother Country to permit us to withdraw our men from their mates of the British and French Armies who are fighting with them for the honour of New Zealand and the glory of the Empire, and to secure peace, justice and righteousness after the war. I want our men to be in at the finish, and I say it is their duty to be there when the last stage is enacted in the horrible drama which is taking place to-day.

In the Legislative Council, Sir Francis Bell, the Leader of the Council, was roused to a pitch of eloquence rarely equalled in that assembly by the plea of an eminent runholder, supported by an ex-High Commissioner, for the export of sheep instead of men. After quoting the message dispatched by the Governor to His Majesty at the beginning of the war declaring New Zealand's readiness "to make any sacrifice to maintain her heritage and her birthright," and the terms of the declaration of "inflexible determination" to carry on the war which had been

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twice passed unanimously by both Houses of Parliament, Sir Francis Bell proceeded :

Yes, sir, "ny sacrifice" and "inflexible resolution"—but when the point has arrived that something of our convenience and comfort is to be sacrificed, the determination of the Hon. Mr. Ormond and the Hon. Sir William Hall Jones becomes flexible at once. . . . Any sacrifice of someone else ; no sacrifice of convenience or comfort of ourselves. . . . Well, sir, at all events I who speak here am solemnly bound by those engagements that I have read. If our promise is no longer to be the measure of our obligation, then let some other men dishonour our word and the promise that we have made. We were the first country—the first dominion of the Empire—to enter upon German soil. We have that to our credit. Shall we be the first to quit, and have that to our lasting dishonour and disgrace ? And, sir, the third anniversary is approaching. Are those who have spoken prepared to seal a message of shame, or will the honourable gentlemen on the third anniversary move an amendment to the twice-repeated resolution ? Shall we not again say that our determination is inflexible, or shall we admit that it is flexible, and that our time for abandonment has come, and that we have had enough ?

Mr. Massey has since roused the cheers of a public meeting by the blunt declaration that we cannot leave our men at the front in the lurch and that we are not going to do it. The patriotism of the country, which had been feeling very sorry for itself, has now quite recovered, and is no longer haunted by the fear of dishonouring the immortal memory of Anzac.

Sir James Allen made a further statement on the subject on August 7 when he informed the House that he had received a telegram from the Imperial Government to say that New Zealand might reduce its reinforcements from 15 to 12 per cent., which will mean a reduction of the four-weekly drafts from about 2,400 to 1,920. The announcement has been received with general satisfaction. The only ground for uneasiness was the possibility that the Army Council had not had quite the same free hand in the

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matter as it had certainly had hitherto. The position was thus summed up by the *Evening Post* on August 8 :

One is, therefore, compelled to regard the result with a doubtful mind and mingled feelings. If the message from the War Office was inspired by purely military considerations, the alleviation of the Dominion's burden without prejudice to the men in the field is a matter for unmixed congratulation. If, on the other hand, the alleviation is the outcome of political wirepulling, if our own Government has engineered it by way of compromise with those who were prepared to see the country violate its pledges because other parts of the Empire had failed in their duty, the result is to be deeply deplored. If Sir James Allen's stubborn patriotism argues against the second alternative, his failure to produce the whole correspondence suggests an unpleasant doubt. So far, at any rate, as he is personally concerned, one may feel absolutely certain that he has done the best that the circumstances allowed.

New Zealand. August, 1917.

Progress of Compulsory Service

Report on the progress of the compulsory service in the various countries of the world, with special reference to the United States.

The progress of compulsory service in the various countries of the world has been the subject of much discussion and investigation. The United States has been particularly interested in the progress of compulsory service in other countries, and has made many efforts to learn more about it. The following is a summary of the progress of compulsory service in the various countries of the world, with special reference to the United States.

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U. S. Army, 1917.





